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2 Abstract
Despite ever growing international trade and dispute settlement, a consistent 
international methodology of uniform private law has yet to be formed.  This is 
needed in order to encourage the use of existing uniform transnational law rules 
specifically designed for application to international commercial contracts.
This study examines uniform contract law in legal methodology and considers the 
barriers which exist toward it in modern nation states.  It explores ways in which 
these barriers can be overcome and considers whether it is thereby possible to 
create a specific methodology of international contract law. 
Through exploring these three areas, this thesis intends to distinguish and analyse 
the main obstacles to the application of uniform contract law.  The study is 
therefore organized into three sections, each exploring one of those methodological 
obstacles and providing solutions for overcoming them.
Part One discusses the barriers erected by traditional theories of contract law. Part 
Two addresses the attitude taken by national lawyers when applying uniform law 
and enquires how this attitude is formed.  This section also asks why this attitude 
provides an obstacle to the success of uniform law and considers ways in which it 
could be changed.  Part Three, the third and final section considers the treatment 
of uniform contract law in the context of conflict of laws.  This section also asks 
how seemingly opposite positions in the modern and traditional theory of private 
international law can be reconciled and considers the ways in which uniform 
contract law can be applied within a domestic law context as lex contractus.
3The author argues that the points of resistance identified can be tackled by 
developing an autonomous methodology of interpretation of transnational contract 
principles; and, by treating model sets of transnational contract principles as a 
form of lex specialis.  Overall, the thesis seeks to demonstrate that the potential of 
the UPICC has not yet been fully recognised, and that barriers to such recognition 
are not insurmountable.
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The remarkable pace at which the global exchange of goods, services and
information develops, leads to new challenges for those who deal with contract
law, both on a national and international level.  Namely, the law relating to
commercial contracts is an area of growing interest.
Both the formal, and the so-called, "soft law", legislation relating to cross-
border trade have attracted great interest in the past ten years in legal
scholarship and practice.  This area of law has thereby become more accessible
through the first publication the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts, by the UNIDROIT Institute in Rome, in 1994, and
other publications on the "New Lex Mercatoria", providing lists and overviews
of current laws and model laws and similar.1  The term which describes the
thereby highlighted type of law is often 'transnational', or 'a-national’, uniform
contract law.  The subject has also been successfully integrated into legal
education, following recommendations by scholars at many international
conferences throughout the last ten years.  Even so, the prevailing views of
jurisprudence, judiciary and legislative organs in most European states do not
agree with the underlying theories.  Instead, national legislators tend to remain
focused on internal markets and participants within the home territory.
                                                 
1
  See for instance K.P. Berger:  "The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria", 1999.
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As a result, transnational uniform contract law is not used as widely as it could
be, and this therefore, leads to a shortfall in the potential of international trade
law as a whole.
2. Research questions and structure of the thesis
This thesis explores the questions concerning barriers to the use of uniform
contract law in the area of legal methodology which exist in modern nation
states, how these can be overcome, and if it is thereby possible to create a
specific methodology of international contract law.  In answering those
questions, three obstacles to the application of uniform contract law are to be
distinguished and analysed in this thesis.
The study is therefore organised into three parts; each one exploring one of the
methodological obstacles and providing answers to the question of how they
can be overcome.  Part One discusses barriers erected by the traditional theory
of contract law.  Part Two analyses the attitude taken by national lawyers when
applying uniform law and asks how this attitude is formed, why it provides an
obstacle to the success of such law, and how it could be changed.  Part Three
deals with the position of uniform law in the context of the conflict of laws,
which has a gateway function in relation to the integration of uniform law into
domestic legal systems, especially in international arbitration proceedings.
This section also asks how seemingly opposite positions from the modern and
traditional theories of private international law can be reconciled and how
uniform contract law can be applied within a domestic law context as lex
contractus .
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The arising questions of international legal methodology in parts two and three
of the thesis are dealt with through examples, namely, the application of rules
of the UPICC within domestic legal systems, specifically the English and the
German law relating to international construction contracts.
This choice was made with a view to answering the arising questions in a
specific rather than general way and facilitating more concrete results.  This
choice is also intended to balance the extensive treatment which matters of
international sales law have received in the past, due to the existence of the
Vienna Sales Convention and preceding uniform sales law sets.  It responds to
the wider scope of the UPICC which covers commercial contracts rather than
just sales contracts.
Within European legal systems, the German and the English legal system differ
most from each other.  English law shows the Anglo-American approach to
social and commercial matters in its purest and original form, while German
law displays the opposite end of the most distinguished historic polarities
among the world's established legal systems.  Together with Austria and
Switzerland, Germany has a continental legal tradition preserving some
extremely scholastic features.  One could say it represents the heart of Europe’s
legal tradition in an undiluted way. Reference to German and English law
therefore provides interesting examples for highlighting typical problems
arising from cross-border commercial activities.
This study therefore focuses on aspects of international contract law which are
analysed under English and German domestic laws but nevertheless are
significant beyond those systems. This allows the presentation of results of a
universal character by carrying out a very detailed analysis of individual
questions.
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3. The subject matter:  Transnational uniform contract law
Legislation regulating international commercial contracts takes at least three
different forms; that of domestic law dealing with international matters,
international law constituted by interstate negotiation such as bilateral treaties
and uniform law rules providing a common textual basis for application in
several states such as the Vienna Sales Convention (CISG), or the UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts.2   The latter type is subject
to analysis in this study, particularly the method of applying such rules of law.
One of the institutions that contributes to the foundations of the legal
framework of international trade and especially uniform law is the UNIDROIT
Institute, (International Institute for the Unification of Private Law), in Rome.
This institute is an independent international organisation with its seat in
Rome. It was founded in 1926 as part of the institution of the League of
Nations.  In 1940, it was reconstituted by a multilateral convention which is
now the charter of UNIDROIT.  As of 1996, there are 58 state members of
UNIDROIT. Although funded by its member states, it is not a political body.
It can therefore operate according to scientific rather than political standards.
Its task is to assess the possibility of harmonisation and coordination of private
law originating from different sources, and also to gradually provide and
prepare (draft), uniform private law rules for adoption by its member states and
other interested parties.
                                                 
2
  Hereinafter referred to as UPICC.
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UNIDROIT has drafted about seventy studies and drafts concerning areas of
law such as sales, credit arrangements, transportation, liability, as well as the
law relating to procedure and travel.  Some of its model laws and draft
conventions have been accepted on international diplomatic conferences and
have subsequently been implemented into domestic law.  Others exist as model
laws for reference of all kinds, such as law reform projects or arbitration.
Examples for conventions based on UNIDROIT`s work are:
- The 1964 Hague Convention on Uniform Sales Contracts and the Sales
Convention
- The 1970 Brussels Convention on Travel Contracts
- The 1983 Geneva Convention on Agency, (Sales of Movables)
- The 1988 Ottawa International Leasing Convention
- The 1988 Ottawa Factoring Convention
Some other international organisations have also based their drafts on
UNIDROIT suggestions such as the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention (CISG),
issued by UNCITRAL, the United Nations' trade law commission.  The
platform that UNIDROIT provides is not a political one, but predominantly a
purely scientific one. This is seen as a guarantee for a special quality of the
outcome of its work.
The UNIDROIT Principles for International Commercial Contracts3  are one
of several sets of international uniform private law rules.  Although not
                                                 
3
 Published by UNIDROIT, 1994 and 2004. The black letter rules can also be obtained
from the internet, (Unidroit homepage / UNIDROIT Principles Main Page), the complete
version including the comments which are meant to be an integral part thereof, can be obtained
from UNIDROIT, 28 Via Panisperna. 00184 Rome, Italy, e-mail: unidroit.rome@unidroit.org;
ISBN 88-86449-00-3: hereinafter UPICC.
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formally law, they are a source of law of a certain quality.4  In this study, they
serve to exemplify the application of transnational law in a national law setting.
The UPICC were first published in 1994, and were supplemented by five new
chapters in April 2004; they were the outcome of research which had been
carried out over many years.  They provide rules for international contracts of
all kind, not just for sales contracts, as for example, the CISG or the Hague
conventions do.
In its 2004 edition, the UPICC consisted of ten chapters: General Provisions,
Formation, Validity, Interpretation, Content, Performance, Non-Performance,
Set-Off, Assignment, and Limitation Periods.  The UPICC are intended to
serve as a reference for many purposes.  They have proved to be useful to
lawyers in contract drafting, as well as in international arbitration where they
serve as "general principles of law" often referred to in international contracts.5
The UPICC do not have the force of law in any country since they have never
been accepted on any diplomatic conference or otherwise been implemented
into national law.  They have, however, already served as a model for the
creation of law reform projects such as the new Dutch Civil Code, as well as in
some Eastern Countries for rebuilding civil law after the end of the Cold War,
(eg. Hungary).  UNIDROIT provide regular updates and briefings on the status
quo of the principles by way of a database, conferences and its quarterly
publication, "Uniform Law Review".
                                                 
4
 Compare infra Part Three, (Chapters Six, Seven and Eight).
5
  cf. for example Eurotunnel v. Balfour Beatty.  [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 7 (C.A.); [1993] 1
Lloyd's Rep. 291 (H.L.)
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PART ONE
GENERAL ASPECTS OF UNIFORM PRIVATE
LAW: JURISPRUDENTIAL CATEGORIES AND
PURPOSE
INTRODUCTION
Part One of the thesis identifies the impeding effect of traditional general
doctrines of contract and conflict law within nation states on the application of
uniform contract law.  Chapter One asks what these concepts are, and where
the position of uniform contract law is, in this context?  Chapter Two asks why
uniformity of law is needed, and to what extent, and how, uniform contract law
can be defined?  Thereby, the first part of the thesis examines the generic
quality and definition of the phenomenon of uniform contract law on a general
doctrinal level, as it is a relatively new term in legal theory and still not subject
to intense and systematic cross-border analysis.  The question in Part One, is
how barriers against the use of transnational law arising from traditional legal
theory can be overcome, by suggesting a modern and novel approach to
existing concepts which will allow the accommodation of a doctrine of
transnational uniform contract law.
The concepts of harmonisation and unification are more than just instantaneous
policies in the current political body of the EU, but rather, are a reflection of
the values of societies in their time.  The transformation of these phenomena
from concepts of arts, music and philosophy, deeply rooted in Western culture,
into suitable tools in legal science and practice is not normally reflected very
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well in the literature.  It involves an analysis of the use of terminology in the
legal sciences in general.  The development and use of scientific terminology is
a discipline in its own right which plays a decisive role in the development of a
modern branch of legal science,6 dealing with private law rules on an
international level, and thereby forming the legal basis for cross-border
commercial activity.  An evaluation of this use of language through a review of
relevant literature in this field 7 provides two insights: firstly, it reveals very
vague usage of the expressions, harmonisation and unification of laws, a use of
language which is not normally employed in the law and legal science.
Secondly, the expression harmonisation serves to disguise the process of
uniform-isation, reference to which is avoided due to its political relevance.8
The idea of unity plays a profound role in western history of thought, history,
                                                 
6
   H. Brinckmann: “Juristische Fachsprache als Wissenschaftssprache?”  70-71; D. Busse:
"Juristische Semantik: Grundfragen der juristischen Interpretationstheorie in
sprachwissenschaftlicher Sicht" Vol. 157, 1993.
G. Frege:   "Conceptual Notation and related articles", 1972; C.S. Haight: “Babel Afloat:
Some Reflections on Uniformity in Maritime Law”, Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce
28.2, (1997): 189-205; K. Hyland: “Scientific Claims and Community Values: Articulation in
an Academic Culture”, Language & Communication - an interdisciplinary journal 17, (1997):
13-31; B.S. Jackson:   "Making Sense in Jurisprudence", Vol. 5,1996; B.S. Jackson:   "Making
Sense in Law", Vol. 4, 1995; B.S. Jackson:  "Semiotics and legal theory", 1985; M. Jefferson:
“Comparing the proper law and the law applicable”, Student Law review 9, sum (1993): 16-19;
M. Kramm. “Rechtsnorm und semantische Eindeutigkeit.”, Doctoral thesis.  Erlangen-
Nürnberg, 1970; U. Ladnar, and C.V. Plottnitz, eds.  "Fachsprache der Justiz", 1977; S.
Levinson:  “Law as Literature,”   155-173; S. Levinson, and S. Mailloux, eds.  "Interpreting
Law and Literature: a Hermeneutic Reader", 1988; D. Mellinkoff:   "The Language of the
Law", 1963; Paulsen: “An Historical Overview of the Development of Uniformity in
International Maritime Law”, Tulane Law Review 57, (1983): 1065 et seq.; A. Podlech:  “Die
juristische Fachsprache und die Umgangssprache”; H. Weinrich:  “Sprache und Wissenschaft.”
7
  A range of publications prepared in the course of the Twenty Fifth Annual Workshop on
Commercial and Consumer Law: "Harmonisation and Change" at Faculty of Law, University
of Toronto may serve as a useful starting point together with a selection of other general
publications on this question:
 M. Boodman: “The Myth of Harmonisation of Laws.” AmJCompL (1991): 699; G. Frege:
"Conceptual Notation and related articles", 1972; H.P. Glenn: “Harmonisation of law, foreign
law and private international law,” European Review of Private International Law 1 (1993):
47-66; H.P. Glenn:  “Unification of Law, Harmonisation of Law and Private International
Law.”   783 et seq; J.Ziegel, ed.  D.W. Leebron: "Lying down with Procrustes: an analysis of
harmonisation claims", 1995.  1-61; S. Levinson, and S. Mailloux, eds. "Interpreting Law and
Literature: a Hermeneutic Reader", 1988; A. Rosett: “Unification, Harmonisation,
Restatement, Codification and Reform in International Commercial Law.” AmJCompL 40
(1992): 683.
8
  It implies assuming a centralised power at the expense of sovereignty of other political
entities.
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philosophy, and subsequently, politics.  Nevertheless legal science does not
assign a high priority to explaining its meaning and potential.  The significance
of unity and creating uniformity in the law needs to be understood in a wider
context than that of the immediate background usually seen when used in
current trade law or European Union institutional law.  Harmonisation is a
euphemism and means uniform-isation.  This is the meaning I am attaching to
it in this study.
Another insight is that the notion of diversity of laws which is presupposed by
harmonisation efforts remains unquestioned.  Legal processes cannot arrive at
suitable conclusions, however, without analysing this notion, too.  Unity and
diversity are naturally opposites and create tension when occurring
simultaneously, as with the phenomenon of transnational law facing domestic
legal systems or vice versa.
Therefore, this study highlights the transition between the two spheres and
suggests ways of reconciling unity and diversity in the law.
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CHAPTER ONE
Diversity in the law
“From our point of view the illusion is not the international unification of the
law.  On the contrary, it is the refusal to contemplate unification and the desire
to preserve law as strictly an instrument of state power and thus divided among
the states;”9
Chapter One investigates the concept of the diversity of laws between nation
states as a logical pre-requisite for unity of laws10 by contrasting traditional
legal theory with modern concepts.
Three aspects are discussed in this chapter; the role of the state ascertaining
sovereignty in the area of private law (I.1.), the role of the substantive contract
law itself (I.2.), and the role of the individual contracting party (I.3.).  The
chapter thereby analyses the current position of uniform law in general contract
law doctrine and in the conflict of laws, namely, what the role of party
autonomy is when it comes to choosing transnational law rules as the law
governing the contract.
I.1. Sovereignty of states and the role of private law
This section examines the relationship between the notion of sovereignty of
nation states and private law in general in current legal doctrine.  It asks
                                                 
9
   René  David. “The Methods of Unification”, Am.J.Comp.L. 16 (1968): 13 seq., p.14.
10
  To be examined in Chapter Two below.
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whether transnational (non-state), contract law can be a legitimate source of
law within a sovereign nation state.  It asks what the role of the state is in
dealing with such law rules, of which the UPICC are an example; and whether
sovereignty as a defining aspect of nation states is necessarily an argument
against a source of law function of transnational law.
In the following section, three different aspects are discussed; instances where
states demonstrate their sovereignty directly by acts affecting international
trade (I.1.1.), instances where they do so towards individuals in private
dealings (I.1.2.), and thirdly where the question of whether law and state
necessarily form an alliance and cannot be separated from each other: the
doctrine of unity of law and state, with the state as the sole source of law
(I.1.3.).
This analysis serves to answer the question of the correct definition of contract
law compared to other national law according to its specific nature, history and
function.  As far as transnational uniform law is contract law, too, its role and
nature within national law can be determined by these findings.  The majority
of the literature on harmonisation and unification of laws introduce an image of
laws as separate entities which can be unified or harmonised, in order to create
a whole new entity, or a bundle of entities.11  It makes sense to stay with this
picture and continue using this game of metaphors.  Traditional legal doctrine
upholds the opinion that laws are such entities and that these are formed
exclusively by state power.  The border lines between the laws coincide with
the political borders between the states according to this view.  The above
quoted opinion of the comparative lawyer disagrees with this view and calls it
an illusion.  The image of laws as individual entities implies that there are clear
                                                 
11
 Compare B. Fauvarque-Cosson: “Comparative Law and Conflict of Laws: Allies or
Enemies? New Perspectives on an Old Couple.” AmJCompL 49 (2001): 407-428, eg. p.416.
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border lines or distinctions between them.  To the extent that domestic legal
borders are effectively crossed, however, and the dividing lines between laws
blurred, the image looses its persuasive force.
In the area of contract law, states express and define the distinctiveness of their
legal systems in relation to those of other states by two main factors; the
approach towards the application of foreign law ( I.2.), and the extent of party
autonomy ( I.3.), embodied in choice of law rules.
Traditional legal doctrines of the sources of law in both the English and the
German jurisdictions,12 representing typical common law and continental
jurisdictions, presuppose that the force of law flowing from, or equalling state
power is an expression of the sovereignty of states.
This forms a great impediment for the development of legal doctrine towards
the integration of transnational law as an important tool in international
commercial dispute settlement.  It is this limiting understanding governing
current legislation governing choice of law and commercial arbitration in both
countries.  Modern legislation has still not incorporated a clear admission of
transnational legal regimes into domestic law.13   Transnational legal rules are
disputed as to their nature as sources of law both in a formal and substantive
sense. 14
The agreed terminology in choice of law matters is, "law" including
transnational law rules and "rules of law" referring exclusively to state law.15
                                                 
12
  Although their viewpoints are not genuinely the same due to historic reasons.
13
  See Part Three for further discussion.
14
  Compare Chapters Six and Seven.
15
  Eg. in the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, in Art. 28
EGBGB or in the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1989, see VII.1.2.
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This distinction determines whether or not a regime such as the UPICC can be
stipulated governing law (kollisionsrechtliche Verweisung), by contracting
parties, or merely as contractual clauses, (materiellrechtliche Verweisung).
Due to the nature of contract law regulating the legal relationships between
private individuals, the strict combination of state power (sovereignty), and
legitimacy of law rules is particularly questionable in this area of law.
This section describes the role of the state in private law and points out aspects
of legitimacy which are relevant for establishing a revised understanding of the
prospective role of transnational law rules in national contract law, conflict of
laws, and the law governing commercial arbitration.  A detailed account of the
current law governing these matters in relation to the application of the UPICC
is provided in Part Three.
It is not the subject of this study to treat all issues of legal theory to be brought
up in the course of this chapter exhaustively, but to rather, to present and
discuss relevant matters forming a pragmatic approach to integrating
transnational law into domestic contract law, on both the doctrinal,16 and the
practical,17 level of application.  This process of recollecting and revisiting is a
formative element of a suggested novel doctrine of international uniform
private law.18
                                                 
      
16
  Chapter One.
      
17
  Chapter Two.
      
18
  Compare Part Two at III.2.
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I.1.1.  Assertion of sovereignty in international trade
The most prominent and rigid method for a state to exercise power in areas of
the private law are by regulatory acts directly affecting contractual agreements.
This is done through rules of competition law, anti-dumping legislation, taxes
and tariffs, and also at times, through embargoes.  An example is provided by
the "Russian Pipeline Case", referred to by Maier. 19  Here, the United States
government relied on judicial measures to balance their national interest
against that of another state (the USSR), - a situation which could have been
(and eventually was), resolved by way of diplomacy.  Here the U.S. asserted a
claim of authority over (both U.S. and foreign), private individuals, and trading
activities by issuing a ban of certain goods manufactured in the U.S.20  This
affected the trading activities and interest of non-U.S. companies involved in
the same deal and also banned equipment produced by foreign subsidiaries of
U.S. companies, as well as their licensees.21 Thus U.S. jurisdiction was
exercised internationally outside their territory.  European states protested
against these measures and encouraged firms to comply with contractual
agreements regardless of the governmental and presidential orders.  This shows
what role sovereignty can play in private law and how states can directly
exercise authority over individuals interfering with private activities.
However, the prevailing interest of the international political and trading
community is to guarantee "a system that would lend support to the reliability
of transnational contracts and reaffirm the authority and responsibility of
                                                 
19
  H.G. Maier. “Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction.” Am.J.Comp.L. 31
(1983): 579-597. See also P. Hay: “Zur extraterritorialen Anwendung US-amerikanischen
Rechts.” Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 60 (1996): 303-
319.
20
  U.S. government decision of 29 December, 1981.
21
   Decision by President Reagan of 18 June 1982, acting under Export Administration
Act 1979, Pub.L No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (1979);  see H.G. Maier. “Interest Balancing and
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction.” Am.J.Comp.L. 31 (1983): 579-597, fn3.
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sovereign states to plot their own economic and political destinies", rather than,
"to create ...the expectation that a single nation ...could legitimately pressure
foreign business entities to act contrary to the perceived interests of their host
or national states".22  This view was supported at the time by a number of
public statements and comments in newspapers in all countries involved. "The
possibility of an adverse impact on the reliability of contracts was a common
criticism of the sanctions on both sides of the Atlantic..." 23
The example illustrates the power of the idea of private law.
I.1.2.  Assertion of sovereignty towards the private individual
In a domestic context a state's sovereignty materialises as a supreme power
subordinating the private individual, (hoheitliches Handeln).  This is reflected
by the concept of "hierarchy of norms" within the domestic legal system,24  as
well as, specifically in German legal theory, the further distinction between
private and public law.  According to the latter, a rule forms part of public law
if and when it concerns a legal relationship between parties, one of whom is
subordinate to the other.  This subordination is seen as a typical feature created
by the state’s authority towards the private individual.  Private law, as opposed
                                                 
22
  H.G. Maier. “Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction.” Am.J.Comp.L. 31
(1983): 579-597, p.586. This statement emphasises the need of independence in international
trade as well as its significance within international law. It does not see the international
merchant as a “state-free”, “a-national” actor.
23
  See H.G. Maier. “Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction.” Am.J.Comp.L.
31 (1983): 579-597, fn 26.
24
  Compare also G. Teubner: “Breaking Frames: Economic Globalisation and the
Emergence of the Lex Mercatoria”, European Journal of Social Theory 5.2 (2002): 199-217, at
p.199 and 206. This concept does, however, perhaps not apply to the same extent in every
state, namely to a lesser extent in common law countries, see also below.
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to that, exists on a level of equality between the individuals involved.25  Rules
of administrative, procedural, criminal, and public international law qualify as
public and often embody the state's function in the field of enforcement by
sanctions, penalties, punishment etc.  State and individual are on equal terms,
however, if and when a state acts privately, eg. concluding building or sales
contracts when private law rules are binding to state parties.26  Nevertheless,
imposing duties unilaterally on the individual, backed by fines and measures of
enforcement which go beyond the legal capacities of private individuals,27 is
considered one of the characteristic ways of state acting.  Its nature is
fundamentally different from private acting so that state involvement in
contract law often involves specialised procedures and rules.28
How 'private', ie. how autonomous, can private law be, given that due to the
territorial distribution of the earth, all private acting necessarily takes place in a
state?
I.1.3.  Unity of law and state:  The state as the sole source of law?
                                                 
25
  For details see Münchner Kommentar, "Einleitung", No. 3. The theory of
subordination is applied by the Federal Court: BGHZ 14, 222,227 = NJW 1954, 1486; BGHZ
27, 283; 66,229,233seq; 67, 81, 84; 97,312,314; 102,280,283 and by its predecessor,  the
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 This distinction has received “formal recognition” in England in 1982 in O‘Reilley v.
Mackman.  [1983] 2 AC 237.
  Similar view expressed in Australian High Court (1988) 165 CLR 30, Spycatcher Case:
equitable duties qualified public law since they had been generated by the relationship between
the British Government and (ex-agent) Peter Wright. The distinction public-private law proved
vital in deciding the question whether the British Government’s legal position was enforceable
in Australia.
In Germany, The nature of the public legal rule rather than any specific legal effect
resulting there-from is subject to intense scholarly discussion.
See Chapter Seven for discussion of contracts with state parties in commercial arbitration.
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  Such as taxation rules.
28
  See Chapter Seven for further discussion; another example is public procurement
procedures regulating state involvement in contractual relationships. For an overview over
modern developments in international procurement law see S. Arrowsmith: “Public
Procurement: An Appraisal of the UNCITRAL Model Law as a Global Standard.” ICLQ 53
(2004): 17-46.
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The notion of unity of law and state can be perceived as the identity of law and
territory.  It can also mean the state being the sole source of law.  The latter
concept is closely related to that of positivism.
I.1.3.1.  Territorial matters and the paradox of contract law
If a state's legal sphere of influence regarding private law is deemed congruent
with its territory it follows that its geographical boundaries define the dividing
line between domestic law and foreign law:
"Boundaries evidence the extent of State sovereignty and form the limits of the
operations of the domestic legal system. They demarcate the territorial
framework within which jurisdiction is established and exercised" 29
The principle uti possidetis iuris stems from land law, i.e. private law and has
Roman origins. "...it operated as an interdict of the Praetor by which the
disturbance of the existing state of possession of immovables as between two
individuals was forbidden.  Uti possidetis ita possideatis."30  The territory of a
state can thus be conceived as the whole of its 'immovable property' in relation
to other 'individuals', (sovereign states).  Ownership of the territory then forms
the state rather than the more abstract social and political entity commonly
understood to form a 'nation'.  Legislative power which is understood to be
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  M.N. Shaw. “The Heritage of States: the Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris Today.” The
British Yearbook of International Law 67 (1996): 75-154, p.77.
30
 M.N. Shaw. “The Heritage of States: the Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris Today.” The
British Yearbook of International Law 67 (1996): 75-154, p. 99.
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directly and exclusively derived from the state is thus also confined to its
territory.
This land related concept has for long been supported by the fact that a single
person such as a king, duke or emperor, was the sovereign who owned the
territory.  As long as states are regarded to be sovereign and distinct, their laws
can thereby be regarded to be distinct in the same way, meaning that the
borders of the legal systems run along the geographical borders of the states.
Contemporary private law in western states, however, has developed in close
relation with the formation of the nation state as a historic process.31  The
direct link between the sovereignty of states and the distinctiveness of laws
could thus be seen by the fact that the legitimacy of law is created separately
and individually by political communities in each state.  In a modern pluralistic
state the feudalistic conception of legislation lacks an equivalent in that
legislative power is exercised on the basis of majority decisions and impersonal
institutions.  The 'sovereign will' is not clearly recognisable anymore as the will
of a single person.  The state, representing a 'unit' (for the purposes of the
metaphoric game in this section32), will give law from a single source
coinciding with a now rather abstract central power.  This understanding
however, even in states where sovereignty is attributed to 'the people' rather
than to a monarch, still seems to presuppose a conception or image of a
sovereign in the traditional sense.  In practice, law is often presented as
originating from the personal work of a person (minister), or a small body of
people, conceived as an entity (party, law commission).33  It is an attempt to
give the source of law a face and to re-personalise it.  Apparently the idea of
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  Roberto Hayder: "Privatrechtsvereinheitlichung durch die Europäische Gemeinschaft -
Kommentar zum Vortrag von Hans Claudius Taschner", in "Gemeinsames Privatrecht in der
Europäischen Gemeinschaft", Peter-Christian Müller-Graff, Editor. 1993, Nomos: Baden-
Baden. p. 167-170.
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  Compare  I.1.
33
  U.W. Saxer:   "Die Zukunft des Nationalstaates" Vol. 6, 1994, p.14/15.
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‘unity’ of source has a strong attraction even in a pluralistic society, preserving
the concept of unity of law and state and that of the hierarchy of norms like a
centre of gravitation.
In the area of private law, this nevertheless deserves further consideration since
private law is addressed to private individuals who tend to go beyond territories
in modern times marked by 'globalisation'.  Individuals make use of (state
guaranteed), party autonomy, and they are also more and more seen as subjects
in international relations and law.  There are more instances where they can
acquire personal individual rights to claim under international conventions
before international courts, and individuals are often seen as the "generator of
political power and actions":  "...international relations and law are generated
by the people, or more specifically, the individuals and groups which constitute
states." 34
This simultaneous occurrence of the doctrine of unity of law and state on the
one hand, and an increasingly autonomous international legal practice35
created by individuals exercising party autonomy on the other, presents
contract law in a paradoxical situation .
The traditional concept of the relationship between law and state seems to fit
particularly badly, therefore, for contract law.  The paradox occurs in three
respects: first, regarding the simultaneous occurrence of subordination typical
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  B.F. Fitzgerald. “An Emerging Liberal Theory of International Law and the Non-
Enforcement of Foreign Public Laws”, Australian Yearbook of International Law 16 (1995):
311-325, p.311.
35
  Eg. Carried out by international arbitration courts, trade associations or other agencies
providing legal services. See Chapters Seven and Eight for further discussion. Compare also G.
Teubner: “Breaking Frames: Economic Globalisation and the Emergence of the lex
mercatoria.” European Journal of Social Theory 5.2 (2002): 199-217, at p.206 with further
references:" Technical standardization and professional self-regulation have developed
tendencies toward world-wide coordination with minimal intervention of official international
politics."
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for state acting and the equal relationship typical for private law.  Second, in
the contradiction between the confined space of the state territory defining the
scope of the contract law rules, and the commercial space used by the
protagonists of international commercial contract law which does not coincide
with the domestic legal space.  Third, the doctrine of unity of law and state
leads to the paradox of law and non-law presented by the lex mercatoria; at
least some of its components are recognised as sources of law even under the
traditional doctrine,36 but they are still positively excluded from being law in
the formal sense on the level of current conflict of law and arbitration
legislation.37
Several suggestions have been made to resolve this paradox; besides accepting
the oscillating nature of certain types of law rules, and working out strategies to
operate them in the practical context,38 one promising approach is to ‘reframe’
the traditional doctrine of sources of law.  This is done by 'shifting' the centre
point of political legislator as the sole source of law away to the 'periphery' and
allowing private law making as additional sources of law.39  This creates legal
pluralism between several types of sources of law (as opposed to the alleged
diversity between separate and uniform state laws).  Together with appropriate
methods of integrating specialised transnational contract law into domestic
practice this can resolve the paradoxical situation of current international
contract law.  It can also be done by drawing on truly traditional concepts of
European legal history40  rather than insisting on limiting ideas from the era of
nation-state and positivism.
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 In both England and Germany.  See also Part Three for further discussion.
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  As done by some game theorists such as M.v.d. Kerchove, and F. Ost:   "Le droit ou
les paradoxes du jeu", 1992.
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  Compare G. Teubner: “Breaking Frames: Economic Globalisation and the Emergence
of the lex mercatoria.” European Journal of Social Theory 5.2 (2002): 199-217, p.207.
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I.1.3.2.  Sovereignty and legitimacy of private law
In the prevailing traditional understanding, however, law, especially contract
law, is still necessarily related to the state as legislator.  The state with its
institutions including courts is the only possible instance to give law, to provide
for legitimacy.  Therefore, although there are recognised areas in which law
can be created by private individuals independently and self-governing, the
sovereign nation state is regarded as the sole source of law in prevailing legal
doctrine.
It is doubtful, however, whether this concept can claim to reflect a universal
understanding of legitimacy.41  Private individuals, persons or corporations,
moving around internationally, acting globally in many different states at a
time might have different standards which make them believe in domestic and
transnational private law rules.  This belief does in fact contribute to the
formation of law without a state by way of custom and usage.42
In a substantive sense, individuals recognise voluntarily the state privilege to
provide the law; states provide the necessary framework for legal procedure
and enforcement of law.  Despite the judicial bodies of most states being
independent (of the legislative and administrative bodies), they are still derived
from the political sovereign, the political 'unit', which provides for their
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  Compare for some considerations on legitimacy G. Teubner: “Breaking Frames:
Economic Globalisation and the Emergence of the lex mercatoria.” European Journal of Social
Theory 5.2 (2002): 199-217, p. 207 and 208.
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  Compare also Chapter Seven.
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identification and grants the power they need to give effect to law rules.43  As
far as private parties seeking the assistance of courts to pursue their rights
within a jurisdiction they recognise the given underlying 'legal instruments'
which the courts will use in order to decide the issue.  The interrelation of
courts, law and territoriality thus seems to confirm the identity between law
and state as if it was part of the very nature of law.  And yet, a number of
connecting factors may lie outside the territory and jurisdiction such as the
place of performance, the place where a crime or tort is committed, or
nationality or domicile of a deceased, and thereby bring foreign law into the
domestic sphere.44
One archaic model of source of law is that of 'divine law', gods as legal sources
and ultimate authority.45  Examples are mythic codifications often given by
gods to men such as Yahweh giving the law to Moses, or as Apollo ruling
through the Delphi oracle.  Various religious traditions as well as Greek and
Roman mythology show that legislation and justice are themes which the
human mind is deeply concerned with and that the ultimate origin of the law is
conceived as somehow beyond the human sphere and rather of a transcendental
nature and origin.  In the course of western history, military leaders and
emperors such as Napoleon, Frederic the Great and Justinian made use of their
worldly power as sovereigns, often referring to divine powers, to enact codes.
These carried the names of their 'spiritual fathers', who had acted as initiators
or mentors to certain codes, and this added to the authority of the law.  It
illustrates the above mentioned46 attraction of the personalised single source of
law.
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  See   I.3.1.1.
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  A. Watson:   "Legal Transplants", 1974, p.88.
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    I.1.3.1.
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This procedure might, however, still lack a substantive source of law quality in
the sense that people believe in this law more than in law without the personal
reference to the legislator.  Alan Watson, however, emphasises that the main
source of authority in those cases was the law itself; the ease of its application -
its persuasive force, was decisive for its enactment and adoption.  The
emperor's role really was to, "end discussion, controversy and doubt."47  This
shows that the worldly power attached to the state function is confined to the
decision-making rather than to the creation of the law itself.  The law carries its
source of law function within itself as a self-referring quality and is therefore,
outside the sphere of state regulation regarding its substantive side.48
Today, theories of the legitimacy of law in modern states explain states as
being both sources of power and complex human societies drawing on more
than one scientific discipline, such as legal science, philosophy, ethnology and
sociology.  The evolution from aristocratic systems towards the democratic and
pluralistic (civil), state concept involves a complex component in the concept
of legitimacy: how can a society simultaneously be the source and the subject
of the law?  Here is one living example:
Theories of legitimacy in legal theory were put to a real life test in Germany
after the reunification.  The law of the 'old' Federal Republic acquired the force
of law within the territory of the 'old' Democratic Republic.  The inhabitants of
the former communist state which ceased to exist were confronted with a
complete legal system which they experienced as new and uncanny.  Questions
of legitimacy appeared in every day life, not only in academia. "We wanted
justice - we got the rule of law", as Bärbel Bohley, who fought for civil
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48
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liberties in the GDR, phrased it.49  This phrase which stands for deep concerns
of a large part of the new citizens of the reunified Germany, expresses
scepticism and confusion towards the legal system.  'Justice' is used here as
different from, and perhaps even opposed to, 'rule of law', and thus stirs up
fundamental concerns of legitimacy.  One substantive aspect of the legitimacy
of law is that generally every legal system tries to achieve 'justice'.  The rule of
law is to serve this aim.  But not in the colloquial sense,50 in which it is used in
the above quoted phrase by Mrs Bohley, but rather in a more complicated way;
explained here:
Canaris explains in this context the relevance of the two categories of
consensus and procedure.  He explains that after reunification a majority of
people in the GDR had formally and legally accepted the social, economic and
legal system of the Western German state.  The consensus arose from the
establishment of a government created out of free and equally held elections
and who negotiated the Treaty.  This was ratified by the parliament of the GDR
which had been formed by democratic elections before. This consensus,
nevertheless, cannot be regarded as a mere majority decision.  The fact that a
minority of citizens disagreed with the reunification and the accession to the
FRG shows that an explanation has to be made, as to how this new legal status
can be called legitimate.  Many citizens of the now larger German state feel
                                                 
49
 This phrase of hers is quoted here after Claus-Wilhelm Canaris: "Konsens und
Verfahren als Grundelemente der Rechtsordnung - Gedanken vor dem Hintergrund der
"Eumeniden" des Aischylos". Juristische Schulung, 1996. 7: p. 573-580, p.574, who
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   This is an almost religious conception of the notion of justice. See below in this
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its treatment in philosophy and jurisprudence in depth but wants to contribute to the
understanding of legitimacy of law by giving selected examples of understanding in the
contemporary political and commercial sphere. Compare Chapter Two at II.2.1.
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enstranged and confused regarding the legal rules which they are confronted
with.51 Are these rules therefore illegitimate in relation to these individuals?
The problem of a dissenting minority, or part of a population within a legal
system, is looked at in the context of the Eumenides-myth by Canaris: as were
the Erinyes appeased by the granting of land and worship in the city of Athens,
the losing party of a legal action has to be respected on a general basis of equal
rights. "The general acceptance of the legal system as a whole is of utmost
importance."52  Otherwise, the losing party may become an enemy of the law.
Another way of explaining consensus is by the "theory of recognition"
(Anerkennungstheorie).  Rules acquire the force of law through the acceptance
and recognition of the individuals to be subjected to the law rules.53  Whether
this recognition concerns each and every individual law rule and its specific
application in the courtroom, or whether this is just a basic rule, has been
subject to extensive discussion among scholars.54   This basic rule contains
both the substantive claim that law shall exist, as well as the formal aspect of
recognition of an authority competent to issue that law.
One of the basic substantive objectives of the 'rule of law' and therefore of
'justice' and the existence of law itself, is to replace archaic forms of pursuing
one's own rights and interests; eg. by means of violence such as blood feud.
Thus the enforcement of legal claims, by private individuals against each other,
has to be generally prevented and instead, entrusted to a judiciary dealing with
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conflicts and representing the ban of violence corresponding to the 'monopoly
of violence' of the state.55  In the mythology referred to by Canaris, the
Erinyes represent this essential feature of law: the threat of violence as a means
of enforcement of law.
The legitimacy of rules establishing this order in a social context confined to a
specific state or nation is to a great extent established by way of procedure.
The notion of procedural legitimacy has become popular recently, but is only
one aspect of the ratio of the force of law.56  Canaris explains in his article the
meaning and role of the tale of the Eumenides, as reported by Aischylos, within
legal theory.  He shows how the recognition of law as such, results in a
discourse (between Athene and the Erinnyes), which creates the force of law
by procedure (the decision by the areopag).  But in addition to this procedure
the myth reports that Athena gave reasons for her vote in favour of Orestes.
Here, legitimacy is created by reasoning.  Canaris emphasises that in this
ancient myth legitimacy is said to consist not only of the pure element of
procedure, but also, of that of reasoning and thus, substantive elements of law
which can even be influenced by the individual delivering a judgment.57
Given this concept of legitimacy the role of the state and its relation to private
law rules can be described as follows:  If private individuals seek the assistance
of a formal procedure to sort out their conflicts and pursue their rights, rather
than relying on the 'right of the stronger party', they also rely on the authority
of an instance to govern the substantive law rules as well as the procedure.  The
compulsive element which is essential to the enforcement of legal claims is
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exclusively reserved for state institutions.  Therefore, legislative and executive
bodies within a state are equally essential to the conception and existence of
law, both in a formal and substantive sense, and are closely linked to its
legitimacy.
In the area of contract law, however, more than in other areas of law, the
compulsive element is confined to the enforcement aspect rather than being
found in the substance of the law.  It is not the law that is compulsive but the
enforcement:58 the parties are entitled to rely on the state organs to enforce the
judgement based on the law.   This law, contract law, derives its legitimacy to a
great extent from its recognition among the individuals subject to it.  Contract
law has traditionally been formed out of established practice and tradition
rather than by way of instantaneous short term political decisions.  Historically,
contract codes often incorporated and restated customary law.  Certain
substantive aspects of justice are thus decisive for the acceptance of law,
specifically contract law.  Legitimacy of law eventually depends on the
existence of procedure and methods of enforcement, as well as on substantive
qualities.
Legitimacy and justice are often understood to mean the same thing in the
commercial world when referring to aspects of 'fair dealing'.  This practice is
not only a simplification and a colloquial use of the term, but is also a reference
to the above mentioned substantive aspect of legitimacy.  Two classical
meanings of justice can be distinguished: iustitia commutativa and iustitia
distributiva.  A just order provides for the good distribution and balance of
goods and charges, duties and rights.  For merchants the principle of exchange
is of central interest; the aim of fair exchange is regulated by rules of mutual
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legal relationships - contract rules.  The substantive quality of contract rules
will decide whether a legal system provides justice.  Reciprocity is an essential
feature for the merchant community and for commercial law; the theory of
reciprocity is an equally basic condition for ethnologic thinking,"as is the
theory of gravitation in astrology".59
"Balancing justice ...is to be found on the level of equality, among individuals
of the same rank."60  This corresponds to the description of private law given
above,61 and confirms the essential quality of contract law as distinct from
regulating and subordinating law rules.
I.1.3.3.  Legitimacy of a-national commercial law
The role of the state in private law comes to the fore if, and when, private
individuals and their transactions cross national boundaries.  Global markets
invite transnational enterprises operating all over the world simultaneously by
way of corporate and financial networks powered by high technology.
"International production appears as a real challenge to the official allocation,
among states, of the power of regulating the economy...One of the primary
causes of this situation is the emergence of the global enterprise”. 62
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"The existence of a global society“ is a presupposition for the existence of transnational
legal discourses.  The global society has an economy "that cannot be controlled by national
policies“ (Mertens, H.-J. (1996). "Lex Mercatoria : A Self-Applying System beyond National
Law".in: Global Law without a state. G. Teubner. Brookfield, Dartmouth. 4: 31-43, p.41,fn10).
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Contracts have been rejected as sources of law since Savigny.63  They have
been regarded as mere factual phenomena of legal reality.  However, within the
jurisprudential discourse about the existence and nature of lex mercatoria, the
existence of an a-national private law is claimed.64  Some even recognise self-
governing bodies within the international merchant community, such as trade
associations,65  certain agencies or arbitration courts.
Teubner encourages a solution to the paradox of self-validating contracts:
"Any self-validating of contract leads directly into the paradox of self
reference, into the contractual version of the Cretian liar paradox....This
underlying paradox is the principal reason why lawyers, as well as sociologists,
declare self-validating contracts unthinkable and talk lex mercatoria out of
existence.... Only on the condition that this paradox of contractual self-
reference be successfully 'de-paradoxified' can a global legal system in
economic affairs get off the ground."  66
Teubner has the answer: it is embodied in "those commercial contracts that
construct a so-called 'closed circuit arbitration'... Apart from substantive rules it
contains clauses that refer conflicts to an arbitration 'court' which is identical
with the private institution that was responsible for 'legislating' the model
contract.  This is the 'closed circuit'.”67  Teubner recognises the existence of a
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lex mercatoria as a genuine, positive a-national law.  He disapproves, however,
of the theoretical foundations legal theory has been trying to build it on so
far.68  He claims that the theoretical justification of the lex mercatoria has
been attempted by means of outdated conceptions (sic), and that where new
approaches are undertaken, traditional arguments as to the requirements and
nature of legal sources (based on the idea of national law and the identity of
law and state), still prevail, and block the way to a reasonable, acceptable
concept of a-national law.
"Theories of legal pluralism will have to reformulate their core concepts,
shifting their focus from groups and communities to discourses and
communicative networks."69
These networks are de facto globalised today and are not confined to nation
states. Global law is therefore the answer to this situation.
An equivalent to domestic institutions such as legislator and judiciary can be
found on a global level in the existence of contracts, arbitration and quasi-
legislative institutions such as; The International Chamber of Commerce, The
International Law Association, The International Maritime Commission, and
others who often draft and issue the respective (standard), contracts or standard
terms.  UNIDROIT is such an institution too, when regarding the UPICC.  One
could say that there is a differentiation into the official and non-official sector
of lex mercatoria which reflects the state functions of formal and judge-made
law on the one hand, and contractual agreements created through party
autonomy, on the other.
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"Private arbitration and private legislation become the core of a decision
system which begins to build up a hierarchy of norms and of organizational
bodies." 70
It is the “dynamics of interaction between an 'official' legal order and a 'non-
official' one, which is constitutive for a modern legal system.”71  In this sense
Teubner conceives his pluralism in the world society: there are at present (at
least), two systems of law co-existing.  One is the traditional law of nation
states and the other is the global law in the commercial world which is, of
course, only fragmentary ("fragmentierte Rechtsdiskurse" - fragmented legal
discourses), and is always related to specific areas which provide for a
considerable differentiation:
"The boundaries of global law are formed not by maintaining a core 'territory'
and expanding on a federal basis as Kant perceived in terms of nation-states,
but rather, by 'invisible colleges' 'invisible markets and branches', 'invisible
professional communities' , 'invisible social networks' that transcend territorial
boundaries but nevertheless press for the emergence of genuinely legal forms.
A new law of conflicts is emerging on the basis of intersystemic, rather than
international, conflicts.” 72
The conflict solving answers in international dispute resolution are successfully
taken from the international contract by arbitrators.73  They reach decisions
without expressly referring to national law and their awards are generally
accepted by national courts if they are to enforce them.   National law is vital to
arbitration and at the same time to the scope of lex mercatoria or a-national
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contract law.74   It does not, however, contravene its existence or
effectiveness. The nation state thus seems more tolerant to a law of no origin
than to a law of another sovereign state.  Apparently there are few instances of
the invocation of public policy or mandatory rules of the forum which are to
enforce arbitration awards.75
In this way a-national law exists outside international (interstate), relations and
cannot be compared with legal provisions based on public international law
and on the authority of international organisations.  Teubner thus supports his
"pluralistic theory of norm-production".  He claims that concrete norms,
positive law, are produced "in national politics and in international political
relations,... in judicial processes within the nation-states and in international
courts", as well as in, "global economic and other social processes".76
In the view of other authors, common-lawyers as well as continental theorists,
the unity of law and state cannot be evaded; a-national law is unthinkable.  A
contract has to be based on a national legal order and thus international
disputes have to be solved by conflict rules and, on a global level, under the
auspices of international conventions based in turn on international public law.
Given this approach of legal theory, states insist on their law being different
from that of other states.  The distinction is equivalent to the distinction
between political spheres of influence and territories.  Thus, with this view, the
law of the forum is generally identical to the law of the nation-state.77
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To question this proposition by suggesting legal pluralism in norm production
means to suggest that on an empirical level there is law which applies in
numerous countries, by way of uniformity of source, and thus dissolves the
boundaries between the national legal orders in certain fields, namely within
the fields established by the global networks.
I.1.4. Conclusion
Section I.1. explained the relationship between sovereignty of nation states as it
is understood in current legal doctrine and contract law in general.  It identified
doctrinal elements which lead to the exclusion of transnational uniform
contract law from the catalogue of possible law rules for operating in
international trade law. However, these seem to be outdated.
The doctrine of unity of law and state as described above cannot claim
universal acceptance or authority.  Too many instances, both historic and
contemporary, of non-compliance with its presumptions occur, particularly
questioning the idea of unity and diversity of national laws.  The section has
provided evidence that alternative plausible concepts already exist and that
they deserve more attention for the sake of the modern globalised role of
contract law.
This particularly concerns the substantive source of law function of
transnational commercial law rules: they can claim legitimacy according to
71
established legal theory which traditionally recognises law rules originating,
and deriving, authority from other sources than state organs.78
Diversity of laws, correctly understood in the sense of legal pluralism, rather
than simply denoting substantive and territorial differences between national
laws, thereby allows for transnational contract law to apply to international
contracts as law governing the contract.
I.2. Distinctiveness of substantive contract law of distinct sovereign states
Section I.1. described the role of the state when acting directly within the
sphere of contract law.  Section I.2. now investigates the aspect of substantive
difference and distinctiveness of national contract laws understood as an
element of the diversity of national laws.  It asks whether laws of nation states
are in fact strictly different from each other, and whether this can therefore be
regarded as a formative aspect of sovereignty of nation states.  National law
under traditional doctrine would then be created by the state organs and be the
same throughout the territory (providing unity), while at the same time being
different from the law of other nation states (providing diversity).
Consequently, this would by definition exclude transnational uniform contract
law rules from being law.  This section asks whether such a concept of
diversity of national laws still exists in modern nation states and if it can be
maintained by analysing the role of foreign law.
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I.2.1.  Application of foreign law
The distinction between laws in different countries would be a mere formal one
if it was exclusively based on the fact that law rules are created and enacted by
distinct sovereign bodies of legislation.  Legal doctrine which is critical
towards the use of transnational law also derives authority from the existence
of differences between the contents of the legal rules of each country.79
However, in some instances these differences cannot be established very
clearly; claims of public policy are often put forward very vaguely, and de
facto is very rarely invoked to defend against a norm of foreign origin.  Matters
of the application of foreign laws and the significance of rivalry between
national legal systems are analysed in this section.
I.2.1.1.  Forum and territory
The direct application of foreign law by a court might be regarded as proof of
the existence of a forum extending beyond the reach of a national territory and
as an instance of disparity between law and state.  A court’s forum can actually
coincide with several political territories and several legal systems, or, with no
political territory at all.  The former two options were a standard situation
during the Middle Ages in Europe.  The latter may be exemplified by the
International Criminal Court at The Hague.
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   As opposed to the same content of a rule applied in different countries (uniformity of source),
see below, Chapter Two.
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Application of foreign law has a tradition in twentieth century German
jurisdiction: the Reichsgericht had a special "Senat" (chamber), dealing with
the application of French law.  Legal theory though, points to incompatibilities
of this practice with the rules of the court's constitutional framework, as well
as, to the requirement of special knowledge on the part of the judges, which is
difficult to guarantee.80  English Courts do apply foreign law directly since
they function as appeal courts in certain cases; the House of Lords apply the
laws of Scotland and Northern Ireland which are regarded as foreign law.81
Thus the application of foreign law seems not to be exclusively determined by
political distinctions between states and nations, but rather, by territorial
aspects of jurisdiction which is not necessarily identical with the territory
where a certain legal system is applicable.
How is a rule recognised as foreign?  One state may well comprise of different
legal systems, such as the common law and Scottish law in the United
Kingdom, still not every court within those states applies legal rules of
different origin to every case.  The Privy Council being an appeal court for
Commonwealth countries also used to apply laws of different countries which
were foreign to the state in which the court was located.  The law might thus be
allocated to a forum rather than to a state and its territory.  The extent of a
forum might differ from that of the respective state.82 This model allows a
wider view of the doctrine of legal sources including the court as another
provider of law, rather than the legislator as a sole political entity providing
law and legitimacy.
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74
Foreign law, however, is applied by virtue of conflict of law rules. English
courts will only apply a foreign law rule which is brought before it as a fact,
the party "who relies on the rules of a foreign system of law must plead and
prove them".83  The conflict of laws thus determines whether the lex fori or the
lex causae is to be applied - the territorial aspect being seen from the viewpoint
of the court concerned.  Law is thus to be conceived as being connected with
the matter to be decided as well as with the court, in that the court has a forum
which can comprise of foreign law, as is the case in certain procedures before
the House of Lords.
I.2.1.2.  Legal theory
The application of foreign law has always faced the need to be explained and
justified by legal theory.  According to the vested rights theory a right or claim
could be enforced on the grounds that it had been acquired under foreign law
and thus could not be disregarded in the domestic context.  The legal result
created by foreign law was to be respected and dealt with according to
domestic law.
"A right having been created by the appropriate law, the recognition of its
existence should follow everywhere. Thus an act valid where done cannot be
called in question anywhere."84
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"...although the act complained of was subject to no law having force in this
forum, it gave rise to an obligation, an obligatio which, like other obligations,
follows the person, and may be enforced wherever the person may be
found."85
These statements acknowledge the legal effects of foreign law rules.
Nevertheless, the significance of the recognition of foreign law for the
sovereignty of states has caused intense scholarly discussion.  The idea of
sovereignty seems to contradict the possibility of the application of foreign
law. The application of foreign law is, however, motivated by comitas:
"There are two reasons why we do not automatically take jurisdiction or apply
English law in all cases.  First there is a historical concern with excessive
assertions of sovereignty and possible foreign reactions to this. Secondly, there
is a concern with fairness to the parties."86
Fawcett refers to the fact that the choice of law rules increasingly serve to
establish whether English courts have jurisdiction over a matter according to
Order 11 of the Rules of the Supreme Court (R.S.C.).  These jurisdiction rules
require the ascertainment of the applicable jurisdiction, while findings, for
example, as to the proper law of the contract, are reached at the trial stage.  The
reported cases mostly concern the discretionary decision as to whether service
of the writ out of the jurisdiction is admissible under Order 11 r.1 R.S.C.
Fawcett therefore, raises the question as to whether the influence of the choice
of law rules on jurisdiction should be extended:
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"There would only nominally be rules on both jurisdiction and choice of law.
In reality only one set of rules would actually be of any real importance in any
given case, the choice of law rules, and the decision on the applicable law.
This is a very radical idea which has been justified on the basis that the
underlying concern is the same in both the area of jurisdiction and choice of
law, a concern with excessive assertions of sovereignty."87
Fawcett refers here to ideas put forward by American authors, suggesting that
jurisdiction and the applicable law should coincide in such a way that a state
exclusively applies its own law or refuses jurisdiction.  This approach promotes
the congruence of the political and territorial sphere of influence of a state and
the jurisdiction of its courts by applying the lex fori to every case.  Its
application is based on a value judgment upon the content of a law rule or legal
system with a view to achieving a just solution.  One criterion is the underlying
interest and legislative policy of the state whose law is considered to be
applied, the "governmental interest analysis".  In a search for the "better law"
the choice is most likely to be one's own law.  Thus in the USA, the main field
of application of this doctrine, the lex loci, is in tort cases due to the respective
considerations.  The U.S., however, being mainly concerned with inter-state
conflict of laws, cannot be simply compared to any other country whose
conflict rules are predominantly made to deal with conflict cases involving
fundamentally different legal systems of independent sovereign countries.
Thus English writers such as Fawcett and Collier reject the extreme approach
to the role of choice of law as part of jurisdiction considerations.  It was also
rejected by the House of Lords in Chaplin v. Boys. 88
The view taken by Collier is the following:
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"Two other considerations are either overlooked or minimised by these
theorists. First, the object of the conflict of laws, as of any other branch of
private law, is to advance the interests of private persons, not the state or
government.  Secondly, one of the interests that private persons (and
corporations) have is in some measure of certainty about the law; whether their
contract will be enforceable or not and what are their rights and duties under it
... to give some examples only of what they wish to know."89
Courts do give effect to private interests of this kind rather than expressly or de
facto enforcing state or government interests or policies; despite being state
organs in that they are established and payed for by public authorities.  Courts
enjoy independence in order to find the law and therefore they do not simply
enact the will of the government.  Their sphere of influence can thus differ
from that of the state and its territory.  The role of a court is not to exercise
political power but to decide conflicts in this case between private individuals.
The applicable law can thus be subject to discussion as far as this is relevant to
the problem solving process.
In the area of contract law, the interest and policies of states or governments
are supposed to be reflected in mandatory rules.  Those rules cannot be
deviated from by the parties to a contract and limit the parties' autonomy.  If
the parties seek the assistance of state courts90 and legal services to enforce
contractual rights, these provide an instance where citizenship and political
objectives reach the closest possible connection in contract law.  Otherwise the
legal concept of a party to a contract does not necessarily presuppose, or
coincide with, that of the political subject of a state such as formal citizenship.
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This idea has allowed the evolution of the connecting factor of domicile rather
than that of nationality.91
The so called theory of the droit acquis was taught among others by Pillet at
the start of the last century;92 he claimed that the rights acquired under a
foreign legal system were to be respected and enforced if, and when, the
domestic conflict of law rules pointed to that foreign law.  This was owed to
respect of the foreign country´s sovereignty (comity).  A slightly different view
is taken by the local law theory as put forward by Walter Wheeler Cook:93
"The forum...always applies its own law to the case, but in doing so adopts and
enforces as its own law a rule of decision identical, or at least highly similar...,
in scope with a rule of decision found in the system of law in force in another
state or country...The forum thus enforces not a foreign right but a right created
by its own law."
This view is adopted and further pursued in Italy by Santi Romano.94  The
legal order is supposed to be exclusive.  Foreign law cannot be recognised as
such.  It is to be introduced through the medium of conflict of law rules which
give effect to the foreign legal result.  These theories are themselves discussed
and adopted internationally without regard to the borders of nation states.
They are a common matter of interest.  Thus the (American), local law theory,
is criticised by the (English), writer Collier, as being "really pointless":95 he
regards both this approach and the vested rights theory as wrongly based on the
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concern that applying foreign law automatically means "subordination to a
foreign sovereign and legislator".
"But this concern is baseless;...[ rules of law ] are not all imperative. An
English court does not, therefore, apply a foreign rule because it is bound by
the foreign sovereign to do so, but because it is constrained to do so by English
law to achieve justice and a satisfactory solution to the problem before it."96
Although Collier’s understanding of these conceptions of the application of
foreign law might take the constructivist views expressed thereby too literally,
they are clearly based on the idea that there is something wrong with directly
applying foreign law.  The arguments supporting this seem not only to be very
casuistic and thus overlook certain conflicts of law constellations, but also
seem to be taken from areas of legal theory which do not correspond to the
special situation of private international law. As Collier says they are "perhaps
connected with Austinian theories of sovereignty and with views such as
Kelsen's that rules of law are built on sanctions."97  The position described
here necessarily involves the private individual as being subject to its state's
law in the sense of being subordinate.  Private law and the conflict of laws in
the area of contracts, however, deal with relationships between individuals on
an equal level, a level of equal rights and powers.98  Once private law is
recognised and guaranteed in a political context it is certainly to serve the
interests of these private individuals, as Collier phrases it.99  Therefore
theories about the application of foreign law and about the nature of conflict of
law rules as such, have to be judged by the degree to which they want to give






  See above.
99
  See above.
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effect to the interests of private parties.  In this sense I agree with the criticism
put forward by Collier towards the theories in contention.
I.2.2.   Reception of foreign law
The sharp distinction between legal systems is blurred further through
reception of foreign legal rules.  Legal theory has recently referred quite
intensely to the reception of U.S. law in European countries.100  In the context
of the development of a European contract law it is suggested, that the
European states should mutually recognise their contract laws so as to give
parties to a contract a free choice. 101
Reception can take place in various ways.  The traditional reception of a legal
system by another or within a foreign territory has often been linked to political
influence, direct imposition and force.  As occured originally when Roman law
was received in Germany, when English law came into India during the time of
the Empire ("English law circulated ratione imperii"102), and when American
law came into Japan after World War II.  There is, however another form of
reception, the creation of "legal transplants".103  This is the phenomenon of
borrowing from other legal systems.  The distinction between 'legal families' as
it is done by comparatists is not confined to nation states.  It can extend beyond
their borders, or not as far, as eg. in Canada.  Distinct legal spheres such as the
common law and the civil law have recently been examined as to their
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distinctiveness.  By the use or creation of such transplants something called
"intellectual leadership" is established by a certain representative of a legal
system: a state.  But "leadership" in this sense, is not acquired by political or
military power, but rather, in the intellectual way by choice, not by imposition.
Mattei describes the historic move of intellectual leadership from French law to
German law and to American law at present.104  Examples of legal transplant
from American law in German law are; the leasing contract, the new product
liability law, as well as, the procedural rules on bankruptcy aiming to
incorporate a similar solution to the "Chapter Eleven" way of clearing personal
debts.  The use of American vocabulary in the German legal language as such
is a symptom of the reception of American law: leasing, franchising, joint
venture, merger all acquire meanings in their own right and often lack a
German translation.  Mattei describes the profound influence of German
refugee scholars in America inducing the formation of "American intellectual
leadership": the acceptance of cross-cultural scholarly activities is another
factor of the spreading of legal solutions (the law making role of scholarship
provided), over more than one country or legal system.
Legal science and legal education are certainly to be considered as "legal
formants" in the sense of Sacco´s concept.105  They serve as a vehicle to
import and export law between countries and legal systems.  Reception means
that features of a legal system are "considered, discussed, copied or
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adopted".106   Since the law of a country on the one hand never exclusively
consists of the positive law rules enacted by parliament or formulated by
judges, but also of scholarly opinion and legal discourse which are influenced
by foreign elements, domestic law is not pure in its substantive quality.
Thus, distinguishing between laws of different countries in a substantive sense
by referring to the territorial and political boundaries of the nation state seems
quite superficial.
I.2.3. Conclusion
Section I.2. shows that there is no sharp distinction between substantive
national contract laws, but that borderlines are blurred by both historical and
current practice of reception and active application of foreign laws.  Therefore,
the idea of diversity of laws flowing from the state as the sole source of law
and providing an aspect of sovereignty of states is unsuitable for describing the
nature of contract law.
I.3.   Party autonomy: How autonomous is the individual?
The previous sections have dealt with the role of the state (I.1.), and the role of
the substantive law itself (I.2.), in the doctrine of diversity of national laws and
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how this enables or impedes the use of transnational uniform contract law.
Section I.3. examines the role of the individual. It asks to what extent
individuals can create their own legal relationships and use state contract law at
their discretion to govern their contracts.  This leads to questions of party
autonomy, freedom of contract and choice of law in general.
I.3.1. Choice of law
Party autonomy allowing a choice of law governing contracts is granted by
almost every jurisdiction.  It is disputed, however, as to what extent
transnational law rules can be stipulated to be governing law, to the exclusion
of domestic law, the so-called kollisionsrechtliche Verweisung or vocation.
This choice would require transnational law rules to be applied in the same
way as any other formal rule of law or legal system.  Questions of conflicts
with domestic law would arise in overlapping areas or where contents might be
regarded as incompatible with national law.  While Part Two and Part Three
below provide a detailed account of the application  of transnational law rules
according to current legal theory and court practice, taking the UPICC as an
example, this section sets out the general setting for transnational law within
conflict of law doctrines without a reference to any particular set of rules.
I.3.1.1.  Common law
At common law, party autonomy leads to the doctrine of the proper law of the
contract.
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“English conflict rules accord to the parties to a contract a wide liberty to
choose the law by which their contract is to be governed”.107
The parties can choose the law of a country expressly, or the court will
investigate their intentions by necessary implication.108  The fact that foreign
law appears as fact before English courts cannot be interpreted as a
comparative reluctance to apply foreign law in relation to the situation under
German conflict of law rules, where courts investigate foreign law ex officio.
The difference rather originates from the predominantly adversarial and more
court-oriented procedural system in England: the territory of the law is
conceived as being assigned more to a court and its forum rather than to the
legislator representing a (nation), state.  The English conflicts of law rules
reflect the strong tradition of the courts.   In fact the example of the domicile of
a person forming a connecting factor shows a less tight link to political borders
than the German solution of choosing nationality as a connecting factor in
comparable cases.109  English traditional conflicts of law rules seem to be less
politically oriented than German ones.
I.3.1.I.2.  The Rome Convention
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Germany has adopted the provisions of the Rome Convention 1980 by way of
the "IPR-Gesetz", (1986), which reformed the EGBGB ("Einführungsgesetz
zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch" - Introductory Code for the Civil Code).  In the
UK this Convention was implemented by the Contracts (Applicable Law), Act
1989.
In German conflict law this has led to a more liberal approach to party
autonomy.  Parties could now choose foreign law to govern their contract or
parts of it even though it had no connection to any other state.  Before, the
provision relating to general contract terms had required a "special interest" for
the effective choice of foreign law rules, (§ 10 No.8 AGBG).  This provision
was overridden by Art. 6 § 2 IPRG.  Today the code says expressly, in Art 27
EGBGB, incorporating the Rome Convention, that the parties are free to
choose the law governing their contract (para [1]), even in domestic cases (para
[3]) - even though they cannot deviate from mandatory rules of the country
with which the contract is most closely connected - and that they can change
these provisions at any time ex nunc and ex tunc, (para [2]).  Thus, at present,
the only limitation to party autonomy in this respect, under German law,
remains the relevance of mandatory rules of the "proper law" of a contract
which cannot be ruled out by depeçage.  The option of incorporating foreign
law rules into the contract (materiellrechtliche Verweisung), will subject these
to the interpretation rules relating to contractual clauses.110  The general rules
as to ascertainment of the applicable law will still apply.
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I.3.2. Limits of choice of law: Doctrines of evasion and the role of
mandatory rules
The incentive in choosing the applicable law will mainly be an international
aspect of the contract.  Either because the parties reside in different countries or
they are making a contract about goods to be shipped between different
countries.  The decision as to which particular system of law they would want
to govern their contract is largely unlimited reflecting a wide range of
motivations and reasons for a specific choice.111  Is this choice always
respected by courts?  The parties’ choice might pursue the aim of subjecting
the contract to a 'neutral' law, which does not give either party an 'undue'
advantage in that one of them might be more familiar with it, or simply that it
is not the domestic law of either of them, thereby symbolising equal
positions.112  This suggests the attractiveness of a-national law for governing a
contract which will be discussed later.113
Another motivation could be to find a legal system with a 'cheap quality' which
provides little obligations and large benefits, eg. according to the amount of
damages or extensive possibilities for terminating an agreement which has
become economically unattractive.  This motivation is often criticised as forum
shopping and is sought to be prevented.  The European Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (hereinafter Judgments
Convention), is meant to regulate and minimise possibilities for forum
shopping within the range of member states.
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Evasion of the law sometimes has a taste of au gout attached to it.  Indeed,
French international private law knows the institution of fraude á la loi.  This
is unknown to English law in a doctrinal form.  Evasion can be described as
being a particular purpose and motivation behind, for example, the choice of
law in an international contract.  The fact that the law of Utopia is made, the
applicable law to a contract which is concluded in England could be regarded
as being evasive if the parties particularly meant to escape English law.
English jurisdiction is not necessarily avoided at the same time.  This occured
in cases of 'evasive marriages' in former days where couples went abroad to
make foreign legal provisions apply to their degree of marriage, or to their
capacity.  The legal issues arising from that marriage were nevertheless tried in
England later since the married couple moved back to live in England.114
This, however, led to the failure of the parties' intention.  Evasion was not
made an independent criterion, but led to the moulding of connecting factors
which classified those cases as dealing with essential validity subject to the law
of the domicile of the parties.  In contract cases there is a requirement of good
faith which can limit the parties' freedom to choose the law applicable to their
contract.  Express evasion of English law would contravene the bona fides
doctrine.  There is, however, no reported case where a choice of law was struck
out by English courts on these grounds.115  Mandatory rules are incorporated
in section 27 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.  A choice of law made by
parties to a contract which appears "to have been imposed wholly or mainly for
the purpose of enabling the party imposing it to evade the operation of this
Act",116 will not be given effect under its rules and party autonomy is thereby
restricted.
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Consumer protection is the most prominent area in private law where most
states have provided for mandatory rules.  In the area of commercial contracts
the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971 can serve as an example.  The purpose
of this Act is to give Article X of the Hague-Visby rules - relating to the
liability of parties to bills of lading - the force of law and the quality of a
mandatory rule.  It cannot be evaded by a choice of law clause pointing to a
law which does not apply the Hague-Visby rules.
Evasion cannot be condemned generally as an impure practice, although "the
term is a loaded one, with connotations of shifty, underhand behaviour."117
However, Fawcett gives two reasons for which a choice of law should be
regarded as undue evasion, other than simply being made in bad faith; cases of
unfairness and where the attempted choice of law is against the national
interest.  Here, the motives of the parties have a specific quality which is
subject to certain political regulatory interests, policies which are intended to
override party autonomy.  An important example where such a policy is
enshrined in a statute is the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.  The protection of
consumers from exemption clauses is regarded as being equivalent to rules of
public policy.118  Therefore, the intention of parties of a contract to apply a
foreign law in order to avoid this act is not against the state's interest merely
because its own law is not applied.  Balancing the parties' freedom of choice
against the national interest only justifies a restriction of party autonomy if
there is a "strong social or economic policy".
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"The parties should not be lightly denied this right to choose. The balance only
tips in favour of the interest of the state when the law which is being thwarted
expresses a strong social or economic policy."119
In the commercial sphere, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act represents such a
policy; to avoid unfairness to one, usually weaker party: "even in contracts
between two large commercial undertakings one party may have the whip
hand."120
Do states protect the national interests and policies expressed in foreign laws?
They do this if and when "the national interest dictates that a foreign law
should not be thwarted....The only basis for a national interest in this situation
is that of considerations of comity of nations."121 This, however, is an
exception as shown by the cases Foster v. Briscol,122 and Regazzoni v.
Sethia.123   There, the enforcement of the obligations in contention involved
the breaking of the law of a foreign friendly country in an extreme way which
would not be comparable to cases where foreign law on exemption clauses is
concerned. "Given that English rules on exemption clauses give adequate
protection to consumers it is hard to believe that considerations of comity
dictate that more stringent foreign rules must be upheld."124  Fawcett here
refers to cases to which English and foreign mandatory rules could apply
accumulatively and thus compete.  What about cases in which foreign
mandatory rules apply in an area where English law does not know mandatory
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regulations, so as to supplement the English rules?  The Rome Convention
makes it clear that the mandatory rules of the forum can be applied without
qualification to contracts that may otherwise be subject to foreign law by
choice or under conflict rules.  It thereby gives special protection to the interest
of a forum to apply its own law.  The parties’ choice of law is thus disregarded
as to the intended legal effect conflicting with the rules in question.  The
question remains, however, which mandatory rules of foreign countries may
otherwise be applicable.  If these rules express such a strong socio-economic
policy every country can have an interest to have these rules applied: whether
its law is the proper law of the contract, has the closest connection with the
case, or is only remotely concerned by it.  The Rome Convention says that
"effect may be given to the mandatory law of another country with which the
situation has a close connection". 125  This seems to leave discretion as to the
application of the rules as well as to the manner in which to do so (direct or
indirect).  Fawcett calls it uncertainty.126  It has to be asked whether this
means uncertainty to the prejudice of contracting parties trying to choose a law
to govern their contract, or to that of the court possibly trying the case with an
underlying intention to give as much effect as possible to the lex fori.
I.3.3. Conclusion
The extent to which national laws grant contracting parties the freedom to
choose the governing law for their contract determines the extent to which
sovereignty is exercised over private individuals and dealings.  It is also a
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measurement for the tolerance towards foreign law and therefore for the extent
of distinctiveness between national laws in terms of forming clear borderlines
in a substantive sense.  This section has given account of the current status of
this notion in national law and has shown why the nature of contract law (as
opposed to other regulatory national law), and the status of the individual are
the key arguments in for determining the desirable scope of mandatory rules
and choice of law rules regulating private dealings in modern nation states.
I.4. Conclusion
Chapter One identified relevant elements of legal theory relating to contract
law in nation states which deny rules of transnational uniform contract law
legitimacy and a substantive source of law function (I.1., I.2.), while limiting
the choice of law capacities of private individuals (I.3.).  These are obstacles to
the successful application of specialised transnational contract law rules and
could be addressed as a form of 'legal conservatism', forming a barrier against
the use of uniform law in international trade.
Chapter One has shown evidence, however, that it is possible to integrate
uniform law using other, equally traditional elements of contract doctrine by
identifying and highlighting them in their wider context following a thorough
review of underlying concepts both on a political and philosophical level .
The doctrine of unity of law and state which is a central an element of
traditional contract law doctrine cannot claim universal acceptance or
authority.  Too many instances, both historic and contemporary, of disparity
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between practice and its presumptions occur because its assumptions are
uncritically extended from other regulatory law to contract law.
The concept of inevitable unity of law and state is an aspect of traditional
theory built on outdated foundations as far as ideas stemming from the
feudalistic and positivist eras under them.  The modern nation state, however,
is defined by its civil society and the equal relationship between citizens
(contracting parties).  The nature of contract law as a key element of free trade
has to be revisited by revisiting practices of pre-nationalistic eras such as the
Middle Ages where the law merchant first evolved for instance, throughout the
history of the Hanseatic League or the evolution of English commercial case
law.
There is a tendency of state organs and courts to prefer the domestic law and
the lex fori to those of other countries via conflict rules, mandatory rules and
doctrines of public policy and party autonomy which reinforces the impression
that unity of law and state is inevitable.  This practice forms an obstacle to the
application of uniform contract law.
The concept of diversity of laws (I.3.), is a consequence of this understanding
of sovereignty and legitimacy, as the states are distinct from each other
forming seemingly separate but homogeneous entities of national laws (unity).
This is a questionable concept, however, because the borders between laws are
blurred by reception, jusrisdiction rules, international legal science and many
other factors (I.2.).  It is not a static concept and is therefore open to
adjustment.  The sovereignty of states is not affected by a liberal application of
party autonomy assumed by critics, and therefore does not need to be defended
against a modern contract law doctrine (I.1., I.3.).  A substantive source of law
function of transnational commercial law rules is therefore possible even
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according to established legal theory which does traditionally recognise law
rules originating and deriving authority and legitimacy from sources other than
state organs.127   Diversity of laws is correctly to be understood as legal
pluralism.
In order to overcome these existing impediments against the use of
transnational contract law in different domestic legal systems, it is therefore not
necessary to invent a novel concept of contract law, but rather review positions
which claim universal validity on a surface level and thereby form obstacles to
the application of uniform law.  The key aspect to be highlighted is the nature
of contract law being private law regulating the dealings of private individuals.
Their position within modern nation states has to be recalled in order to derive
an appropriate role of national contract and conflict law.  Such a review was
carried out in this chapter and proves that uniform law can be integrated into
the existing doctrine of contract law.
The process of reviewing such positions and highlighting supportive aspects of
traditional legal theory in the different legal systems, however, forms an
element of a novel methodology of international contract law.
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CHAPTER TWO
Unity through uniform private law
The previous chapter has dealt with legitimacy and functional source of law
quality of uniform international law.  This chapter explores the outward
appearance and form of such law; it investigates its manifestation as one text
and asks to what extent functional unity of legal solutions is attainable through
drafting and interpreting of law rules.
This chapter explores the question of what the nature and definition, the
generic quality of transnational uniform contract law is, with regard to the
notion of unity.  It asks whether uniformity is needed in international trade law
and to what extent (II.1.).  It identifies arguments contesting the usefulness and
achievability of uniformity on an international level and thereby highlights
barriers to the use of such law rules.  The chapter then investigates ways to
remove obstacles to the use of uniform contract law in this area of theoretical
dispute, including arguments relating to the idea of codifying rules of law in
general (II.2.).
Unity of laws on an international level, forming the opposite concept to
diversity can be understood in a number of ways.  Uniformisation or
unification of national laws is one possible meaning.  The latter could be
regarded an extreme move since it might realise all fears and expectations
regarding a loss of sovereignty, or rather a shift of sovereignty onto the creator,
the origin,  of the (supra-national), uniform source of law, eg. the EU and its
institutions.  Uniformity in a functional sense is the eventual aim of
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harmonisation efforts in the European Community.  Within the scope of the
Treaty, i.e. the common policies, the ideal standard is to achieve the same legal
solutions for a given problem in all Member States.  EC law appears as a
uniform source of law in the form of the Treaty, Directives and Regulations as
well as legally binding decisions by the Commission etc.  Thus, it is one
example, a form and manifestation of uniform transnational law since its legal
effects extend across several national legal systems and originate outside these
legal boundaries.
Another different form of transnational law source is the CISG, a multilateral
Convention.  This has the force of law in the signatory states (eg. Germany, not
the UK), and appears as law in its original form without the interference of
implementing legislation, thereby avoiding any alteration of the original text.
The application of this Convention within domestic law is not part of everyday
legal practice however, nor is it in education and contract drafting, or in court
practice.128  Instead, the Convention is often excluded by contract clauses, so
the development of methodology in this field is not considered an urgent issue
in legal science.  Given the critical views on the role and quality of EC
Directives, 129 this is surprising, given the accessibility of the uniform source
of law as a common text.  The CISG encounters problems on the functional
and substantive side in Germany, though.  Some of its features are considered
to predominantly belong to the Anglo-Saxon legal systems, and these are often
said to clash with certain aspects of German law.  This view lacks a thorough
methodological basis which would allow proper integration of transnational
law rules into German domestic law.   This study provides an example of how
to develop such a specific method.
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The UPICC represent another type of uniform transnational law originating
from yet another source, i.e. a group of legal scholars rather than a political
body.
II.1. Why uniformity?
This section asks for the need for unity and uniformity in international trade
law. It follows up on critical arguments questioning the usefulness and
desirability of uniform law.
The concept of uniform source of law is the core concept of unity in the law.
The law materialises as one text which is applied by diverse users.  Uniformity
as an objective in international contract law is not self- explanatory.  Regarding
the UPICC, it is motivated by the actual needs for uniformity which require
legal services to create and sustain uniform contract law on a transnational
level.  This is to be distinguished from the politically motivated driving force
behind the uniformisation efforts, for example, on the Community (EU) level
where there are political powers in charge of creating new uniform legal
sources.130  The creation of a new source of law function equalling a political
power such as a sovereign entity, is not the objective of the UPICC and their
creators.
II.1.1. Globalisation
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One of the needs for uniformity emerges from the modern process called
globalisation.  "International production appears as a real challenge to the
official allocation, among states, of the power of regulating the economy."131
This is due to less trade barriers, interlocked financial markets and multi-
national enterprises acting as 'global players' being able to transfer workers,
ideas, materials, products all around the world so that in some cases it is hard
to establish even the place (state), of their seat.
Purely domestic legal systems, traditionally aimed at domestic legal situations,
do not respond adequately to many of those constellations both in corporate
and contract law.  Examples include commodities contracts being passed
through a chain of buyers and sellers which often cannot be allocated to a
specific country by applying the characteristic performance rule.132
The above described theory of unity of law and state,133 rooted in the era of
the emerging idea of nation state and positivism, does not genuinely consider
cross-border transactions because of its national viewpoint.  Modern
developments, eg. incorporating the Treaty of Schengen within the EU, as well
as an EU citizenship, on the contrary deliberately facilitate unlimited mobility
of persons, services and goods across borders.  The requirement of
transnational law is that of a transnational community which is only beginning
to evolve.  This transnational community is shaping up geographically through
technical developments such as communication technology and travel.  Prof.
Fox explains that, "not all law needs to be harmonized; one searches for the
problems that most demand attention and for solutions that are feasible because
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they draw upon shared goals..."134  These shared goals form the community
on an international level which gives itself its own rules.  In this way, there is a
general need for 'global law' because of the existence of a global legal space
created by international trade.
The room for discourse, which Teubner describes and which he considers the
source and catalyst for de-localised law, develops thereby in both an
intellectual and geographical sense.135  Eleanor Fox states: "Disharmonies of
law and procedure are costly and bothersome."136  She sees interdependence
between the increase of international transactions and activities and the costs of
difference.  The urge for uniform law is described as: "People begin to wish for
harmonization in order to tidy up a messy world; they wish everyone would
adopt the ideal standard, which is the one they like best." They can, however,
only be as consistent and homogeneous as is the respective community.
II.1.2.  The costs of difference
The above mentioned "costly and bothersome" differences among national
contract laws and the diversity of even conflict law create a need for uniform
contract law.
The costs of difference can be precisely described in a monetary sense: The
costs arising from the necessary research of the law applying to any transaction
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or involving a party from one or more foreign countries are those for legal
consultancy, litigation and its economic risks.137  Uniform law can reduce
these costs to the extent to which true uniformity is achieved.
Prof. Kramer, in his talk on the section on validity of contracts in the UPICC
on the UNIDROIT conference in Basel in Nov 1997,138 called diversity in
private law "disfunktionale Handelsschranken" (dysfunctional trade barriers).
Prof. Kramer stated that the uncertainty about the applicable law very often
compensates the interest tradesmen have in the deal, and thus many contracts
remain unconcluded which would come into existence if there was more
certainty.139  Those who decide to blindly take the risk of agreeing to the law
of the other party's country to govern the contract often do so in order to save
negotiating or because the other party is economically stronger.  Often, the
parties choose a "neutral law" of a third country both being rather unaware of
the solutions this law will provide in case of a dispute.  These provisions are
often made in the belief that the contract will be performed without problems.
Indeed, most international contracts do not encounter any trouble while only a
small number are brought before arbitral tribunals or state courts, who have to
deal with those contracts which were made in quite considerable unawareness
of any particular legal system.140  The stipulation of "natural justice" or lex
mercatoria as governing law is one frequent choice of law clause in such
cases.141
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II.1.3.  Inverse conclusion: Indicators of acceptance
Another indication for the need for uniform law is the extent to which the
UPICC have actually been accepted within the legal practice. Prof. Bonell
regularly reports on the development of their dissemination and use.  From a
survey which was undertaken by UNIDROIT between 1994 and 1997 it was
apparent that many lawyers and arbitrators took recourse to the Principles and
found them helpful.142  The UPICC have actually found consideration in the
drafting process of civil codes of countries which reformed their legal system
after a political change, such as Estonia, the Czech Republic, Lithuania and the
Russian Federation.143  The Principles even influenced the drafting process of
the new Dutch Civil Code and that of Quebec, as well as the Scottish and
German Law Commission in the course of their work eg. on the new law of
obligations in Germany.
Non-English-speaking parties may find them translated into their language but
otherwise mutual understanding of the governing law is supported by referring
to the UPICC as an international English language legal instrument.  This
applies of course regardless of the alternative option to choose English law for
reasons of language and the general popularity of the forum London for
international dispute settlement.144  This choice implies not just an English
language governing law but provides a whole legal cosmos which the parties
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might not be familiar with. This is often overlooked in international contract
drafting.145
In addition to the potential choice of law, uniform contract law can play the
role of a model for contract drafting.  The higher its quality in terms of skilful
drafting, the greater its use for international lawyers.  The UPICC have found
very high acclaim unanimously throughout legal science and practice for their
high quality in this respect.146
II.1.4. Conclusion
Section II.1. has shown that uniformity of laws is needed on an international
level in trade law.  It is not merely a theoretical subject but a real phenomenon
in international trade, manifesting in trade relationships and the fact that
uniform model laws and other examples of transnational law rules are well
received in law reform and international commercial arbitration.
II.2. What uniformity?
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The previous section has dealt with the aspect of the necessity to use and create
transnational uniform contract law.  This section asks what form such law can
take, what makes this law uniform, and what unity of laws might mean with
regard to applying and interpreting such law in different legal systems and
jurisdictions.
There are two sides of uniformity of law: uniformity of results and uniformity
of sources.  Uniformity of results in the application of the law is a popular
demand and is mostly discussed under the heading of certainty and
predictability in legal discourse.  This presupposes uniform law sources as they
are usually present on the domestic level.  On a transnational and global level
this means uniform sources of contract law for the merchant community.
Besides the above discussed aspect of inherent legitimacy of transnational law,
uniformity of transnational  law is another quality of the law, namely the actual
shape it takes: one form of appearance is written law rules which are
ascertainable and accessible in the same way for everybody - such as the
UPICC. 147
Uniformity means recognisable manifestation and thereby distinction of law
from non-law.  Once again, one can realise a simultaneous occurrence of
uniformity and distinctiveness, of unity and diversity.  It is the degree of
manifestation which determines whether or not transnational law, especially all
phenomena which are called lex mercatoria, qualify as law in the eyes of the
critical voices who tend to deny the lex mercatoria its source of law function
without distinguishing individual phenomena within this complex of legal
instruments.
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The main argument against them being law is that they are vague and
unascertainable, i.e. non-law, not distinguishable from non-law and therefore
not uniform.  The paradoxical aspect of this process is described in-depth by G
Teubner.148
II.2.1. Uniformity of results: The desire for certainty and predictability
Uniformity of law thus serves to establish certainty and predictability of the
law.  It is to serve the aim to submit people to the rule of law rather than to "the
rule of men" - law would otherwise be perceived as the "creation of wilful
interpreters". 149  Certainty and predictability, however, are the core issues of
misunderstanding between lawyers and businessmen confronted with questions
of international trade law.   Businessmen, who are after all the addressees of
the transnational law rules, seek the same kind of certainty which allows them
to create a strict timetable for the venture.  The standard contract forms used in
the commodities trade are a good example for such an understanding of
certainty and predictability.  The legal background for these transactions needs
to be clear cut allowing the merchants to decide about pricing, risk allocation
and insurance requirements.  This understanding of certainty in turn is the very
reason why they sometimes fail to achieve this objective and, instead of
smooth sailing, a dispute arises and litigation ensues.150  It might be due to the
businessman's orientation towards economical efficiency rather than towards
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mediation and conflict settlement that businessmen often feel they do not get
what they want out of a legal dispute: justice.151
Predictability and certainty in the law is often understood to mean: one
problem - one answer.  The nature of contract law and legal reasoning never
really reveals itself to many users of legal services.  They tend to suspect too
much discretion in the activities of the law applying body, the court.  They
have a natural dislike for the dynamic character of the law which needs
concrete application to a single case in order to manifest.  This process has
effervescent qualities for a trader who measures the value of his activities in
hard money not learned speeches. However,
"...it is sometimes said that certainty in the law is an illusion; and there is more
than a grain of truth in this, once a dispute has gone to litigation.”152
Not even a most elaborately formulated rule will open the paradise of complete
certainty because it is "not possible to devise any formula...which will be
adequate and appropriate for every possible contingency."153 This
understanding of certainty means automatism. As much as this might be sought
by the above mentioned business attitude this is wishful thinking and not
attainable in legal reality  154 .
Predictability and certainty of law are one objective of codification and
drafting techniques: effort is usually made to achieve the utmost precision and
clarity in legal texts.
                                                 
151
  Compare Chapter One.
152
  G.H. Treitel: "Doctrine and Discretion in the Law of Contract", 1981, p.3.
153
  New South Wales Law Reform Commission, quoted after G.H. Treitel:   "Doctrine and
Discretion in the Law of Contract", 1981, p.19.
154
  "The dream of a mechanical justice is recognized for what it is - only a dream and not even a
rosy or desirable one." A.L. Corbin:   "Corbin on Contracts" Vol. 12, 1964/2002, § 1136.
105
The proper understanding of certainty has to be more complex: it is achieved
through the method.  Plausible solutions are reached by way of accepted
methods.  There is a range of solutions which is predictable, and certainty is
limited to this range.  Uncertainty remains an element of litigation as long as
there are human beings involved.155  Applying the law is nothing mechanical
but rather a creative act.  To maintain standards of legitimacy and ultimately
justice, the notion of procedure is therefore essential. 156
II.2.2. Uniformity of sources
Written law rules, codes, are the most prominent, visible, accessible form of
uniform legal source.  So they are the object to be assessed here, with the
UPICC as an example on the transnational level.  This is not to question the
existence of uniform case law on an international level, as well as general
unwritten principles of law.
The concept of uniformity is a standard by which private law on an
international level is measured.  Transnational law is exposed to higher
expectations as to the aspects of certainty and predictability.  The latter
qualities are not considered conditio sine qua non on the level of domestic law
but are readily used as an argument against the workability of transnational
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legal rules.157  This might, however, reflect the generally increased level of
uncertainty involved in transnational dealings.  Higher expectations regarding
international law as opposed to domestic law might be justified given that there
is no state judiciary and legal administration on the international level - another
argument against the existence and acceptability of transnational contract law.
One text - one legal solution.  Frequent targets of criticism on the international
level are EC Directives and multilateral conventions like the CISG.  Such
criticism, concerning clarity and certainty of the law, often refers to the idea of
codified law in general as well as to written law on an international level from
where it is to be applied in different jurisdictions, often indirectly through
another transforming process of implementation.  Again both the function and
the form of the law are to be looked at: the codification as a manifestation of
legal source and the quality of the text, the drafting technique.
II.2.2.1. Uniformity through codification on the domestic level
Codified, or non-codified, law mark the poles traditionally represented by the
civil law and the common law systems, and hence one of the marked
differences between English and German law.  The UPICC as a written source
of transnational contract law are therefore subject to discussion with regard to
this aspect.  Codifications and statutory law perpetuate the legal rule through
one textual formulation.  This technique is considered utterly inflexible by
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sceptics.  What if times change and with them the problems demanding legal
solutions?158  Flexibility to sceptics is an inherent opposite to codification.
This, however, does not appear to aim at the idea that statutes cannot easily be
adapted to different situations, but rather at the experience that the formulation
of statutes can display a stifling quality.
This is a drafting style often serving the aim of certainty and clarity.  However,
experience shows that even the most carefully drafted contract can encounter
unforeseen problems and leave questions open.  How can a statute be expected
to exceed this degree of certainty while covering a wider scope?  Regarding the
quality of the formulation, the example of the BGB is useful. A few remarks
are therefore to follow below.159
II.2.2.1.1. The value of codifications in civil law and common law
traditions
Hein Kötz commented on codification efforts of the Law Commission
concerning the law of contract in England in 1986 in his fifteenth Chores
lecture held at the LSE in London.160  He takes a comparative look at the
attitude towards codification in common law countries from the perspective of
a civil lawyer.
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"No one in England seems to object to the judges using vague and
indeterminate concepts and particularising them as cases come up so long as
these concepts are common law concepts created by the judges themselves, as
when a judge in an action for damages for negligence decides whether the
defendant's conduct has been that of a reasonable man who took reasonable
care to avoid an unreasonable risk of causing injury to others.  But when it
comes to legislation, the parliamentary draftsman, if he can be persuaded to use
a broad term like 'reasonable', seems to be under an irresistible urge to teach
the judge a lesson on what 'reasonable' really means, and while the words
commonly used for that purpose are no-doubt well meant they exude, at least to
a Continental lawyer, a somewhat condescending and pedagogical flavour."
161
It is Kötz' point that the language used in certain examples of English
legislation is nothing less broad and general as a typical civilian counterpart.
Such an example is provided by a comparison of the formulations used in the
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 as well as the German Standard Terms Act
(AGBG), 1976.  Hence this argument is unsuitable to back the distinction of
written law in civil and common law spheres and the dismissal of codification
as such.
The forms of manifestation of the law in written texts range between the
maximum accepted degree of vagueness and the required degree of certainty.
These are reflected in English law, according to Kötz, by the extremes of case
law on one end, consisting of nothing else but a sequence of cases, one being a
precedent for another; a "wilderness of single instances",162 with the
acceptance of general principles of law existing independently from the
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cases163 as an intermediate form, and the claim that a code is required to
"cover every foreseeable situation",164 at the other end of the scale.  Statutes
do not always live up to the latter expectation.  Critical arguments either target
the codes’ "vague generalities" or "rigorous inflexibility".165
The purpose behind codification is to mould the law into a more accessible
form; "to make the law manageable and findable, and to provide a language in
which a meaningful discourse between lawyers can take place".166   The often
cited conflict between the role of Parliament and that of the judiciary regarding
the creation of law by drafting legislation, is said to be meaningless by Kötz in
those cases where a generally accepted principle of common law is put into the
shape of a codification (restatement), because of the use meant to be made of it,
in either form of existence.167  Kötz reminds of the limited use of taking
specific continental Civil Codes as a point of reference for value judgment
about codification in general, since each of them was created within a different
political, historical and social setting.  These codes were drafted "in other
countries, at other times and for other reasons".168  Only the technique of
codification ought to be taken into account, though.  There are different stages
of generality and particularity which can be realised by skilful draftsmen. After
all, legislative drafting is an art.  The subject to be regulated determines how
much flexibility is needed, how much precision is required.
This applies to domestic matters as well as to transnational contract law.
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Kötz: “Taking Civil Codes Less Seriously.” Modern Law Review 50 (1987): 1-15, p.5).
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 Kötz: “Taking Civil Codes Less Seriously.” Modern Law Review 50 (1987):1-15, p.5
165
  Ibid., p.14-15
166
  Ibid., p.6. Another aim is of course to make the law accessible for "everyman" which was the
republican postulation at times of parliamentary discussions of the BGB in the 19th century, see Chapter
Five at V.3.
167
  Ibid., p.6.
168
  Ibid., p.8.
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“He (the draftsman) must steer the best course available by finding language
that strikes an apt balance between certainty and flexibility and facilitates the
orderly development of the law without unduly fettering judicial creativity.”
169
Kötz, in the end, makes the same observation as Hartley,170 when he states:
"Indeed all codes, partly from age, partly from the intention of their draftsmen,
partly from mere oversight, leave wide gaps which cannot be filled by the
available statutory rules." 171
The process of reaching decisions within the framework of such a typical
imperfect code is the same on both a domestic and an international level.  The
general problem of uncertainty and open-textured terms in a code can be
approached by way of established techniques applied in case law as well as by
recurring to pre-code legislation or judge made law and customary law.
To illustrate this further, the controversy around the notion of good faith in
English law can serve as a reference; it is often accused of inducing the use of
"visceral justice".172   However, open-textured terms occur regularly in
English law, they must be filled with legal meaning by objectively formulated
principles.  Such principles exist in English law in connection with the use of
judicial discretion conferred to courts under doctrines such as the doctrine of
                                                 
169
   Kötz: “Taking Civil Codes Less Seriously.” Modern Law Review 50 (1987): 1-15, p.9.
170
   Looking at EC Directives, T Hartley: “The European Court, Judicial Objectivity and the
Constitution of the European Union.” Law Quarterly Review 112 (1996): 95; See also II.2.2.2.
171
  Kötz: “Taking Civil Codes Less Seriously.” Modern Law Review 50 (1987): 1-15, p.11
172
  M. Bridge:  “Good Faith in Commercial Contracts.”  139-164, p.140.
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frustration and many other instances in contract law.173  Apart from the
various instances where contract law is applied by reference to reasonableness
a few examples from statutory law might illustrate the point; the Sale of Goods
Act 1997 not only provides, in s.17 (1), that for the passing of property "at such
time as the parties so intend", but also that for the ascertainment of this
intention; "regard shall be had to the terms of the contract, the conduct of the
parties and the circumstances of the case." This is a clause of remarkable
vagueness.174   Nevertheless, the vagueness of s. 17 (1), "has not in practice
caused unacceptable uncertainty because it is supplemented by statutory
guidelines and by principles derived from an extensive body of case law."175
Note also Treitel's example, "an Act of 1854 (now repealed), which required
certain terms in contracts for the carriage of goods by rail to be such as the
court found reasonable." 176  Interestingly enough, the court practice resulting
from the application of this Act, which became known as "the doctrine of the
'fair alternative'", 177 found its way into modern law; "a modified version of
which appears as a statutory guideline (applicable to contracts for the supply of
goods), in the Unfair Contracts Terms Act 1977." 178
Treitel gives many more examples from case law and statutory law, and they
are worth studying to demonstrate the extent to which English law is suffused
with open-textured rules and terms.  The vagueness of which has been subject
to criticism but nevertheless they are standard tools in English legal practice.
                                                 
173
  For an in-depth analysis see G.H. Treitel: "Doctrine and Discretion in the Law of Contract",
1981.
174
  Compare Varley v. Whipp.  [1900] 1 Q.B. 513, 517.
175
  G.H. Treitel: "Doctrine and Discretion in the Law of Contract", 1981, p.14. By statutory
guidelines further legislation is meant, here s. 18 SGA 1979; see "Benjamin's Sale of Goods" (1974) ss.
291-391; 1400-28; 1556-61; 1689-1703.
176




  Ibid. The doctrine said that it was “reasonable” according to the Act, “if the carrier gave the
consignor the option of sending the goods either at the carrier’s or at the consignor’s risk, of course at
differential rates.”
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Section One of the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts), Act, 1943, confers
discretion to the courts regarding the expenses and benefits incurred by the
parties which might be subject to reimbursement. S.1 (2), confers a free
discretion while s.1 (3), provides "guidelines", as Treitel puts it,179 to the
courts.
The important thing to note is that the use of these rules illustrates "that they
provide different legislative techniques for producing a balance between
certainty and discretion." 180
II.2.2.1.2. Example: The BGB
One example of domestic unification of private law181 is the enactment of the
German BGB in 1900.  When the BGB first came into force it replaced a large
number of Partikularrechte, about 39 of them, which were feudal laws of
different regions applying to different areas of life, partly stemming from the
Middle Ages; the Gemeines Recht (common law); the Saxon Civil Code
(1863); the Preußisches Allgemeines Landrecht (Prussian Civil Code, 1794);
Rhenish Law (including the Code Civil, 1804); Danish Law (1863); Austrian
Law (ABGB 1811).
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  Including many examples of successful drafting meeting Kötz' description quoted above,
II.2.2.1.1.
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Application of contract law was subject to one instance only (Reichsgericht -
Imperial Court), which could be perceived as conditio sine qua non for
uniformity by guaranteeing a uniform application and interpretation.
The uniform application of this law naturally did not follow the introduction of
the code immediately.  Judges resorted to pre-code law in order to interpret
certain passages which might have left gaps open.  A common interpretation
grew out of the activity of the Reichsgericht and later the Bundesgerichtshof.
The methods of interpretation, however, had been the result of scientific
research of almost a century.  The evolution of interpretation methods
happened independently from the introduction of new legislation.  Legal
science had been a strong factor in building the law before the BGB came into
force.  Thus gaps and general clauses provided little difficulty since judges and
lawyers were accustomed to resorting to science and general principles to
develop the law further.  The technique in a code like the BGB is the
formulation of abstract sentences that are to be interpreted and can cover as
many instances of real life as possible.182
Skilful drafting of codes is what is needed for such a project.  This approach
avoids trying to pre-formulate every possible twist of life and thus become too
literal.  General clauses are therefore sometimes the last resort for the objective
to provide for as much substantive value as possible.  Vague formulations,
gaps, "Generalklauseln", open terms, require an agreed method of application
and interpretation.  After all, applying law is not an automatic mechanism but a
process taking place in a human brain, sometimes a process of negotiation and
                                                 
182
  The BGB claims to be formed of a comprehensive, scientific legal system the original claim of
which was to provide for the possibility of deducting a logically founded and thus guaranteed solution for
every case, see Münchener Kommentar:   "Einleitung"    , No.19.
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interaction between several individuals.183  The outcome cannot be
characterised by absolute certainty.  The way in which German domestic law
deals with gaps and open terms can serve here as another example of how
wrong common prejudices about the static character of the legal families and
their attitude towards fundamental and constituting principles of their system
actually are, and how the civil and the common law can use the same
techniques.  Also, a first reference is made to a substantive rule of the UPICC,
which will be the subject of Part Two.
In German law general clauses (Generalklauseln), provide for judge-made law
to be developed.  This happened in many instances and has lead to the birth of
the doctrines of; culpa in contrahendo (pre-contractual liability), positive
Vertragsverletzung (damages for negligence in the course of contractual
performance), and Drittschadensliquidation (damages for third parties), which
are all unconnected to the wording of the statute at first sight and seem to grant
claims which were not provided for by the legislator.  The most dramatic case
is that of the doctrine of frustration of contracts (Wegfall der
Geschäftsgrundlage), which is to fill a gap discovered in the wake of the First
World War concerning the validity of long term contracts.
Under German law supervening events are generally addressed under the
heading of impossibility.184  It is a different approach from the common law
one in that it focuses on the nature of the event rather than on the commercial
purpose of the contract.  The only instance where a German judiciary was
forced to pay tribute to the commercial purpose of the contract is the doctrine
of Fehlen oder Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage, the lack or the subsequent
                                                 
183
  Compare O. Lando: “Homo judicans.” Uniform Law Review 2/3 (1998): pp. 535-544 and see
Chapter Eight.
184
  See II.2.2.2.2.
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disappearance of the commercial basis (of a contract).  This doctrine was in
fact first accepted and developed by the judiciary (Reichsgericht), after World
War I in the wake of political and economical upheavals.185   Many contracts
and intended businesses could not be performed as planned due to tremendous
changes in the underlying circumstances.  A substantial amount of business
transactions were desperately affected by hyper-inflation and destruction of
goods and production facilities by the war.  The same applied, of course, after
World War II when the Oberster Gerichtshof für die Britische Zone (OGH),
and the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), continued to apply the doctrine, thereby
moving further away from the pure exceptional and emergency-induced
character of the first instances of its recognition  186 .
This, and most other doctrines mentioned above, are based on the principle of
good faith as it is expressed by §§157, 242 BGB, the provisions relating to the
                                                 
185
  The creators of the BGB had not followed Windscheid’s “doctrine of the assumption”
(Bernhard Windscheid: "Die Lehre von der Voraussetzung” in AcP 78 (1892), p.1-195), see Mot. I, 249.
During the times of gross inflation after World War I Oertmann (“Die Geschäftsgrundlage”, 1921),
developed his doctrine of the Geschäftsgrundlage, the commercial basis. Taking these writings together
with certain provisions in the BGB (§§321,610), into account the Reichsgericht recognised the so-called
clausula rebus sic stantibus and granted relief in cases mostly concerned with price adjustment to parties
affected by the inflation. Examples are RGZ 50,255,257; 60,65,68; 100,129,130; 103,3; 107,151,153. See
also K. Zweigert, and H. Kötz:  "An Introduction to Comparative Law",1998, at p.518-524.
186
  See BGHZ 25,390 where the parties, after the currency reform (RM to DM), had based their
price (for some disowned property), on the then accepted exchange rate of 10:1 for the new currency
(DM) which was subsequently changed for this particular claim to a relation of 1:1. This was a typical
example of a situation where the change of the basis of the contract was beyond the parties’ control and
could not have been foreseen. A later case, BGHZ 47,48,51, concerned the price of land sold for building
purposes, but development was not allowed later.  BGH NJW 67,721 and JZ 77,177 were similar cases.
See also BGH LM No.83 at §242 (Bb).
Following the German reunification similar problems were met by the enactment of numerous pieces
of legislation such as the “DM-Bilanzgesetz” (DM balance law) which grants a possibility of adaptation
of the price in its § 32 II. Other laws relate to pre-unification debts (Altschuldengesetz, excluding the
application of the doctrine), adaptation of interest rates (Zinsanpassungsgesetz). Regarding sales contracts
there is only one special constellation where sales effected under the urge of emigration to the West
which is regulated in the Vermögensgesetz (wealth law). All other sales contracts concluded before the 9
Oct 1990 remain valid and are not affected by the political changes, KG OLG-NL 96,76. Overall this
modern situation of fundamental change has been handled with much more preparation and sophisticated
foresight than the previous ones which were of course set in a situation of chaos and subsequent lack of
judicial organisation and preparation , e.g. regarding technical facilities and personnel.
For further reference see Görk, „Deutsche Einheit und Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage“ (German
unity and the doctrine of lack of the basis of the transaction), 1995.
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construction of contract clauses and Treu und Glauben.187  The principle of
good faith provides another traditional conflict between the common law and
the civil law worlds.188  The reason for granting special relief in the above
mentioned cases, was the disturbance of the overall equilibrium of the contract,
just like Art. 6.2.2. UPICC describes it.  Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage does
not automatically discharge the parties of their original obligations.  The legal
effect is the adaptation of the contract terms by the court.189  The UPICC
provide for renegotiation by the parties, which is a solution more suited to
commercial men rather than the general public and consumer contracts.
II.2.2.2.  Uniformity on the international level: Examples of uniform law
sources
In order to examine the quality of international contract law as to the degree of
its uniformity, three different types of international law may serve as examples
for written uniform international sources of law: the CISG, EC Directives and
the UPICC.
CISG, which emerged originally as a convention, has now been turned into
domestic codifications in many countries.  In most cases it has not been altered
through implementing legislation.  Its rules are thus subject to judicial review
and thus to interpretation by judges, but also by users such as lawyers and
                                                 
187
  D. Medicus:   "Bürgerliches Recht", 1991, No.165a; K. Larenz: "Allgemeiner Teil des
Deutschen Bürgerlichen Rechts", 1983, p.382; K. Larenz: "Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts. Erster Band:
Allgemeiner Teil", 1982, p.297; H. Hübner: "Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches", 1996,
§42 D I; MüKo /Roth §242 No.535 seq.
188
  With regard to the UPICC I suggest to deal with this doctrine under the principles developed in
the context of applying any open textured terms in English law.
189
  H. Hübner: "Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches", 1996, §42 D V, p.468; BGHZ
47,48,51; 70,47,51.
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merchants who become parties to contracts under CISG.  These rules can now
be understood and interpreted differently in different jurisdictions according to
different languages and legal techniques.190  CISG contains certain internal
rules concerning interpretation (Art. 8 - 13), as well as the rule in Art. 7., which
provide for external interpretation methods, in order to give effect to the
international character and the purpose of the convention.
Uniform application is ensured in most international Conventions and Model
Laws through the insertion of a clause into international codifications.  An
example is provided by Art. 7, CISG.  Section (2), of this Article provides a
standard of interpretation by pointing to the "general principles underlying this
convention".  Thereby it is meant to suggest that there exists a common
understanding of the regulated matters extending beyond the literal meaning of
the convention.  This is the potential enabling lawyers and contracting parties
to apply the convention in a uniform way.  The final outcome of any
application still depends on the technicalities of interpretation which differs
between legal systems.  Once the interpretation has to leave the framework of
the literal text and the "underlying principles", and resort to the conflict of laws
according to Art. 7 (2) CISG, there is, of course, a strong possibility that the
uniformity can get lost and turn into diversity or entropy and thus possibly the
state in which the law of international sales was before CISG came into
existence.
These are in my view, no typical ambiguities and sources of uncertainty
specific to international law as opposed to domestic law but rather specific to
any written law.  Specific problems of international uniform law are, however,
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  Compare in this Chapter at II.2.3.
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said to arise from different textual versions such as differing translations and
unsuitable drafting techniques.
II.2.2.2.1.  Textual understanding
Applying law in the form of a written text can take the form of interpreting
literature.  It is the perception of words.  Language has a great significance
here.  A common understanding of certain words is important to successful
communication.  But at the same time one would not expect a greater certainty
of the law than the meaning of words can ever have.  Certainly, interpreting
legal texts requires insight into special characteristics of each language, such as
the subtle change of expressions over time, once a legal text is of any age:
"Consider, for example, the vicissitudes of the description of a person as
'sentimental'.  The Oxford Dictionary tells us:  'Of persons, their dispositions
and actions; characterised by sentiment. Originally in favourable
sense:...refined and elevated feeling.  In later use: Addicted to indulgence in
superficial emotion; apt to be swayed by sentiment.'  What has been a term of
praise became one of mild reproach.  What would be the task of a lawyer, then,
if asked to construe a trust instrument written in 1720 establishing scholarship
for 'sentimental' youths?" 191
And what that of the merchant reading a code dating from fifty years earlier in
our fast moving times?  One only has to think of the grand expression 'good
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  S. Levinson:  “Law as Literature.”   155-173, p.157.
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faith'.192  Is this not a rather outdated use of language?  Is this expression
suitable for certain and predictable results?
"...the plain-meaning approach inevitably breaks down in the face of the reality
of disagreement among equally competent speakers of the native language."
193
So, is a certain uncertainty, disagreement and implied unpredictability not
immanent to uniform domestic contract law?  To the extent that this is tolerated
on the domestic level, it should be on the international level, too.  Certainly,
complete uncertainty cannot be the nature of law and its application, either.
Applying law generally implies the need to create the missing bit between the
abstract formulation and the real case to be decided.  This process is innate to
any written law.  This is not an argument specifically affecting international
codifications.
EC directives, to provide an example, often display a deliberate textual
openness since they are usually not directly binding but to be implemented into
domestic legislation. They are meant to be models leaving space for the
creative spirit of legislators, i.e. to the sovereignty of the Member States.  This
is the theory of harmonisation.  The creation of ambiguities in directives and
other EC instruments is said to stem from deliberately ambiguous formulations,
either because a final decision as to the meaning was diplomatically avoided
and could not be reached, or because it was subject to a "deal" as in an example
given by Hartley:
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  Contained in Art. 1.7 (1) UPICC. "Treu und Glauben" in German which is also an outdated use
of language.
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  S. Levinson:  “Law as Literature.”   155-173, p.158.
120
Regulation 1612 / 68; Directive 68/360; The Queen v. The Immigration Appeal
Tribunal, ex parte Antonissen.194
Uniform application of EC law, and especially EC directives, was discussed at
a comparative law conference in Graz 1997.  Trevor Hartley commented on the
lack of clarity in EC directives from the point of view of English law.195
Hartley reports on the specifically English approach to interpretation of
statutory law, while referring to the opinion given by the House of Lords in the
Webb case196 on the interpretation of domestic law according to EC directives.
Linguistic uncertainty for him is one of the first and most obvious reasons for
distortions of meaning of EC directives which are meant to be applied equally
in all member states. These directives serve as one single source of law just
like CISG does for its member states and the UPICC can do for parties who
choose them.  However, Hartley demonstrates different legal meanings of the
term "goods" in the Unfair Contract Terms Directive.197  He points to the fact
that the directive was originally drafted in French, in which "goods" is to
correspond to "biens" which covers land, as opposed to the English meaning of
"goods" referring only to movables.  Is, now, the scope of this directive
different in French and English speaking countries?  Does the translation and
formulation have to be adjusted according to the true meaning of the directive?
Which is the true meaning?
II.2.2.2.2. Drafting technique
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  Case C-292/89 (1991) ECR  I-745  ( paragraph 18 of the judgment.).
195
  Compare T. Hartley: “The European Court, Judicial Objectivity and the Constitution of the
European Union.” Law Quarterly Review 112 (1996): 95 and T C Hartley:  "The Transposition and
Interpretation of EC Directives: The British Viewpoint", 1997.
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  Webb v. Emo Air Cargo.  [1995]  1 WLR 1454 .
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  Directive 93/ 13, OJ 1993 L 95/29.
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A high standard and quality of drafting technique and legislative concept is
specific to any written law and equally important on both the municipal and
international level.  It is unjustified to allow a lesser standard to any of these
types of law.  The UPICC provide a successful example regarding the drafting
of individual rules and consistency of the whole set.198  Therefore they are
well suited to serve as a model for new domestic legislation in the field of
international commercial contracts.  Unfortunately, recent German law reform
projects have not implemented the high standard of clear drafting and
conceptual consistency provided by the UPICC,199 neither in the area of the
law of obligations, nor in that of international commercial arbitration.  While
the new law on arbitration is discussed in Chapter Eight, the following section
will give a brief example of failed integration of international law into novel
German legislation.
The UPICC introduce the concept of non-performance giving rise to
autonomous contractual rights.  In German contract law non-performance,
Nichterfüllung, appears in damages provisions merely as a measure for
damages,200 §325 BGB,201 and is mentioned in §326 BGB202 as a ground
for liability in damages of the defaulting party.  Nevertheless non-performance
is not specifically defined in the BGB, and it does not entitle to ensuing
contractual rights as an independent contractual remedy or defence.  Therefore,
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  This will be discussed further in Part Two, compare also the acknowledgements by B.
Fauvarque-Cosson: “Comparative Law and Conflict of Laws: Allies or Enemies? New Perspectives on an
Old Couple.” AmJCompL 49 (2001): 407-428, at p.416; C.-W. Canaris:  “Die Stellung der 'UNIDROIT
Principles' und 'Principles of European Contract Law' im System der Rechtsquellen.” pp.5-31; U.
Drobnig: “The UNIDROIT Principles in the Conflict of Laws.” Uniform Law Review 2/3 (1998): 385-
295.; R. Goode: “Usage and its Reception in Transnational Commercial Law.” International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 46 (1997): 1-36.; P. Mankowski: “Rechtswahl für Verträge des
internationalen Wirtschaftsverkehrs.” RIW 1 (2003): pp.2-15.
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  As well as by the PECL.
200
  Eg. in §§ 325, 326,338,340,463,538,545,635 BGB.
201
  On impossibility on the debtors part.
202
  On delayed performance.
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the notion of non-performance as used in the UPICC might at first sight be
considered an instance of incompatibility and thus, lead to more entropy in
international contract law.  In fact, the BGB used to employ the highly
sophisticated concept of "impossibility".  Cases that would fall under non-
performance rules in the UPICC would be solved under impossibility or
defective performance rules in the BGB.  One objective of the recent reform of
the BGB was the simplification of this over complicated section of the code as
well as its adaptation to international standards and models.  Traditionally, the
concept of breach of contract as it is contained in the CISG, or the concept of
non-performance of contractual obligations as contained in the UPICC, are
recognised as originating from common law jurisdictions in Germany.  In order
to come up with a similar concept the new concept of "breach of duty", or
breach of obligation (Pflichtverletzung), was introduced into the new law of
obligations.  This does not seem to be a convincing solution, however, given
that it introduces another term, meaning yet something other than the above
mentioned two international sets of rules, also something other than the English
concept of breach of contract, so this aliud results in even more variety of
concepts on the scene of contract laws, and hence, more entropy instead of
harmony of standards on an international level.
The new term suggests a confusing proximity to the concept of breach of
contract which stems from a fundamentally different understanding of contract.
A fundamental change of understanding of contract, however, cannot have
been the aim of the German legislator.
Obviously therefore, the legislator did not take existing and suitable examples
of modern international contract law into account, probably due to the lack of
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formal authority of the rules as discussed above.203  The persuasive force of
the UPICC,204  however, was of no interest to the legislator which shows that
other interests, certainly purely domestic ones rather than those of international
trade, were observed in the drafting process.
It confirms the above mentioned theory, that traditional doctrine focuses on,
and confines itself to, the nation state and ignores the international dimension
of modern developments of the law in the course of the evolution of global
trade and the EU.
Besides this effect, the law reform has brought about various difficulties in the
application of newly introduced concepts because it disturbs the consistency of
the traditional system of German contract law, which is an important
constituting element for legal reasoning in German legal practice.205  The lack
of thorough doctrinal foundation of the new concepts and notions206  highlight
the importance of the UPICC as a prototype for international contract law in
the field of commercial contracts.  The UPICC provide a comprehensive
solution for a whole area of contract law using the notion of non-performance
which includes defective and late performance.207  Questions of defective
performance are dealt with by Art. 7.1.4. and 7.1.5.  Under German law
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  An absence of coordination in the sense described by P.J.-J. Hering, and A.J. Kanning:
“Unifying Commercial Laws of Nation-States, Coordination of Legal Systems and Economic Growth”,
(accessed online 2004).
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  Compare Part Three.
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  Compare for an indepth analysis of this problem J. Kohler: “Rechtsetzung im demokratischen
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  Another example is the notion of consumer which is alien to German law otherwise. German
law deals with a very unique distinction of merchants and non-merchants and important legal
consequences are attached to this definition. The Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch) is based on this
distinction.
207
  Art. 7.1.1. UPICC, “non-performance defined”: “Non-performance is failure by a party to
perform any of its obligations under the contract, including defective performance or late performance.”
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questions of hardship and force majeure need to be distinguished from, and
sometimes resolved under, the rules relating to defective and late performance,
too.208
It would be a recommendable solution to provide for a law relating to
specifically defined international commercial contracts which then expressly
introduced specific theoretical concepts distinct from traditional domestic law.
This would clearly mark and justify the introduction of new paradigms for
special subjects to be resolved under specialised law.  It would avoid the
dilution of traditional concepts by flawed drafting and conceptualisation.  Such
a technique would be in line with both the established German doctrines of
Sonderprivatrecht der Kaufleute, the special law merchant, as well as the
doctrine of lex specialis.209
II.2.3. Uniformity of application and interpretation methods
One of the main objections against the idea that uniform law can exist at an
international level is the absence of a common instance functioning as an
interpreter of the law.  Application of uniform law, such as CISG, for example,
is said to inevitably lead to a modification of that law, to the creation of new
difference which is then often called "harmonisation" (indicating that there is
still some common feature left), as opposed to "uniformity".  It has to be asked,
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  Eg temporary impediment. In the area of discrepancies between he parties‘ expectations and
reality the law relating to defective performance is applicable: If goods or services suffer from a defect, if
they do not comply with the employer‘ s or buyer‘ s expectations there are remedies granting damages,a
right to rectification,  a right of termination and a right to reduce the price: §§ 633 - 636 BGB for service
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  See  Chapter Eight.
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whether this kind of modification arising from applying the law is not innate to
applying any law. 210
Uniformity is a matter of definition and depends strongly on the purpose it is
trying to achieve.  Uniform international law is predominantly defined by its
purposes and sources, rather than by the technically uniform nature of the
results when applied to concrete cases.  The determination of the purpose of
unified international contract law is the decisive argument in order to assess the
degree of uncertainty and lack of clarity which is tolerable, or, to what extent
precision and uniform interpretation methods are required and indispensable.
Interpretation and application beyond the literal terms of the codification,
convention or model law is inevitable.  As to the BGB it has already been said
that probably the largest component of legal questions, arise from gaps in
legislation.211  If we were to find the larger amount of legal problems to be
solved under diverse domestic laws and interpretation methods rather than
under international law, this would not frustrate the purpose of unified
codification as long as there were suitable methods of integration and
application, within domestic legal systems, available.
A model for internationally "unified" interpretation of legal rules is sometimes
seen in the jurisdiction of the ECJ.  Open textured formulations in regulations
or conventions have often given rise to the development of more concise
formulations by the judges justifying decisions which then form a network of
guidelines or even judge-made law.
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  Compare  II.2.2.2. and II.2.2.2.1.
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 See Heck: “Gesetzesauslegung und Interessenjurisprudenz”, 1914, S.174, quoted after
Münchener Kommentar, Einleitung, No.64.
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True uniformity is therefore often said to be available only in this and similar
areas of international law where a common judicial body is available.  We
subject our legal conflict or quest to the judges.  We accept their judgments due
to their institutional power but also, and only, if their judgments are
"reasonable".212  If they are not, we take them to the next instance or
constitutional court or otherwise, if there was none of those, we would
gradually loose faith in the law and evade it.
Indeed, methods of interpretation used by the ECJ as well as the formulation of
its rulings are considered a source of "uncertainty" by some.213  Methods of
interpretation are themselves to be agreed; as far as they concern the
international level and a transnational forum, this process requires its own
specific method and understanding.  Common methods of interpretation are an
essential tool to achieve uniformity.
II.2.4. Conclusion
This section has shown that unity of laws manifests through uniformity of
sources, not uniformity of results. This means using codified systems of
transnational law on an international level to provide this form of uniformity
for international commercial contracts.  Uniformity of results cannot be
expected from uniform contract law on application in national legal systems.
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  See G. Graff:  “Keep off the grass, Drop Dead, and other Indeterminacies: A Response to
Sanford Levinson.”   175-180, p.179. There the polarity between the two perceptions is illustrated:
interpretation as "unchallenged authority of divine commands“ against no authority whatsoever except the
"coercive authority of institutional force“  and certainly an attempt to mediate.
213
  Hartley‘ s example: “Torfaen Borough Council v. B&Q plc.” Case C-145/88  ECR 3851
(1989). see: T Hartley: “The European Court, Judicial Objectivity and the Constitution of the European
Union.” Law Quarterly Review 112 (1996): 95.
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This is not the aim of uniform law neither on a domestic nor on an international
level.  This also means that skilled drafting of such rules214  and a practice of
applying written law, especially open-textured terms,215 are a condition of the
successful use of such law within national legal systems.   If this is recognised,
a successful use of transnational contract law even in common law systems is
possible.  Such a way of using uniform law is guided by the uniform law itself
under its interpretation provisions as incorporated eg in Art. 7 CISG.  It
requires an agreed method of operating such law within the area of
international trade law.  This can become a methodology of international
contract law as suggested in this study.  The understanding of the nature of
applying written law and textual understanding of its rules implies the
acceptance of the simultaneous existence of unity and diversity in the law as a
general phenomenon which is not only typical for transnational law.  Creating
a method of working with this paradox is the task of a specific methodology of
international contract law.
II.3. Conclusion
This chapter has explained an important aspect of uniform transnational
contract law; it has shown what uniformity of law means, how it is to be
defined.  Namely two aspects have to be distinguished; uniformity of sources
on the one hand and uniformity of application and its results on the other.  The
former is achievable through transnationally used uniform sources and texts,
the latter is commonly understood to provide 'certainty and predictability' in the
                                                 
214
  See Chapter Eight below at VIII.1.
215
  Compare Chapter Four below.
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law and is not normally achieved, not even on a domestic level.216  Based on
this understanding it follows that uniformity of laws cannot be universal
(unifying all the law of all the nations), but is fragmentary and confined to
branches of trade or a geographical network of trade relations.  Uniform
contract law arises where there is need for it.  The need (incentive), exists in
the area of international commercial contracts in an international community of
merchants which is not defined by political or geographical borders.  The
degree and quality of uniformity is determined by the needs for uniformity.
Unification of laws and uniformity of international contract law are not a goal
in itself, it provides no self-fulfilling purpose.  The uniform character of
transnational law is kept up by discourse and common practice.  It would be
wrong to expect uniformity of results through the application of uniform law
and therefore deny the prospects of transnational law by pointing to the
absence of supra-national state court control (II.2.3.).217
CONCLUSION
Part One of this study has identified the origin of obstacles to the successful
use of transnational uniform contract law arising from legal theory in modern
nation states; an unreflected use of traditional concepts of contract law doctrine
(Chapter One), as well as, wrong expectations towards the function of uniform
law (Chapter Two).
                                                 
216
   Certainty and predictability in transnational law can be advanced by a competent discourse
producing accepted standards. This discourse does not need to be embodied in a state court structure. The
emergence of courts on a transnational level is not excluded, anyway. There are already bodies like the
ICC and their arbitration institutions, compare below, Part Three.
217
  Compare also Chapter Eight.
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Part One of this study has also described and identified aspects of the legal
nature of uniform contract law; its position within traditional legal doctrine of
contract law and its generic quality and definition as uniform law in general.
Part One has also shown in which way problems posed by traditional concepts
and the current superficial understanding of uniform contract law can be
overcome:
Revisiting and reviewing the use and understanding of traditional concepts, the
application of equally traditional concepts upon deeper analysis and addressing
the law in an appropriate context which allows the integration of uniform
contract law into domestic legal systems.  This process and practice forms an
element of a novel methodology of international contract law.
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PART TWO
METHODS OF INTEGRATING APPLICATION OF
UNIFORM PRIVATE LAW IN DOMESTIC LEGAL
SYSTEMS
INTRODUCTION
The previous section, Part One of the thesis, has looked at general aspects of
legal theory with regard to applying transnational rules of law.  This second
part of the thesis explores how the UPICC, as a specific set of uniform law
rules, can be integrated into domestic law on the level of substantive law and
by concrete practical application of individual rules.  It identifies the second
major obstacle to the use of transnational uniform contract law; the application
process of such law by national lawyers.  It inquires whether this process
reveals or presupposes a specific methodology of international contract law and
how difficulties applying uniform law within national legal systems can be
overcome accordingly.
The two domestic legal systems under which the principles are analysed are
English and German law.  These two legal systems represent two of the major
'legal families' in the Western world.  English law has laid the foundations for
the whole of the common law world especially the Anglo-American
jurisdictions, which are given special consideration in this section.  German
law represents the so-called civil law jurisdictions.  This may sound to
somewhat simplify since the civil law jurisdictions themselves are very
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different from each other.218  German law, however, differs most significantly
from English law in many aspects of contract law and the law of civil
procedure.
Part Two therefore asks how the UPICC as a novel international contract law
blend with the standards of substantive law of these two European
jurisdictions. It investigates whether the UPICC are compatible with English
(Chapter Four),  and with German law (Chapter Five), what their quality as
rules of law are, and whether they offer advanced solutions to selected
problems in domestic contract law on the level of international contract law.  It
examines the question of how obstacles to the use of transnational uniform
contract law created by a flawed application technique can be overcome both
from a substantive law aspect as well as from a methodological viewpoint.
Another general concept examined in Part Two is the idea of applying a
codified contract law within the context of English law as a common law
system. Both Chapter Four and Five219 analyse aspects of the codification of
contract law throughout European history, in order to suggest possible answers
to questions of the integration of uniform contract law into a common law
system.
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  See for instance the following quotation by John P. Dawson: "The contrast between the French
and the German treatment of specific performance is among many demonstrations of the great differences
between the "civil law" systems. Despite their long exposure to ideas derived from Roman law, each of
the "civil law" systems is the product of independent values and objectives from the society it purports to
regulate." (Dawson: “Specific Performance in France and Germany.” Michigan Law Review 57 (1959):
495, at p.525).
219
  Compare IV.1.3. and V.3. below.
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CHAPTER THREE
Performance of payment obligations in the UPICC
Chapter Three analyses the meaning and scope of Art. 7.2.1 UPICC in the
context of international building and construction contracts.  This rule provides
for a right to require performance of payment obligations.
The chapter asks how Art.7.2.1. UPICC is to be applied according to an
autonomous interpretation technique and researches the answers to questions
brought up by scholars in connection with this rule of the UPICC.  This
involves a discussion of aspects of specific performance, the enforcement of
payment obligations, and cancellation rights in building contracts under the
UPICC as well as under English (Chapter Four), and German, domestic
contract law (Chapter Five).
The wide scope of the principles invites a discussion of contracts other than
those for the sale of goods in order to establish the compatibility of the UPICC
with domestic legal systems.  The Commentary of the UPICC very often refers
to construction contracts to explain the scope and meaning of single provisions.
I have therefore selected the example of international building and construction
contracts to conduct an exemplary discussion of selected provisions of the
UPICC and the potential of their application within domestic legal systems.
III.1. Starting point:  Article 7.2.1 UPICC and scholarly critique
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This section introduces one specific article of the UPICC, a written rule of
uniform contract law.  It sets out the wording and literal meaning and asks how
this rule can be applied to individual cases within a domestic law setting.  It
pinpoints one specific problem raised by a scholar in the course of her research
on the scope of payment obligations in the UPICC.
III.1.1. Articles 7.2.1. and 7.2.2. UPICC 220
Art. 7.2.1.UPICC is located in Chapter 7 of the UPICC on non-performance in
its second section entitled: “Right to Performance”. It provides for the
enforceability of payment obligations:
"Where a party who is obliged to pay money does not do so, the other party
may require payment."
Here, the UPICC establish their concept regarding performance of contractual
obligations.  They generally recognise a direct self-executing right to
performance and at the same time determine the way monetary obligations are
to be dealt with under their regime.  The right to performance is further
described by the subsequent Art.7.2.2 UPICC, "Performance of Non-Monetary
Obligation“, which reads:
"Where a party who owes an obligation other than one to pay money does not
perform, the other party may require performance, unless;
(a) performance is impossible in law or fact;
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  Articles of the UPICC will also be quoted without express reference in the following, eg Art.
7.2.1.
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(b) performance or, where relevant, enforcement is unreasonably burdensome
or expensive;
(c) the party entitled to performance my reasonably obtain performance from
another source;
(d) performance is of an exclusively personal character; or
(e) the party entitled to performance does not require performance within a
reasonable time after it has, or ought to have, become aware of the non-
performance."
III.1.2.  Scholarly critique
The wording of Art. 7.2.1 UPICC has provoked some objections because it
does not contain express limitations.  It is said that this provision grants an
unqualified right to performance of the monetary obligation.221 Professor
Schwenzer submits that no other European jurisdiction supports specific
performance to such an extent, and she mentions the duty to mitigate loss as a
possible limitation to the scope of Art. 7.2.1 UPICC.222  Above all she misses
a right of cancellation in the Principles.  This criticism is based on the
understanding that the monetary obligation is not to be qualified by any
limitation under the Principles.  It is considered an overly rigid expression of
the principle of pacta sunt servanda especially since a cancellation right is not
included which could even force an unwilling party to consummate a
transaction which is of no interest to them.  It would follow that the Principles
do not provide the potential to create uniformity in international contract
                                                 
221
 I. Schwenzer:  Erfüllung und Schadensersatz nach den Unidroit - Prinzipien, 1997,p.4-5,
(conference paper); published as I. Schwenzer: “Specific Performance and Damages According to the
1994 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts.” ELR 1 (1998/1999): 289-303.
222
  Ibid. p.295.
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law223 because they are incompatible with national law, at least in this
area.224
Professor Schwenzer's Article provides an excellent starting point for a
thorough analysis and interpretation of the UPICC not only because it is the
first and probably the only one dealing with the subject of specific enforcement
and damages in the Principles but also because it provides an example of
applying the Principles in a way which is very typical for a national lawyer.225
It is because of this phenomenon that uniform private law falls short of its true
potential.
Another noteworthy aspect of Professor Schwenzer's article is that it is a civil
lawyer who shows great concern about the scope of the right to performance in
a uniform law model.  Traditionally, the common law systems are skeptical
about the use of performance provisions in international sets of rules226  which
are obviously created according to the civil law model.  Civil law systems are
said to support specific performance often equalled with specific enforcement,
much more generously than common law jurisdictions.  It is therefore all the
more surprising that with regard to Art. 7.2.1. UPICC the concern about rights
to require performance can be said to have been raised from both sides; the
above mentioned criticism is expressed by a civil lawyer pointing out that the
UPICC create an exaggerated and unacceptable emphasis of specific
performance by the way Art. 7.2.1. UPICC is formulated.  The common law
position can be presumed to be equally critical given the legal situation under
Art. 28 CISG.227
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 See below III.2.
226
  Compare. Art.28 of the 1980 Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods, CISG.
227
  See IV.1.1. below.
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III.2. Towards a methodology of transnational contract law: Doctrinal
foundations revisited
The following section explores the compatibility of the UPICC with English
and German contract law and asks how they can be integrated and how
conflicts arising out of differences between the transnational and the national
regimes can be solved.
An autonomous interpretation method as suggested here presupposes the
conception of the UPICC as a comprehensive and self -sufficient body of rules
and their application as the law governing the contract to the exclusion of
national law (Kollisionsrecht), in the first place.  National contract law would
then serve to supplement the UPICC where they do not provide answers to
certain questions of law or fact, either because they are outside their scope or
because there is a gap.  This technique corresponds to standard methods
applying CISG and other international conventions within a domestic
context.228  It requires the UPICC to be compatible with national contract
laws which means it must be possible to overcome existing differences by
applying established techniques.229
                                                 
228
 Compare eg F. Ferrari: “Das Verhältnis zwischen den Unidroit-Grundsätzen und den
allgemeinen Grundsätzen internationaler Einheitsprivatrechtskonventionen.” Juristenzeitung 1 (1998): 9-
17 and F. Ferrari: “Defining the sphere of application of the 1994 "UNIDROIT principles of international
commercial contracts".” Tulane law review 69 (1995): 1225-1237.
229
  The legal prerequisite for applying the UPICC as the law governing the contract
(Kollisionsrecht), are supportive conflict of law rules in domestic legal systems. These are
discussed below in Part Three.
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III.2.1. Autonomous method of applying Art. 7.2.1. UPICC
An autonomous method of applying Art. 7.2.1 UPICC starts by looking at the
wording more closely.  The wording of Art. 7.2.1 UPICC reveals that it really
presupposes the payment obligation rather than creating it.230  Hence
considerations must focus on the question of whether or not there is a payment
obligation to be performed in the first place.  This question has to be
determined relying on the rules of the UPICC.   It is different from the method
applied by Professor Schwenzer in her study,231 where she does not mention
the existence of a valid obligation as a prerequisite for Art. 7.2.1 UPICC to
take effect.  She would, however, do so applying domestic law.  Instead of
doing so here, she jumps to the question of whether a duty to mitigate can
provide a limitation to Art. 7.2.1 UPICC.232  This deficiency of
methodological coherence regarding the application of law, on a domestic level
on the one hand, and on an international level on the other, is a source of
misunderstanding in the area of application of international uniform law rules.
It also characterises the often alleged deficiency of such law; it is truly the
deficiency on the part of its users.
The following sections highlight some issues of legal theory which were
brought up in the context of the above described critique of Art. 7.2.1. UPICC.
Viewing these together is a formative process for the development of a
potential novel doctrine of transnational contract law.  It is also part of an
appropriate method of application of transnational law; keeping the
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  See below III.3. for further discussion.
231
  I.Schwenzer:  “Specific Performance and Damages According to the 1994 UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts.”  European Journal of Law Reform  1 (1998/1999):
289-303.
232
  Ibid., p.295: "A first possible  interpretation would seek to apply the duty to mitigate as stated
in Art 7.4.8...."
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background in perspective and in the user's awareness.  Even using domestic
legal concepts as an argument in the context of such an application process233
requires revisiting these concepts in order to justify the argument.
Some of the objections raised against rules of transnational law such as the
UPICC are based on unfounded preconceptions brought about by domestic
law. This chapter will therefore revisit conceptions of English and German law
in order to demonstrate that a correct understanding of one's own legal
background is essential for the successful application of transnational law.
The following Chapters Four and Five therefore analyse the right to require
payment, specific performance and cancellation rights in English and German
law responding to the above mentioned critique. They show how
Art.7.2.1.UPICC is successfully to be applied within the context of both these
legal systems, namely by analysing the scope of the primary right to require
payment under the UPICC, as well as under current English and German
law,234 and by explaining the respective areas of both legal systems where
clashes are to be found and defining what requirements have to be met in order
to overcome these difficulties.
The Principles fulfil a prime category of compatibility with domestic law and
practical workability as the law governing international commercial contracts
(Kollisionsrecht), due to their high level of drafting technique and consistency.
This is a paramount quality compared to highly specialised and fragmented
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  Such as reservations against specific performance or good faith in English law.
234
  Considerations of mistake, frustration, force majeure and hardship as well as good faith aspects
which are possible defences against payment claims are disregarded here.
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solutions of standard terms and general trade usages235  tailored to match the
needs of diverse branches of international trade.236
III.2.2. Conclusion and structure of autonomous methodological approach
The two previous sections of Chapter Three have shown how one particular
rule of uniform law can be misunderstood and have explained a concept for a
more successful method of application. This is called an autonomous
interpretation, but it will be extended in the chapters to follow by an element of
historical perspective.  In the following, Art. 7.2.1.UPICC will be analysed
according to an autonomous interpretation primarily, by taking other rules of
the UPICC into account and namely, by analysing the scope of the primary
right to require payment.237
Chapters Four and Five below, then analyse the right to require payment,
specific performance and cancellation rights in English and German law
responding to the above mentioned critique.  They ask how Art.7.2.1.UPICC
can successfully be applied within the context of both these legal systems,  and
by explaining the respective areas of both legal systems where clashes are to be
found and what requirements have to be met in order to overcome these
difficulties.
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  Such as INCOTERMS.
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  Compare P.Schlechtriem:  “Termination and Adjustment of Contracts.”  European Journal of Law
Reform  1.3 (1998/1999): 305-323, at p.323: "...a legal counsellor will check the Principles point by point
so as to determine whether and to what extent they conform with the client' s interests and expectations."
This biased quality of trade standard and standard contract forms may have supported the traditionally
critical attitude of English Courts to the use of a-national law in international commercial arbitration,
compare V.1.1. and VIII.2.2.2. and see Charnikow v. Roth Schmidt & Co.  [1922] 2 KB 478.
237
  Considerations of mistake, frustration, force majeure and hardship as well as good faith aspects
which are possible defences against payment claims are disregarded here.
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III.3. Scope of the payment rule in Art. 7.2.1. UPICC
This section explores the inherent limitations that are contained within the
UPICC but not in the form of express limitations.  The logically preceding
question of the existence of a valid payment obligation is the true limitation of
Art.7.2.1 UPICC.
III.3.1. The legal nature of the right to performance in Art. 7.2.1 UPICC
The wording of Art. 7.2.1.UPICC suggests that the existence and the maturity
of the obligation are conditions for  payment:
"Where a party who is obliged to pay money does not do so..."
This rule does thus not establish the payment obligation itself but rather
presupposes its existence.  It describes the breach of an obligation as well as a
remedy for this breach.
There is no provision in the UPICC which constitutes this underlying payment
obligation.  Regarding the specific purpose of the UPICC it seems difficult to
expressly state each of the parties' duties since those will depend on the
contract type they have concluded.  The UPICC relate to all kinds of
commercial contracts.  So, the only reference made by the Principles
concerning the establishment of the respective obligations is in Art. 5.1
"Express and Implied obligations": "The contractual obligations of the parties
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may be express or implied." Although the Principles then refer to the details of
performance such as modalities of payment, place of performance, quality of
performance etc., the actual content of the obligations to be performed has to
be formulated in the contract.
Some insight as to the intended meaning of Art 7.2.1 UPICC can be gained by
looking at the reception of comparable rules in other international conventions
such as ULIS and CISG which are well introduced and established.  The
question of whether a payment obligation exists is therefore one which
concerns the type of the actual contract under consideration and is thus a
question to be answered according to the special circumstances of each case.
Payment, despite being one out of countless possible obligations in a contract,
can be said to be the common denominator in most of them.  Therefore, this
specific obligation can be isolated and treated separately from other, non-
monetary obligations.  This justifies the decision of the authors of the UPICC
to create Art.7.2.1., separate from Art. 7.2.2. UPICC.  But does it also justify
the special treatment as to the lack of express limitations, eg. in the form of a
legitimate interest or a mitigation provision?
Under CISG the obligations of seller and buyer are constituted through
separate rules. The seller's general obligations under a sales contract are
established in Art. 30 CISG while the following Articles refer to the more
detailed aspects of the sale such as time and place of delivery of goods and
documents (Art. 31 to 34 CISG), as well as conformity of the goods (Art. 35 to
44 CISG).  The buyer's obligations (to pay the price and take delivery of the
goods), are written down in Art. 53 CISG again and are followed by detailed
provisions as to the modalities of payment (Art. 54 to Art. 59 CISG), and
taking delivery (Art. 60 CISG).  Remedies for breach of contract by both seller
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and buyer are then stated separately relating to each party to the contract in the
sections following the description of the parties' obligations. The 1964 Hague
Convention follows the same pattern; the wording of Art. 56 ULIS expressing
the obligation of the buyer to pay the price, differs from that of Art. 53 CISG in
that it uses the word 'shall' rather than 'must'.  Apart from that they are
identical.  The same applies to Art 18 ULIS compared to Art. 30 CISG, where
the slight differences seem to be merely editorial.
By way of an inherent interpretation of the UPICC, however, these limitations
can be found within the whole system of the Principles.  Art. 7.2.1 UPICC does
not answer the question as to when payment actually becomes due.  A
contractor can only have a right to claim any sum of money if the payment
obligation is mature.  In most cases the contractor, by common usage, will have
to perform first.  Especially according to Sec. (2) of Art. 6.1.4. the non-
payment performance in building contracts will be the one to be rendered first.
Therefore, the employer will not be "obliged to pay money" unless any work
has been carried out.  This is, in itself, a basic limitation to payment claims
which is contained in Art. 7.2.1. UPICC. The wording at least provides
expressly for an existing and valid monetary obligation, it does not create such
an obligation.  Whether or not the right to performance granted by Art. 7.2.1. is
an overly rigid one, requires further investigation.
The Principles contain a right to cure, provided for in Art.7.1.4 and 7.1.5
UPICC.  The contractor could 'retract his repudiation' (i.e. cure his anticipatory
non-performance in the terminology of the Principles), under Art. 7.1.4.  One
objection to this solution could be that the Principles deal with anticipatory
non-performance in Art.7.3.3. and 7.3.4 in the section on Termination (Section
3 of Chapter 7).  These provisions could therefore be meant to regulate
remedies relating to this special case of non-performance exclusively, not
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allowing for an application of the provisions on cure. Art.7.1.4 (2), however,
provides expressly that “the right to cure is not precluded by notice of
termination”.  Because of this link any doubts should be removed.
Art. 7.3.3. reflects the innocent party's option to terminate the contract in case
of anticipatory breach. Art. 7.3.4( 2nd phrase), provides for the option of the
"injured party to terminate the power of retraction by indicating to the
repudiating party that the injured party considers the repudiation final."238  It
also confirms that no explicit notice of repudiation i.e. non-performance has to
be issued in order to entitle the aggrieved party to the said remedies.  On the
part of the party in breach, the employer, it is vital to decide whether Art. 7.1.4
and 7.1.5 can be applied besides the previously mentioned ones.  This could be
answered in the affirmative if the anticipatory non-performance is at the same
time regarded as a breach of an already existing obligation of holding oneself
willing and able to perform. 239
There is also a right to withhold performance in the Principles, Art. 7.1.5 (2)
UPICC which adds to the options the contractor has in this case.240  The
provision  also leaves all other remedies available which affirms the freedom
the aggrieved party has under English law in case of the anticipatory breach,
Art.7.1.5 (4).
Can the performance of the contract be forced upon the unwilling party in
order to obtain the right to claim the price under the UPICC?241  In most
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  R. Goode:   "Commercial Law", 1995. E.A. Farnsworth:   "Contracts", 1990, p.668; United
States v. Seacoast Gas Co., 204 F.2d 709 (5th Cir.); UCC 2-611(1); Restatement Second §256.
239
 Relying to an interpretation taken from English contract law.
240
  Compare UCC 2-609 (1) and (4); restatement Second § 251 for contracts other than contracts
for the sale of goods.
241
  Obviously, the defendant did not try to contravene the performance through the plaintiff, and
thus issues of consent as an argument supporting the price claim could have been discussed in the case.
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building contract cases, co-operation of the employer (eg as site owner where
the contractor needs access to the site) is required. 242  Do the Principles give
the contractor the opportunity to force performance upon the employer by way
of Art. 7.2.1.?
The problem has been discussed in the context of CISG. In sales contracts a
similar problem can occur where a buyer has not received the goods but the
seller requires payment under Art. 62 CISG.  Bearing in mind that, other than
in Art. 7.2.1 UPICC, Art.62 CISG also explicitly provides for the buyer’s
obligation to take delivery, coerced performance may create an unwanted result
for both parties.  This is illustrated by Honnold243 in his example:
"Example 28A: Seller, a Stockholm furniture manufacturer, and Buyer, a
furniture distributor in Buenos Aires, made a contract for Seller to ship 500 of
its standard coffee-tables to Buyer. Before Seller shipped, Buyer learned that
customers in Buyer's area did not care for these items. Buyer telexed these
facts to Seller, requested cancellation of the shipment, and offered to
compensate Seller for any loss on the transaction. Seller replied: 'Shipping as
ordered. Require you to pay the agreed price'."
The first question arising here is that of the systematic difference between the
payment of the price and payment of a sum to "compensate any loss on the
transaction". Would these two sums be equal?  Why is it significant whether
the seller's claim is labelled 'performance' or 'damages'?
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  In White & Carter (Councils) v. McGregor.  [1962] A.C. 413 the recognition of the
performance of the contractual obligation by the plaintiff was only possible because no co-operation of
the defendant was necessary. See below Chapter Four for further discussion.
243
   J.O. Honnold:   "Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations
Convention",1991, No.193.1
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III.3.2. The wording of Art.7.2.1: Unqualified right to performance? Debt
or damages?
Art 7.2.1 UPICC reads: "...the other party may require payment." and not "may
require performance."  Is payment thus not regarded as performance in this
case?  Does it allow for an award of damages instead of one for payment of the
price?
Under CISG and ULIS, compensation of the loss would cover any difference in
market prices that arise on resale of the goods.  This is not necessarily identical
with the original contract price.  The situation would be different, of course, in
cases where the buyer has received the goods: "When the buyer has accepted
the goods the seller's legal remedy to recover the price normally resembles an
action to collect a debt implemented by execution on the debtor's property".244
However, English law has always had a preference for the remedy of damages,
even where a party is entitled to "the monetary equivalent of performance",
compelling performance by the breaching party is not normally available. 245
The second question concerns the behaviour of the seller: should it be protected
by the law?  Honnold points out that in this case the seller is clearly the party
who can resell the goods more efficiently than the buyer, since not only is the
seller "regularly engaged" in selling these goods, but also the goods are not
wanted in the buyer's place which puts him in an unfavourable position.  In
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  J.O. Honnold:   "Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations
Convention", 1991, No. 345
245
  A.H. Kastely: “The Right to Require Performance in International Sales: Towards an
International Interpretation of the Vienna Convention.” Washington Law Review 63 (1988): 607-651,
p.611. See Chapter Four for further discussion.
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this, and similar situations, the substantial transportation costs common in
international sales can augment the waste involved in forcing the completion of
an unwanted transaction”. 246   This argument must be all the more true in
international building contract cases where the unwanted completion of a
project would involve the construction of plants that cannot be resold or
removed easily at all.  The UPICC must therefore provide a satisfactory
solution to the problem of coerced performance.
To answer this question Art. 7.2.1. UPICC cannot be applied on its own.  The
complete system of the UPICC has to be taken into account.  With regard to
CISG  inherent limitations are recognised and discussed by Honnold,247 who
especially mentions the principle of good faith as an interpretation maxim.
CISG contains provisions other than Art. 28 restricting the right to
performance. Just like CISG, the UPICC contain an interpretation rule in Art
1.6 which provides for the observance of the international character of the
Principles (Art. 1.6.(1)). Therefore, with regard to various factual
circumstances, an analysis of the conflict solving qualities of the Principles
themselves has to be first in order to answer questions arising in the course of
their application. 248
Again, the main concern of possible critics of the UPICC is that due to the
conception of contractual performance in the Principles, unwanted and
inappropriate results are achieved by a lack of express limitations, or
exceptions, to the right to require performance of payment obligations in Art.
7.2.1 UPICC.  This concern is well illustrated by considering a situation of
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  J.O. Honnold:   "Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations
Convention", 1991, No. 193.1
247
  Ibid. No.285
248
  See also A.H. Kastely: “The Right to Require Performance in International Sales: Towards an
International Interpretation of the Vienna Convention.” Washington Law Review 63 (1988): 607-651,
p.645 who emphasises that this method is “suggested a basic tenet of statutory construction.”
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construction contracts, where, according to sec. (2) of Art. 6.1.4. UPICC, the
contractor's non-monetary obligation will be the one to be rendered first and
might be used to unduly compel performance.
The express requirement of a legitimate interest - one potential inherent
limitation - is missing in the Principles.  It could, however, be derived from the
underlying principles of the UPICC by interpretation.249  Of course, one could
argue that the duty to perform the monetary obligation ought to be
supplemented by an express exception or qualification providing for a
requirement of a legitimate interest.  The requirement of a legitimate interest of
the creditor and a duty to mitigate loss may be expressly inserted into Art. 7.2.1
UPICC perhaps in the course of an updated second edition.
III.3.3. Termination and non-performance under Art.7.3.1, 7.3.3 UPICC
The contractor might regard an express rejection of performance at any stage of
the performance of the contract as an anticipatory non-performance as provided
for in Art. 7.3.3. UPICC.  The apparent similarity of this expression and its
counterpart in English law (anticipatory repudiation), raises one main problem
of the application of transnational uniform law; the problem of the misleading
similarity of language and wording often disguising a difference in meaning
upon superficial understanding, the problem of  faux amis  (false friends).250
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  A similar position is taken under German law where the difference between the
formal nature of a contract debt and that of a damages claim in the civil code causes conflicts
in the reception of the UPICC, see below.
250
  “No introduction to the French language would be complete without the traditional list of faux
amis”: E.A. Farnsworth: “The American Provenance of the UNIDROIT Principles.” Uniform Law
Review 2/3 (1998): 397-404, p.402. Farnsworth gives a few examples in his note No.36. Another
noteworthy example might be one reported on the Bristol Congress 1998 by the Canadian Reporter on the
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The concept of anticipatory breach set up in the UPICC should not be
construed as being identical with the English anticipatory repudiation.
Nevertheless, this notion has to be introduced here for purposes of comparison
as the corresponding concept under domestic English law.  It needs to be
established here whether the solution in the UPICC is compatible with English
law, or whether it is irreconcilable and remains a foreign element. 251
In order to provide a defence against, or limitation to, the right to require
payment, the intention not to pay for the contractor's services would have to
amount to a fundamental non-performance as stated in Art. 7.3.1. UPICC:
“A party may terminate the contract where the failure of the other party to
perform an obligation under the contract amounts to a fundamental non-
performance,” (Art. 7.3.1. (1)).
According to the guidelines given in section (2) of Art. 7.3.1., the intention not
to pay the contract price would easily have to be regarded as being
fundamental.  Especially lit.(e) can be assumed to be applicable in case the
contractor has already contributed to the realisation  of the project, eg., not only
by buying material but also by commencing the building work.  He might also
have entered into further obligations himself, such as leasing machinery, and
liabilities might arise out of such arrangement for the supply of equipment.
The announcement of the non-performance by the employer might be regarded
as "intentional or reckless", Art. 7.3.1 (e) lit.(c).
                                                                                                                                 
UNIDROIT Principles: the English protocol of a court session reported that “the witness had a change of
heart” which was translated officially into the French version as “the witness had a heart transplantation”.
251
  In Chapter Four below.
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The contractor would then have a right to terminate the contract.  He would
notify the employer according to Art. 7.3.2. (1).  The contract would thereby be
terminated and both parties released from their obligations, Art. 7.3.5. sec.(1).
The contractor could also not claim performance anymore.  The obligation to
pay money arising from the contract would thus be discharged by remedies
contained in the UPICC, other than express limitations as in Art. 7.2.2.
Anticipatory breach in combination with termination would provide for the
right defence against a claim under Art. 7.2.1.252
Of course, in this situation the other party, the contractor, is required to take
action and exercise a right, the remedy of termination.  The employer depends
on the contractor's decision in this respect.  This is not satisfactory from the
employer's point of view.   But what can a party expect if they were in breach
of contract?
This section has explained and highlighted the conditions and defences
contained in the UPICC that apply and are available to parties obliged to pay
money under Art.7.2.1. UPCC.  These make for the limitations of this right to
performance when viewed together.
III.4.   Conclusion
Chapter Three has identified and analysed a specific mindset of national
lawyers dealing with international uniform law which impedes the easy and
successful application of such law:
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  Claims out of secondary monetary obligations such as damages or restitutional claims are
disregarded here.
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Compatibility of uniform contract law with national (domestic) contract law is
often denied due to a superficial attitude towards the application of
international private law rules:
Some scholars allege that the UPICC contains an overly rigid right to
performance of payment obligations rendering this rule incompatible with
domestic contract law.  This view, however, results from an insufficient
application technique in practice, namely, the fact that the UPICC are not seen
as a comprehensive set of rules.  Solutions are therefore not taken primarily
from the Principles (according to an autonomous interpretation technique), but
instead, Art. 7.2.1. is viewed as an isolated rule.  The appropriate autonomous
interpretation of the UPICC carried out in this chapter, has revealed, however,
that there are sufficient inherent limitations within the Principles to safeguard
against excessive effects of their payment obligation,253 namely the logical
precondition of validity and maturity of the obligation and the defences and
remedies against the claim itself, as well as against breach of contract
contained in the UPICC.  Some scholars allege an overly rigid right to
performance of payment obligations in the UPICC by merely looking at
Art.7.2.1. on its own, disregarding all other rules of the UPICC and thus
declaring this rule incompatible with domestic contract law.
The interpretation method applied by the national lawyer in the example
introduced in this chapter forms an obstacle to the smooth application of the
UPICC.  This is because a lesser standard of diligence is applied to the
international rule than would have been standard practice dealing with the
same rule in national contract law.  The appropriate autonomous interpretation
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  Compare also below Part Three, Chapter Six VI.3.2.
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of the UPICC carried out in this chapter, however, has revealed the full
potential of an individual rule of uniform contract law.
The fact that two different standards are applied means a shift from domestic to
uniform international law of which national lawyers are unaware.
Consequently, there is no explanation for this shift from one level to another
and application of double standards in traditional contract law practice and
hence a flaw in methodology.
An appropriate attitude of the national lawyer towards uniform contract law
and practice of its application, however, is not the development of a hybrid
attitude and mindset of national lawyers, but rather the consequential
application of existing domestic standards to international uniform law rules.
The solution is to maintain the same high quality in methodology as is standard
practice in domestic law.  This seems to be commonplace, but, as has been
shown in this Chapter Three, is not a common standard in the treatment of
uniform law at present.
The autonomous interpretation method is to be further explained and
demonstrated by thorough comparative analysis in the following chapters of
Part Two, where the legal concepts addressed in this section are examined in
national legal systems, namely the English (Chapter Four), and the German
(Chapter Five), in the light of the UPICC and their critics' opinion.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Exemplary application of the UPICC in the context of English
law
The previous Chapter Three has established the scope of Art. 7.2.1. UPICC
according to an autonomous interpretation technique, and has highlighted
specific questions brought up in the course of applying UPICC in practice and
research.  These questions are now further analysed with regard to English law.
Chapter Four investigates how difficulties in the area of substantive contract
law can be met when applying the UPICC within the English legal system.  It
asks whether clashes between concepts used in the UPICC and English
contract law, which seem to be irreconcilable, can be overcome.  The main
concept analysed under this aspect is that of specific performance.  The chapter
explains the status quo of the legal position of contractors and employers under
current English law regarding payment obligations in building and construction
contracts and compares this position with that under the UPICC.  This serves to
answer the question whether the UPICC's solution is compatible with English
law, and, where it seems to differ from English law, how a solution can be
achieved using established application techniques according to an autonomous
interpretation method as suggested in Chapter Three.
IV.1. The compatibility of the UPICC with English law
Section IV.1. asks what difficulties arise in the course of applying the UPICC
in the context  of English contract law and how these could be overcome by
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revisiting traditional concepts and historic developments of European legal
history.
At first sight, the UPICC appear to meet with considerable difficulties when
applied by common lawyers. The provision on monetary obligations in Art.
7.2.1 UPICC could be regarded as incompatible with English law because of
fundamental differences in underlying concepts.  Monetary obligations are
described by Art. 7.2.1. UPICC in a general way and are subjected to the right
to performance as in civil law jurisdictions, thus making Art.7.2.1. UPICC a
type of claim derived from the law of obligations.  It clashes with the concepts
of specific performance, breach of contract and the procedures for recovering
debts and awarding damages under English law.  This is because requiring
performance is not generally available for monetary obligations in common
law jurisdictions.254 Monetary obligations themselves do not give rise to a
homogeneous type of claim. 255
Art. 7.2.1. UPICC poses complex questions of legal methodology in the
context of English law since it involves specific performance of contractual
payment obligations.  The formulation "may require payment" is obviously
tailored to reflect the discretionary nature of the remedy but is employed here
in connection with the claims stage of the contractual relationship, or,
respectively, the duty stage rather than the enforcement stage.256  Clarification
is therefore required with regard to the use of the term.  As much as the
formulation may have been intended to provide scope for the corresponding
discretionary remedy of specific performance under English law, it still might
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  See below for further discussion.
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  See below for further discussion.
256
  Because the UPICC do not deal with procedural but with substantive law.
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not be easily integrated into legal procedure due to the rule's structural
resemblance with the law of obligations.
The term specific performance is commonly only used to denote a remedy to
enforce non-monetary contractual obligations other than payment obligations.
The discretionary and subsidiary nature of the equitable remedy distinguishes
this legal instrument from the continental idea of a claim based on the primary
obligation to pay the contract price.  The applicability of specific performance
under English law is not self- evident from the principle pacta sunt servanda.
Specific enforcement of the primary payment obligation is addressed expressly
only in the Sale of Goods Act, 1979 (Sec.49 (1) and (2)), providing for the
action for the price.  This is mainly due to the history of the court system and
procedural law in England.  Even though payment obligations can generally be
subject to specific performance under English law, it might be technically
difficult to base such a claim on Art.7.2.1. UPICC and thus integrate the
provision into English contract law.
The expression specific performance, in English law, can in fact be generally
applied to the enforcement of primary contractual obligations.  It does not
exclusively denote the remedy for non-monetary obligations in a procedural
sense, drawing on the tradition of the ancient formulas and real actions.257  It
therefore covers instances of debt claims, including the action for the price.258
This does not affect the position regarding actions for damages for breach of
contract which, as paramount remedies, traditionally enjoy a privileged role in
common law jurisdictions compared to civil law systems.
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  Compare M. Bridge:   "Sale of Goods", 1988, p. 718-719 and note 306; G. Jones, and W.
Goodhart:   "Specific Performance", 1996, p.6 et seq.
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  Compare G.H. Treitel:   "The Law of Contract", 1999, p.944
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This use of terminology notably involves a shared value with civil law
jurisdictions in that it acknowledges the general availability of specific
enforcement of contractual claims, without discrimination as to their monetary
or non-monetary nature.  This might be regarded as bridging the gap between
the two systems and hence between the UPICC and English law.
In the following, I will therefore analyse the scope of the remedy of specific
performance in English law, in other international conventions, and in other
European and common law jurisdictions, in order to provide arguments
promoting the integration of Art. 7.2.1. UPICC into English law, using the term
specific performance in the above described sense.
A brief recollection of the historic development of the role of specific
performance under continental European jurisdictions reveals the core of the
conflict underlying the discussion of Art. 7.2.1 UPICC.259  An example is
given by a description of the concept of astreinte,260 and its development and
current role in French law.
IV.1.1.  Requiring performance and payment obligations in international
contract law
It is a special technique pursued in international contract law models to work
with payment obligations in close context with requiring performance.  This is
irritating from a common law viewpoint, where the action for the price,
damages for breach of contract, and performance of non-monetary obligations,
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  See IV.1. below.
260
  At IV.1.3.2. below.
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are traditionally subject to different treatments from each other.261
International contract law models have been striving to blend common law and
civil law notions forming new concepts.  The terminology in international
contract law rules is designed to include ideas derived from the law of
obligations which recognises a right to require performance of monetary
obligations.
A right to "require performance" is expressed in Art. 46 (1) CISG:
"The buyer may require performance by the seller of his obligations unless the
buyer has resorted to a remedy which is inconsistent with this requirement."
The seller's right to performance is contained in Art. 62 CISG:
"The seller may require the buyer to pay the price, take delivery or perform his
other obligations, unless the seller has resorted to a remedy which is
inconsistent with this requirement."
The  provisions use the special terminology ("requiring performance") of the
uniform law conventions that had been adopted internationally before; the 1964
Convention relating to a Uniform Law on International Sales, ULIS, granted
rights to require performance in various provisions: eg Art.24 (1)(a), Art.42,
Art. 55(2) etc.  The expression corresponds to "specific performance", the
"common law parlance". 262  Art. 61 (1)  ULIS reads:
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  J.O. Honnold:   "Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations
Convention", 1991, No.279.
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"Where the buyer fails to pay the price...the seller may require the buyer to
perform his obligation".
Both CISG and ULIS, however, contain provisions which restrict the right to
performance under their regime in cases where the law of the forum does not
recognise specific performance to the same extent as the Conventions; Art. VII
of the Hague Convention and Art. 28 CISG, both state that the courts cannot be
forced to grant judgments for specific performance unless they would do so
under their domestic law.
Apart from this more procedural limitation to the right to performance under
these conventions, there are express limitations to the right itself.  Under Art.
46 (1) CISG there is the limit of the "inconsistent remedy" resorted to by the
buyer, and equally under Art. 62 CISG by the seller.  Also, in ULIS as well as
under CISG there are provisions protecting the commercial interests of the
parties by allowing, even requiring, replacement transactions.  CISG does not
allow the buyer to compel delivery of substitute goods in cases of minor
defects (Art.46(2) CISG), while ULIS even provides explicitly for the
replacement purchase of goods by the buyer "if it is in conformity with usage
and reasonably possible", Art. 25 ULIS.  In this case the buyer cannot "require
performance".  The rule even provides for the contract to be ipso facto avoided
if these requirements are satisfied.263  The corresponding provision
concerning the seller’s right to performance (the payment of the price), is Art.
61 (2) ULIS.
                                                 
263
 Since it is not easy to establish in a given situation whether these requirements are satisfied or
not, in my view a great uncertainty as to the validity of the contract and the parties' mutual obligations is
created by Art. 25 ULIS. The existence of usages and reasonableness has to be established prior to the
decision whether the contract "shall be avoided“. Due to the openness of the terms it does not seem
practical for merchants to deal with this provision.
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Despite these efforts to compromise, neither of the main international sales law
conventions have entered into force in the United Kingdom because of these
disparities which have been regarded as incompatible with English law so far.
The UPICC follow a tradition established by international codifications and
conventions of uniform private law,264 by including the principle of requiring
performance.  However, the UPICC do not contain the possibility of a
reservation like the one of Art. 28 CISG.  Therefore, the chances of their
success in the sphere of English law appear to be only minute at first sight.
IV.1.2. The law relating to specific performance of payment obligations in
common law jurisdictions
In order to prepare the ground for the analysis of the UPICC from the point of
view of English law, this section provides an overview of the position
regarding the enforcement of contractual payment obligations under English
law.  American law is taken into account where it helps to emphasise the
English, and thereby the common law, position in a wider sense.  This is done
by contrasting solutions in both jurisdictions which are related through the
bond of traditional common law.
Despite modern developments there still remains a difference in Anglo-
American law, especially in English law, regarding the origins and the effect of
the action for the contract price (specific performance), on the one hand and a
damages claim for breach of contract on the other.  These two concepts need to
                                                 
264
  Such as the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(CISG) or the 1955 Uniform Law on International Sales (ULIS), enacted by the 1964 Hague Convention
relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (the Hague Convention).
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be treated separately and require different procedural steps for their
enforcement.
Regarding the extent of enforceability of payment obligations, it can be said
that under English and American law, the contractor cannot generally insist on
performing the contract (subject to certain exceptions), by simply relying on
his right to performance, even though the original contractual payment
obligation might entitle him to specific performance.  There are limitations to
the right to performance, particularly regarding price claims, based on the
equitable principle of a legitimate interest in the enforcement of the contract
against a party in breach.  These can even amount to a duty to mitigate loss in
the form of a duty to terminate the contract.  It shows that the overall situation
regarding the outcome of cases and the eventual position of the debtor under
Anglo-American law resembles very much that under German law, where there
is by law a general right of cancellation for an employer in building and
construction contracts (before the completion of the work), coupled with a
modified payment obligation in case of a cancellation.265  The existence of
doctrinal difficulties and peculiarities 266  provide for another similarity of this
particular area of contract law.
The Sale of Goods Act (1979), (hereinafter SGA), deals with the enforcement
of the seller's right in Art. 49 (1) SGA.  It provides for an action for the price,
but only where the property has already passed onto the buyer at the time of the
breach of the contract.  The buyer's remedy for breach of contract is described
in Art. 52 SGA (1979). Specific performance can only be sought for contracts
for specified or ascertained goods.  The court retains its discretion even
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claims in common law jurisdictions, IV.2.5., and the problem of classifying the modified payment
obligation in §649 BGB as a “disguised damages provision” under German law, V.1.3. below.
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then.267  The Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter UCC), of the United
States, provides for specific performance for the buyer in Section 2-716.  It
does not require the passing of property prior to a right to specific performance
but limits this remedy to cases where "the goods are unique or in other proper
circumstances".268   Apart from this restriction the remedy is quite far
reaching, concerning the content of the decree to be granted by the courts,269
as well as the possibility of replevin270 involving seizure of the goods and
their delivery to the plaintiff.
The seller's right to recover the price is regulated by UCC §2-709. Full
recovery of the price is only provided for where the buyer has 'accepted' the
goods.  Otherwise, §2-709 (1)(b) UCC only grants specific performance in case
of 'identified goods', and "if the seller is unable after reasonable effort to resell
them at a reasonable price, or the circumstances reasonably indicate that such
effort will be unavailing". 271  The foremost concern against specific
performance is that of coerced performance.
The legal effect of specific performance in English law is that a court order
instructs a party to perform the contractual obligation in question.  The remedy
is an equitable one and is only available where damages are not considered by
a court as being adequate.  Even in a "contract to pay money" "specific
performance ... could be granted in a proper case".272  Specific performance is
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 Beswick v. Beswick. (1967)”2 All E.R. 1197 . A husband had concluded a contract with his
nephew to pay a weekly sum of £5 to his widow  in return for the sale of his business. She was granted
specific performance by the H.o.L.
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thus not generally excluded for monetary obligations under English law.  In
contracts for the sale of goods, however, it is rarely granted since "other goods
of a similar kind can be purchased and the difference assessed in damages".273
This position is well reflected in CISG as well as in ULIS. 274  It is also
present in the limitations to the right to performance in Art. 7.2.2. (b) and (c)
UPICC.
The remedy first appeared in the form of a decree issued by the Equity courts.
These were enforced by the courts fining non-complying defendants for
'contempt of court' which could lead to imprisonment. 275  "Equity does not
act in vain." 276  Due to this, history specific performance is sometimes
considered an overly-rigid remedy in a contractual context.
"In the common law system, the sanction was both severe and effective, since
specific performance was enforced by penalties such as fines (or, in some
jurisdictions, even by imprisonment for contempt of court).
.... It was in view of the undue harshness of that remedy (particularly in the
context of international sales) that the drafters of the 1964 ULIS had rightly
limited the role of specific performance..." 277
IV.1.3. Common origins of specific performance in European jurisdictions
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  Prof. Farnsworth in Summary Records of the First Committee (18 th meeting);
U.N.Doc.A/CONF.97/C.1/SR.18(1980), at p. 328,330 on the United States proposal to limit the
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Payment obligations arising from promises to pay a price for the supply of
goods or services have a common origin in European jurisdictions. Money
judgments were the most common relief given in Roman legal practice, and
this remained a predominant fact under early English law.  German law as an
example of civil law together with most European legal systems also has a
Roman heritage.  Therefore, the development of the law relating to payment
obligations needs to be explained in this wider context.
IV.1.3.1. Roman law and the reception through the Bolognese glossators
The development of the two apparently adverse poles of specific performance
and damages has very much been influenced by procedural facts and
circumstances concerning the actual execution of judgments, which were
relevant in the respective eras of their use.  In the classical Roman period the
praetorian procedure involved iudices to render judgments against litigating
parties.278  These lacked a sort of power and authority of a central power to
enforce decrees, in the form of, for example, physical force.  This was more up
to various occurrences of private self-help; it was the judgment creditor who
exercised measures like killing or enslaving of the defendant in case of
disobedience to the award obtained.  In England during the twelfth century this
important power to command which was held by kings, was "made available to
private litigants" by way of the royal courts.279  It may have been this
difference in procedure and distribution of power which contributed to the
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  D. Liebs:   "Römisches Recht"(Roman Law) Vol. 465,1999, at p.37et seq. for general reference
see also F. Wieacker:  “Der Prätor.”   83-127.
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  Dawson: “Specific Performance in France and Germany.” Michigan Law Review 57 (1959):
495, at p.497.
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development of the two ends in performance claims, represented by the
common and the civil law.  In fact, despite certain procedural means, either
written law or practice,280 granting a certain use of force to aid enforcement of
money judgments even in the classical Roman period, 281 the money judgment
remained the most common, and effectively the only form of, award a party
could obtain:
"As has been said, the general principle of praetorian procedure at the time he
(Celsus) wrote was that all obligations were translated into money judgments,
whether they involved doing, not doing, surrendering specific property or
anything else." 282
This practice was recorded by the Bolognese glossators during the mediaeval
Holy Roman Empire and preserved by the Roman law tradition spread over
Europe throughout its reign.  Aspects of specific performance started to evolve
in the form of concerns such as: "If you have sold bread, have not delivered it,
and I have died of hunger, will a money judgment suffice?" 283  In addition,
there was the notion that a promisor who paid damages instead of performing
was merely doing so relying on a privilege given by law.284  One innovation
of that period was that the distinction between obligations "to do", and
obligations "to give", resulted into different legal consequences.  The
commentator Baldus stated that no one could be compelled to perform,
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  See the comment by Dawson that a certain clause extending the traditional money judgments
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  Ioannis Bassianus quoted by Accursius in the gloss to D.19.1.1.
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specifically a promise to build a house since "this would be a kind of
servitude", especially if this performance extended over a period of time.285
So, the opinion was that only promises "to give" could be enforced to be
specifically performed, whereas any breach of promises "to do" were
sanctioned by damages: Nemo potest praecise cogi ad factum.  It is noteworthy
that the mediaeval Italian glossators did take notice of an ancient opinion that,
"in obligations 'to do' the promisee might often have no interest of his own that
performance might serve",286 but in general, their practice of dealing with the
material they studied was purely academic and without any consideration for
the great time spans that lay between the time of the creation and practice of
the ancient Roman texts and their then contemporary revival.  Thus they tended
to take the Corpus Iuris at face value and delivered a law to their
contemporaries, and even generations after them (by learned interpretation),
which was full of restrictions in substance and content, taken mainly from
sources from which they were derived by way of technical and merely
terminological reproduction.  There was little regard to the factual necessities
from where the legal solutions recorded by the Roman authors had come into
existence.
Contemporary legal practice and legislative activity should not copy this
technique.
IV.1.3.2. Specific performance in the form of astreinte in French law
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The astreinte seemingly found its way into the UPICC in Art. 7.2.4. - "Judicial
Penalty". This penalty is payable to the aggrieved party on non-compliance
with a court order to perform.  Although it does not "exclude any claim for
damages" (Art. 7.2.4 (2) UPICC), the Principles do not refer to the French
practice of keeping the astreinte a preliminary means of enforcing the court
order.  Therefore this provision has been criticised as not complying with
domestic rules.287  In fact, German law does not recognise any punitive
damages (in accordance with French law), and would not recognise a
regulation  formulated in this way, especially since the penalty is payable to the
other party.  Penalties like this can, however, be agreed by the parties: §§ 339-
345 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Civil Code; hereinafter BGB).288
The influence by theoretical authority of the Roman authors and the glossators
reached far into the eighteenth century when the Code Civil was drafted under
the prominent contribution of the French lawyer Pothier.289  His interpretation
and compilation of past and present legal writings and practice, resulted in an
upholding of the statement, nemo potest praecise cogi ad factum, and its
penetration of the new legislation regarding specific performance and most of
the law of obligations.  Again, procedural circumstances of that era might have
supported the rather uncritical acceptance of the old restrictions in substance as
the royal courts were established by the crown under the Ancien Regime,
having a vast amount of power through saleable and inheritable offices, as well
as largely uncontrolled legislative powers.  The legal views, which impose a
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C.H.Beck'sche Textausgaben, "Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch mit zugehörigen Gesetzen und EG-Richtlinien“,
105.ed., 10 Apr 1999.
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  Pothier provided with his “Traités” some of the most important sources of the “ancient droit”
on which the Code Civil is based, see M. Stolleis, ed.  "Juristen - Ein biographisches Lexikon von der
Antike bis zum 20.Jh", 1995, p.174
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substantive restriction of the means of enforcing obligations by rigid measures,
meant at the same time a restriction of judicial powers.  This was welcomed by
the libertarian movement, formed during the times of the Revolution, fighting
against arbitrary power exercised not only by the courts.  Also, the Code was
drafted within a short period of time commanded urgently by Napoleon.290
This, among other things, obviously hindered a thorough scrutiny of the
underlying dogmas and doctrines.291
Without going into too much detail of the various expressions of specific
performance within the Code Civil, two developments are to be mentioned; the
remedy of astreinte, and the treatment of obligations "to give".  This latter type
of obligation is strongly determined by the mechanism cast in Articles 1136,
1138, 1583, 938 and 1703, which establish the passing of title by mere
agreement.  Thus, obligations to transfer assets as in contracts for sales, gifts
and exchanges are subject to direct execution i.e. seizure of the assets. "The
doctrinal writers, at least, all claim that direct execution is available to buyers
of both land and goods, and the fact that so little litigation on the subject has
spilled into the law reports seems to lend some support for the claim."292  The
general rules for protection of ownership are the vehicle for facilitating this
result.  Regarding the obligations "to do or not to do", another way had to be
found.  Under Art 1142 Code Civil:293 "Every obligation to do or not to do is
                                                 
290
  See Dawson: “Specific Performance in France and Germany.” Michigan Law Review 57
(1959): 495, p.510
291
  Ibid., p.508: "There was no inherent reason...why French law could not have developed a
rational system of contract remedies and freed itself from hampering restrictions that the glossators had
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  Dawson: “Specific Performance in France and Germany.” Michigan Law Review 57 (1959):
495, p.511
See also 7 Planiol et Ripert, Traité Pratique de Droit Civil Francais, 2d ed., §779 (1954); 4
Garsonnet et Cézar-Bru, Traité de Procédure Civile et Commerciale §6 (1913); Baudry-Lacantinerie et
Barde, Traité Théorétique et Pratique en Droit Civil, 2nd ed., §364 (1900).
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  "Code Civil. Textes, jurisprudence, annotations“, 2000 ed.  (Paris: Dalloz ).
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resolved in damages in case of non-performance by the obligor".  The astreinte
as a "mode of coercion" (Dawson), began to develop from 1804.  This was a
provisional, and "comminatory", order by the court to pay a fixed sum of
money unless the required performance was rendered.  These judgments were
revoked and transformed into definite damages awards once the required act
was done, and very often the money payable under the astreinte amounted to
fantastic sums.  Besides raising a procedural problem (offending the rules of
res iudicata), the fact that the money was in fact never paid, but the astreinte
only used as a threat, resulted into practical difficulties after World War II,
when it came to numerous cases of unsuccessful eviction of illegal occupants
of residential property in times of housing shortage, following large population
movements. Courts resorted to an attempt to extend their powers by changing
their provisional judgments (derived from Art. 1036 of the Code of Civil
Procedure as well as from coutume jurisprudentielle),294 into final damages
awards; astreintes non-comminatoires.295  This attempt was contravened by
legislation in the form of the statute of July 21, 1949, which declared "that
every astreinte attached to an order for eviction from housing was necessarily
merely “comminatory” and must be reduced to simple damages after the tenant
had finally left".296  Punitive damages were consequently counteracted as they
violated the principle that damages, "no matter to whom they are paid, are
arbitrary and cannot be subjected to any kind of definite rule".297
Nevertheless, to French courts they appeared to remain the only solution to the
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  See Dawson: “Specific Performance in France and Germany.” Michigan Law Review 57
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problem which the lack of persuasive qualities of the astreinte posed to the
plaintiff  parties.
These considerations ought to have shown the critical attitude to coerced
performance in the civil law systems, in order to have counteracted a general
concern in the common law world about the notion based on the argument of
mere origin from the law of obligations.
IV.2. Scope of employer's rights and limitations to payment claims under
construction contracts under English law
The previous section, IV.1., described general doctrinal difficulties in contract
law which might impede the application of UPICC under English law as a
specialised law governing international commercial contracts.  These
difficulties arising out of the notion of specific performance can be overcome
by a thorough analysis of underlying principles also referring to historic
developments.
This section, IV.2., asks how the UPICC can contribute to reaching solutions
in the specialised area of construction contract law.  It analyses the existing
law, and the scope of payment claims under English construction contract law,
in order to compare the solution suggested by the UPICC.
The Commentary of the UPICC very often refers to international construction
contracts to explain the scope and meaning of single provisions.  These are
typically contracts involving large engineering projects where the parties
(persons or corporations), reside in or operate from different countries and
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where the project is possibly to be completed in a third country.  Contracts of
this kind often involve third parties playing a key role in the legal process of
the performance of the contract, eg. architects, consultants and sub-contractors.
Special payment mechanisms, as well as financing procedures protect the
interests of the parties.  Projects of this kind are mostly long term commitments
and involve special risks which would not occur in "one-off" transactions such
as contracts for the sale of goods.  This contract type can serve here to explain
the relationship between English law and the UPICC in terms of compatibility
and methods of integration.  The above mentioned Art. 7.2.1. UPICC concerns
the legal position of the employer in a construction contract and his payment
obligation in case of subsequent events affecting the contractual performance.
The employer's rights and defences are the subject of the following discussion.
IV.2.1. Standard terms and practice of contract drafting of international
construction and building contracts under English law
International construction contracts are commonly concluded under the
standard forms of the various Professional Institutions such as the JCT (Joint
Contracts Tribunal), "Standard Form of Building Contract", 1980, or the "JCT
Nominated Sub-Contract Conditions and Agreements".  These forms are
intended to help standardise, and thereby simplify and professionalise, the
procedure of concluding contracts involving the planning of large, also
international, projects.  They do, however, not rule out contract law.  Domestic
contract law is applicable to international construction or building contracts298
                                                 
298
  A. May:  "Keating on Building Contracts", 1995.
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under the conflict of laws.299  Non-English parties will often not agree to a
standard contract issued by an English professional agency.
On the level of contractual performance, international projects depend to a
great extent on political events in the countries involved.  Although security
bonds and insurances are involved in the process in large projects to back
payment mechanisms - embargoes, export regulations, currency fluctuations
and building regulations can interfere with such projects in a major way.  The
employer might be deprived of the whole purpose of his intended project by an
embargo or other change of legislation which, for example, renders the
production of certain substances illegal.  Currency fluctuations can also greatly
affect the economic balance between the parties.
The specific character of the construction contracts, both domestic and
international, originates in special circumstances such as the great time span
involved and the tendency of problems to create "domino-effects". 300
The parties will provide for most of these typical risks in their contracts.
Contract law solves problems reaching beyond the scope of the contract.
Therefore, the law should provide for the corresponding categories.  Although
this is often not the case with domestic law in general, English law has a
tradition of giving consideration to commercial matters and the practices of
international trade developed through centuries of seafaring.301  It is likely,
therefore that the UPICC cannot offer novel solutions in the area of substantive
law, but will have to stand the compatibility test if they are to be an instrument
of neutral transnational contract law.
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IV.2.2. Speculative aspects of international contract practice and
contractual performance
What would be the position of an employer in an international building
contract who suddenly changes his mind, withholds all payments and
announces his intention not to pursue the contract any further?  What is the
position regarding his obligation to pay the price and to have to consummate
the transaction even though it might be of no interest for him?
Under English contract law, no right of cancellation as such exists.  The parties
are free to include it into their contracts, though.  Standard contracts will
usually not provide for any right of cancellation as such.  Contract Forms, such
as the JCT 1980 Form, or the British Electrical and Allied Manufacturer's
Association's (BEAMA), Conditions of Contract (E), are drafted by the
respective professional institutions representing the contractors.302  Therefore,
in this respect, regard is not made to the interests of the employer.303  An
unqualified right of cancellation is not contained in any standard form.  A right
of cancellation on special grounds is sometimes included in building
contracts.304  There are instances of termination provided for, given that
certain factual circumstances occur.  These are called forfeiture clauses.305  In
addition, general rules of law apply.
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  JCT : Joint Contract Tribunal , BEAMA: British Electrical and Allied Manufacturer‘ s
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  This has already given rise to criticism and ultimately to reform of the standard forms, see A.
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  See eg Hounslow London Borough Council v. Twickenham Garden Developments Ltd.  [1971]
Ch. 234.
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Relying on the principle in White and Carter (Councils) v McGregor, 306  the
contractor may decide to compel the employer to proceed with the transaction.
In order to perform a building contract, access to the site is essential to the
contractor.  Standard forms provide for the contractor's right of access.  The
employer's interest in this case is not only to defend against the payment
obligation arising out of the contract but also to stop the actual performance of
the building work.  Therefore a legal possibility needs to operate in his favour
allowing him to terminate the contract.
The extent to which a legal system supports the enforceability of contractual
obligations, by for example, specific performance, reflects the degree of
intensity with which the keeping of legal promises is emphasised in the
domestic legal order.  One aspect concerning the significance of strictness of a
binding promise is the change of circumstances after the promise is given.  A
subsequent change of mind of a party to a contract can have various reasons
and some of them, certain motivations, are recognised as valid points by the
law.  These instances are reflected in the rules relating to mistake and
frustration, rescission, cancellation, repudiation, termination, etc.307
In trade relationships the speculative aspect of contractual agreements is an
important factor to be considered.
"At the time the agreement is made, each party has reason to suppose that it
will be profitable for that party. A party may, however, err in calculating the
net benefit to be anticipated from performance of the agreement, or
circumstances may change so as to disappoint that party's initial hopes.  A
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contract that the party once thought would be profitable may turn out to be
unprofitable. If it is profitable for the other party, should the reluctant party be
compelled to perform?" 308
Farnsworth mentions the 'economic theory' as an underlying justification and
modern doctrine enforcing and strengthening traditional common law
decisions.  Modern (American), common law finds support in this theory for
the existing manner of solving contract cases of 'efficient breach' where there is
a 'redistribution of wealth' as a consequence:
"The party in breach may gain enough from the breach to have a net benefit,
even though that party compensates the injured party for resulting loss,
calculated according to the subjective preferences of the injured party...., and
economic theory not only sanctions but encourages breach." 309
It is obvious that in a legal environment where specifically merchants are
addressed by a set of rules like the UPICC these considerations are particularly
attractive.
German "common law", the gemeines Recht  which was in use until the
modern codifications like the Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch, HGB),
and the Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB), were enacted, strongly
emphasised the "keeping of the promise", and was hostile towards withdrawal
and other means of discharging a contract other than by performance.310  The
merchant community, however, had always postulated, even since the Middle
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Ages, a legal solution which allowed for a quick discharge or termination of
contracts as in cases of non-payment or defective performance.311  It is said
that the BGB contains more flexible solutions in this respect, so that the
modern rules give effect to the traditional preference of the trading world.312
This question deserves further discussion in the light of the UPICC. 313
On commodities markets, contracts are of a considerably different kind from
consumer contracts.  Not only is a number of up to 100 contracts all relating to
one and the same consignment of cargo perfectly common, but hedging
transactions and trading in futures are essential in modern agricultural
commerce.  All these contracting parties deliberately benefit from speculative
aspects of their agreements.  It is their vital interest to engage in paper trading
encouraging the activities of speculators: "Paper trading creates liquidity, and
liquidity tends to even out prices so as to remove the more extreme cyclical
swings." 314  In addition to this the ready use of technical rejection rights are
an important means for gaining flexibility and taking advantage of specific
market conditions.  In this respect emphasis of loyalty towards the contract or
the other contracting party, in order to maintain any future goodwill, does not
seem to be the most prominent feature of the rules among commodities traders.
315
  This means that not only special forms of agreement and practices are
used to bargain but also the contract law itself, namely the provisions on breach
of contract.
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Substitutional relief, such as awarding damages rather than specific
performance, serves the attitude of aiming for relief on breach of promises
rather than for preventing such breach: "Our system of contract remedies is not
directed at compulsion of promisors to prevent breach;...Its concern is with a
different question: how can people be encouraged to deal with those who make
promises?" 316
It is this speculative element which makes a right of cancellation a paramount
demand made by German authors towards the UPICC.317  German,318
Swiss,319 and French 320 law also contain a right of cancellation.321
IV.2.3. Cancellation rights, breach of contract and anticipatory
repudiation in English law
Since most building contracts do not contain a stipulation providing for a
general right of cancellation, the employer's announcement to step back from
the contract and not pay any money due under the agreement is regularly dealt
with according to the rules relating to breach of contract.
However, an illustration of the law relating to cancellation of building contracts
is provided by the Hounslow case.322  A cancellation clause was contained in
condition 25 (1) (b), in the contract  incorporating a R.I.B.A. standard form
between the Hounslow London Borough Council, as employers, and
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Twickenham Garden Developments Ltd., as contractors.323  The employers
were entitled to give notice to determine the employment if the contractors
failed to proceed "regularly and diligently" with the work.  The employers gave
notice but were refused a mandatory injunction on motion expelling the
contractor from the site which they sought. This was decided because there
were some doubts as to the valid determination of the contractor‘s licence to
occupy the land and the subsequent arising situation of trespass to be
recognised.
The Hounslow case shows that the right of cancellation was only provided for
in a restrictive way in that notice was not to be given "unreasonably and
vexatiously".324  The speculative element occurring under a general right of
cancellation as eg., under German law 325 is thereby counteracted.  If the
contract was thus not validly determined by the Hounslow Borough, the
employers were to be regarded as being in breach of contract.  The contractors
then had a right of election whether to continue or to terminate the contract.
If the employer announces to the contractor prior to taking up any work that he
has no intention of paying the contract price and that he will refuse to accept
the intended work this would be an anticipatory repudiation and thus a breach
of contract.326  Under English law the maturity of the payment obligation is
thus not a condition for a breach of contract.327  Formally the common law
solution resembles that of the UPICC.  It has to be established, however, to
what extent the views taken on anticipatory breach can be applied to payment
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obligations such as those addressed in Art. 7.2.1. UPICC; it has been contested
that anticipatory breach can occur in unilateral contracts, or those bilateral
contracts where one obligation is fully performed and just the obligation to pay
money remains.328  The latter case might occur where the contractor has
completed the work entirely, and only the contract price remains outstanding.
This appears unlikely to occur under most building contracts since they usually
provide for payment in instalments on presentation of certificates, after
completion of building sections, as the work progresses.
IV.2.4. The aggrieved party's options on anticipatory breach under
English law
The contractor has several options how to react to the breach.  Even if he treats
the contract as discharged329 this does not necessarily free the employer from
paying a sum of money since he might be liable in damages.330  The
contractor, as the aggrieved party, is discharged of his remaining duties.  There
is, however, generally one possibility that might match the employer's interests
in this case.  The employer can retract his repudiation before the contractor has
reacted to it in a way which would lead to a discharge of the contract. This
would suit him when the reason for him to withdraw from the contractual
agreement is, for example, adjusting to a change in market prices; he could
repudiate on finding a better offer, which even compensates potential damages,
and retract if this chance falls flat.331  It is doubtful, however, as to whether
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this is a suitable option in building contracts, since it is unlikely that the costs
of breach could leave an alternative employment lucrative.  In the Hounslow
case the employers probably sought to complete the work with another
contractor facing excessive delays under their existing contract.  The court
acknowledged this interest, but preferred the view that "a contract remains a
contract even if, or perhaps especially if, it turns out badly."332  The
contractor, on the other hand, is not forced to wait until the employer chooses
to retract. His rights are balanced by the possibility to treat the contract as
terminated after taking notice of the repudiation.333  In the Hounslow case, the
duty not to exercise the right to give notice unreasonably and vexatiously was a
safeguard against any speculative action on the employer's part.
IV.2.5. Compelling performance and enforceability of the contract by
action for the price
As mentioned above, under Anglo-American law the contractor is generally
not obliged to accept the employer's repudiation.  He can keep the contract
open:
"Repudiation is not something that calls for acceptance when there is no
question of rescission, but merely excuses the innocent party from performance
and leaves him free to sue for damages." 334
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Does it therefore follow that the aggrieved party is entitled to enforce the
contract, relying on the payment obligation against the will of the party in
breach?
In White and Carter (Councils) Ltd. v. McGregor ,335 a contract was
concluded providing for the advertisement of the defendant's business through
the plaintiff’s advertising contractors.  Although McGregor (the employer),
expressed his unwillingness to perform the contract before any work was
carried out, the plaintiffs did in fact perform the contract by placing metal
plates on rubbish bins delivered to local authorities for the agreed period of
three years.  They then claimed the whole sum due under the contract.  The
House of Lords awarded the contract price as a recoverable contract debt, not
as damages.336   The court held that the contractor had the right not to act on
the anticipatory repudiation and not to terminate the contract. There is,
however, a limit to this option of the contractor:
"...where performance is so obviously commercially wasteful and of no benefit
to the guilty party that the innocent party cannot be said to have a legitimate
interest in continuing the contract".337
This view was also, indirectly, taken by Lord Reid in White and Carter where
he contemplated that the plaintiff's action would have failed had the defendant
shown that the contractor had no legitimate interest in performing the contract
in that case.338  It was pointed out that this legitimate interest could have been
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denied if the contractor had a duty to mitigate his loss under the circumstances;
eg. if he had an opportunity to obtain another customer.  The contractor could
thus not be obliged to terminate the contract under a duty to mitigate.
The restraint of the legitimate interest is derived from general equitable
principles which apply to a case depending on the facts.   An unfettered right of
election by the innocent party on breach of contract is not recognised.  In Clea
Shipping Corporation v Bulk Oil International, The Alaskan Trader,339 the
chartered vessel broke down requiring expensive repairs, whereupon the
defendant charterer gave notice of their intention to end the contract.  This was
regarded as repudiation.  The plaintiffs claimed that they had a right of election
as the innocent party and decided to keep the contract open.  They sought to
keep the (prepaid) hire as contract price instead of having to sue for damages
after termination.  Lloyd J. held that the plaintiffs had no legitimate interest in
this case to uphold the contract and could thus be forced to accept damages and
not the sum due under the contract after the actionable event had occurred.
The contract price was awarded in White and Carter because of the fact that
White and Carter were able to carry out their contractual performance without
the cooperation of the employer.  It was because of these special circumstances
that Finelli et al. v Dee et al. was distinguished from the previous case later;
the plaintiff, the contractor, paved the driveway of the defendant employer in
the absence of the owner against the owner's will.  The owner (employer), had
expressed the intention to end the contract by oral notification on the telephone
prior to any performance which had not then been scheduled.  This was
received and possibly agreed to by one of the contractor's employees.  Leaving
the question of a rescission of the contract open, Laskin J. held that in either
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case (rescission or repudiation), the contractor was not entitled to recover the
contract price:
"...and without wishing to embark on any issue as to trespass, the plaintiffs, in
my view, were obliged to give previous intimation to the defendant that they
were prepared to do the work called for by the contract and proposed to do it
on a certain day. This, of course, was not done."
Damages cannot normally be awarded instead of the contract price, since under
an action for the contract debt damages are not the normal remedy to an
actionable event.
This is true notwithstanding the fact that, where the two sums happen to be
equal the two claims appear to be the same and are sometimes not clearly
distinguished under English law,340 but more commonly so under American
law where the law has developed a more blurred distinction between actions
for debt and those for damages.
Thus, it is understood that in White and Carter, the defendant employer was
not successful in claiming a failure to observe a duty to mitigate on the
contractor's side, because this was irrelevant in the context of an action for the
contract price as a debt.341  This general position has equally been valid under
US-law where it was expressed in 25 C.J.S., Damages, §34, p.708 (1966) that
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the duty to mitigate leaves the action for the price untouched.342  The decision
in White and Carter , however, has not received a positive reaction in the US
343
 where an earlier case, Rockingham County v Luten Bridge Co.,344
provided the basis for the modern legal situation;345 the County had employed
the plaintiff contractor to build a bridge over a street and subsequently notified
them that they regarded the contract to be void.  The costs of the work already
carried out had amounted to $1.900 by then.  The contractor carried on
performing the contract and claimed $18.000 nine months later as part
payment.  The appeal court held that the contractor had been under a duty to
avoid unnecessary losses subsequent to the notification by the defendants (a
repudiation of the contract), and that he should therefore have stopped the
building work on the bridge which had become worthless to the employer after
the County's underlying street building project had been cancelled.  The
contractors were awarded the costs up to the time of the repudiation, but were
refused the subsequent incurred costs as contract price.  The reason why the
duty to mitigate loss (originally developed in the context of damages), was
introduced into that case of a price claim, was that the plaintiff was deemed to
have attempted to evade his otherwise arising duty to mitigate by performing
the contract.346  In this way action for the contract price (specific
performance), will usually fail if a damages claim would lead to a different
result, and therefore becomes the subordinate form of remedy.  In the US the
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346
  S. Williston: "Williston on Contracts. A Treatise on the Law of Contracts" Vol. 11, 1968,
§1301. p. 80 et seq.;  A.L. Corbin: "Corbin on Contracts" Vol. 4,191951, §981, p.936; Wilson v Western
Alliance Corp.  715 P 2d 1344, 1346 (Or. Ct. App. 1986): “We do not agree, however, that non-
acceptance makes the repudiation a nullity.”
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action for specific performance is therefore practically regarded as a special
form and a measurement for damages, even a sub-division of a damages
claim.347  Accordingly, the action for the price is not directly regulated
anymore in the Restatement (Second),   which even points to the rules about
damages.348
Some early evidence for the connection between the concepts of debt and
damages under English law may be Slade's case,349  where "damages ... for
the whole debt" were the subject.350  In the context of an action of assumpsit
there are instances of overlap in the use of both terms.
In respect of an action for the contract price the abstention from any
subsequent performance after repudiation or other breach of contract is
regarded as the required contribution to mitigate the loss.  There are, however,
instances where just that could actually amount to a bigger loss for the innocent
party; where a contractor has a special interest in performing a contract, other
than that to claim the contract price, the courts might grant specific
performance, i.e. award the contract price on completion of the agreed work as
the appropriate remedy on the facts of the case.  This was so decided in
Bomberger v McKelvey,351 where the contractor had completed the work
despite the employer's repudiation.  The contractors in this case were in need of
the material which there was shortage of at that time, and they were to obtain
the material from the demolition of the house, the agreed work.  The argument
behind this decision can be seen in the consideration that, unless the employer
lacks a legitimate interest in the performance of the contract, the contractor’s
                                                 
347
  See P. Neufang: "Erfüllungszwang als "remedy" bei Nichterfüllung" Vol. 186, 1998, p. 79.
348
  Restatement (Second) , Contracts, Ch.16, Topic 2, Introductory Note.
349
  76 Eng Rep. 1074 (K.B. 1602).
350
  See previous note, p.1077.
351
  220 P.2d 729 (Cal. 1950).
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duty to mitigate his loss can only be satisfied by performing the contract.352
The contractor's loss would otherwise be part of the calculation of
damages.353 Another specific interest of a contractor in performing the
contract can be a special advertising effect,354 or, in international contracts,
the company's introduction to new markets.
There is, overall, clearly a temptation to regard the claim for the contract price
on full performance despite prior repudiation as nothing else but a
mathematical transformation355 of the damages to be awarded in case of an
accepted breach of contract.  This view corresponds to a recognised method of
calculation of damages as in §2-708 (2), UCC, for cases in which a covering
transaction cannot be seen as a mitigation of loss because the party was in fact
in a position to deliver to both the original, as well as to the replacement,
buyer, and his loss is really caused by a decrease in turnover.
IV.3  Conclusion
The notion of specific performance as it occurs in Art. 7.2.1. UPICC is not a
general obstacle to the integration of the UPICC into English contract law.
This is because this notion to some extent only serves as a label to distinguish
aspects of civil law systems from English law and the common law in general
merely on a surface level.
                                                 
352
   See Bomberger v McKelvey  220 P.2d 729 (Cal.1959), p. 733.
353
  E.A. Farnsworth: “Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract.” Colum.L.Rev. 70 (1970): 1145,
p.1162.
354
  E. Yorio: "Contract Enforcement, Specific Performance and Injunctions", 1989, p.351.
355
  See Restatement (Second), Contracts, §349, Comment a.
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An appropriate application of the relevant provisions of the UPICC needs to be
carried out against a comparative background in order to accommodate the
international character of the transnational contract law into the national legal
systems.  Chapter Four has shown that recourse to and recapitulation of historic
developments allow a comprehensive understanding of certain general
concepts of contract law, such as that of specific performance, in a national
legal system. This understanding of a national lawyer’s own national law will
allow the integration of transnational uniform contract law.
The true meaning and use of the concept of specific performance (of payment
obligations), in civil law systems does not justify the strict reservations made
by common lawyers against the notion.  Civil law traditions show exactly the
same reservations against any potentially overly rigid effects of specific
performance in its rudimentary sense.356
The analysis in this chapter has proven that, because English law takes an
almost identical attitude towards coerced performance as the UPICC, it is not
justified to regard Art. 7.2.1 UPICC as a legal import from civil law systems
and introduce a legal position strongly opposed to by the common law sphere.
The process of revealing and reviewing the underlying aspects of national legal
concepts forms part of the suggested method of applying uniform international
contract law.  It prevents conclusions drawn on a superficial basis which
provide obstacles to the application of such uniform law.
Due to the nature of the common law and the role of modern statutory English
contract law, the integration of the UPICC into English law depends strongly
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  Compare also V.3. below.
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on the willingness of English courts to do so, rather than on positions adopted
within legal doctrine.  Therefore such developments cannot be anticipated in
this study.357  Given the traditional support of commercial aspects in English
contract law,358 it can be expected, however, that the courts will be in favour
of the integration of uniform law rules into English law to the degree that a
need for uniform transnational law manifests.359
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  Compare Chapter Eight.
358
  Compare also Chapter Eight.
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  Compare Chapter Two.
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Chapter Five
Exemplary application of the UPICC in the context of German
law.
The previous chapter, Chapter Four, has analysed the position of the UPICC
under English domestic contract law, this chapter now identifies potential
clashes between individual rules of the UPICC with German substantive
contract law and asks if, and how, those can be overcome.
Exemplary, as introduced in Chapter Three, is again demonstrated by analysing
Art.7.2.1. UPICC; providing for a right to require payment in international
commercial contracts and is set into the context of international building and
construction contracts.  This procedure allows the examination of, in detail,
specific instances of successful application of uniform contract law in a
national legal system.
The lead question is still taken from Prof. Schwenzer's criticism as set out in
Chapter Three, where she asks how Art.7.2.1. UPICC (regulating payment
obligations), can be integrated into domestic legal systems, given that it is
drafted without express limitations to the right to require performance, unlike
the rule in Art. 7.2.2. UPICC about non-monetary obligations.
The chapter carries out a review of underlying theoretical concepts and current
legislation in order to suggest ways of application and integration of the
UPICC into substantive German contract law.  It also asks, what the meaning
of the general concept of specific performance is, particularly in the context of
the historic development of codified modern German contract law.  This
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recourse further purports to the analysis of the understanding of civil law
concepts in common law systems and English law, in particular, following the
findings of Chapter Four. Both chapters thereby highlight ways of reconciling
and integrating the solution of the UPICC into common law as well as into
civil law jurisdictions.  They look at possible underlying common origins of
both legal systems, which could help to develop a modern approach to
international contract law doctrine and the methodology of its application.360
German private law is firmly grounded in the belief that law has to be
scientifically developed.  The BGB was created by the end of the 19th century
as a result of intense scholarly work.  It consists of interrelated provisions
forming a network of obligations, remedies and defences which are to provide
a general instrument to find an answer for every problem that could possibly
arise.  The rule of law is affected by this systematic, 'scientific' way in which
results are achieved.361 Legal method and the carefully planned doctrinal
system of the legislation is designed to provide orientation and to facilitate
consistency of legal decisions all the way through the hierarchies of judicial
reasoning.
One of the major principles of German contract law is the synallagmatic
(reciprocal), structure of the contract.  A contract consists of mutual and
corresponding rights and obligations.  These obligations each have an
individual life of their own, and there are specific means to discharge
obligations and to enforce rights.
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  Compare V.3 below.
361
  K. Larenz:   "Allgemeiner Teil des Deutschen Bürgerlichen Rechts", 1983, §4III (p.79); see
also J. Kohler: “Rechtsetzung im demokratischen Rechtsstaat und Rechtswissenschaft - Anmerkungen zu
Stil und Bedeutung neuerer Gesetzgebung.” Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und
Rechtswissenschaft 4 (2002): pp. 369-391.
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Under German law, any result derived from a legal rule thus has to be
reconciled with the doctrinal basis of the contract law.  This is one of the major
sources of misunderstanding in the application of uniform private law rules.
Awareness of this problem is one of the most important demands to be put
forward to a German lawyer if they are to apply the Principles in an appropriate
way, giving effect to Art. 1.6 UPICC.362
This chapter explains; how both employer and contractor under building
contracts can discharge the payment obligation, to what extend German law
supports compelling performance, and the weaknesses of current German
contract law regarding the regulation of building contracts.
V.1. payment obligations in building contracts under German law
This first section of Chapter Five asks about the current status of payment
obligations in building contracts under German domestic contract law.  It sets
out the current legislation applicable to the Werkvertrag, the contract type
comprising building contracts, and compares the position with the UPICC
rules, highlighting questions which could be addressed under the heading of
this novel uniform law.  These are, in particular, questions of cancellation
rights and the ensuing right to require payment in the current German contract,
which have given rise to reform proposals but have not benefited from recent
enacted law reform.
Building contracts are generally governed by the rules relating to the
Werkvertrag, contracts for works and services in the seventh section of the
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  Compare above -  III.2.2.2.
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Second Book of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Civil Code; hereinafter
BGB),363 §§631-650.  Also, the parties can choose to make the
Verdingungsordnung für Bauleistungen, Teil B ("Standard Terms for Building
Services, Part B", hereinafter VOB/B),364 part of their contract.  These rules
are the most widely used standard terms in this area of contract law and
regulate much of the issues contained in British standard contracts such as the
contract price (§2), liability and risk (§7, §10), co-operation of the employer
(§6). They are not formal legislation, though in Part A, they contain guidelines
for procurement that are binding for the public sector to prevent discrimination
and violation of competition rules.365  Part C relates to technical standards of
the building contract.  The VOB was first drafted and published by a
commission of the ministry of finance, the Reichsverdingungsausschuß in
1921-26.  Its successor, the Deutsche Verdingungsausschuß für Bauleistungen
(DVA), issued five updated versions.  The current version of Parts B and C is
from 1996.  The VOB are not currently qualified to be trade usage or common
usage, they are standard terms.366
The rules on the Werkvertrag fit a small scale business, but they are largely
supplemented by standard terms367 and are subject to extensive judge-made
law in the field of large construction projects.368
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   Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, 18 Aug 1896, first published in Reichsgesetzblatt (1896), p.195;
C.H.Beck'sche Textausgaben, "Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch mit zugehörigen Gesetzen und EG-Richtlinien“,
105.ed., 10 Apr 1999.
364
 Text published among others by H. Kuß: "Verdingungsordnung für Bauleistungen (VOB), Teile
A und B mit Erläuterungen",1997.
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 EC Directives 71/305/EEC (26.7.1971/21.7.1989) and 90/531/EEC (17.9.1990/14.7.1993,
93/38/EEC) also concerning purely domestic procurements, ECJ in EuZW 1996,506. Based on these
directives, the 1993 version of the Haushaltsgrundsätzegesetz, 1969 was issued as well as the
Vergabeverordnung, 1994 which regulate public procurement.  For texts see H. Kuß:
"Verdingungsordnung für Bauleistungen (VOB), Teile A und B mit Erläuterungen", 1997.
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  Palandt/Heinrichs:   "Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch", 1998, Einf. v. §631, No.4.
367
  Hans-Leo Weyers, “Welche Ergänzungen...”, in: "Gutachten und Vorschläge zur Überarbeitung
des Schuldrechts", ed. Bundesminister der Justiz, (Cologne: 1981)Vol. II: 1115.
Examples are the ECE (United Nations Commission for Economy) clauses of March 1957 in the
German version, published by Maschinenbauverlag, Frankfurt, and the joint 1968 clauses of the metal and
iron producing and manufacturing industries.
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Large projects, such as the acquisition of industrial plants, the construction of
underground transportation systems, power stations or railway bridges, can, of
course, be subject to various areas of private law since they do not, in their
complexity, fit into the standard categories of specific contract types of the
BGB.  Contractual arrangements relating to such projects can range from
leasing to building contracts including hire, purchase, contracts for works or
services, all in one complex agreement. 369
The requirement of maturity of an obligation contained in Art.7.2.1. UPICC,
"who is obliged to pay money", under German law regarding Werkverträge, is
contained in §641 BGB.
Under a building contract the contractor can only demand performance on
completion and acceptance (Abnahme), of the work by the employer, §641 I
BGB.  If, as in large construction projects, building work is completed
subsequently in stages, payment is due on acceptance of each agreed partial
stage.  Payment is then dependent on issuance of the Aufmaß, 370 mostly the
architect's certificate testifying the stage of the progress.  VOB/B terms371
contain detailed regulations as to the necessary requirements (Feststellungen),
preceding payment, including rules concerning the bill.372  The architect's
certificates are regarded as representing the result of a joint investigating
                                                                                                                                 
See also P. Joussen:   "Der Industrieanlagen-Vertrag",1981.
368
  R. Grimme:  "Die Erfüllung beim Werkvertrag" Vol. 105, 1987; Nicklisch: “Empfiehlt sich
eine Neukonzeption des Werkvertragsrechts? - Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung komplexer
Langzeitveträge.” JZ  (1984): 757;
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  See P. Joussen:   "Der Industrieanlagen-Vertrag", 1981, p.7; F. Nicklisch: “Empfiehlt sich eine
Neukonzeption des Werkvertragsrechts? - unter besonderer Berücksichtigung komplexer
Langzeitverträge -.” JZ 39 (1984): 757-808, p. 757,758, 761.
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  §14 No.2 VOB/B; H. Kuß:   "Verdingungsordnung für Bauleistungen (VOB), Teile A und B
mit Erläuterungen", 1997, §14 VOB/B, Annotation No.18 et seq. and see below.
371
 H. Kuß:   "Verdingungsordnung für Bauleistungen (VOB), Teile A und B mit




activity and consent of both parties that the performance of the contractor has
been completed, and they constitute the maturity of the payment obligation.
In fact, this area provides a good example for a demonstration to what extent
German law as a civil law system depends fundamentally on judge-made law
and how decisions of the Federal Court can have quite large scale economic
effects:
Following an extensive discussion in the 1950s the Federal Court
(Bundesgerichtshof, BGH), established its opinion in a decision of 26 Nov,
1959,373 that contracts employing architects were to be classified as
Werkverträge, as regulated in §§631-652 BGB, and thus subject to the thirty
years' time limit under §195 BGB.  Then, unexpectedly, in 1972 374 the Court
changed its opinion and held that architects were regularly employed under
contracts for services, and the time limits for their right to claim the contract
price was two years according to §196 I No.7 BGB.  The profession faced
millions of losses but despite vigorous opposition by legal writers 375 the court
did not see a need for intermediate solutions. 376
The law relating to building contracts is governed by a rather fragmentary set
of rules which have not been reviewed fundamentally since the enactment of
the BGB.  Many of its solutions do, in fact, not quite live up to the
requirements of modern industrial practice.
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  BGH Z 31, 224.
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  BGHZ 59, 163 (165) = NJW 1972,1799 (1800).
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 Many architects had relied on the thirty year’s time limit and not yet collected their outstanding
balances. See Ganten, NJW 1973,1165; Jagenburg, NJW 1973,1721(1728); Schneider MDR 1973,305.
Nowadays the situation has changed again: the contract employing an architect "is to be treated according
to the rules of the Werkvertragsrecht”, BGH NJW-RR 1989, p.1248-1250, p.1249.
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  BGHZ 60,98(101).
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Certain contract types which were brought about by modern times have been
subjected to new legislation now.  One was incorporated into the BGB, the
travel contract (§§651a-k BGB).  Complex long term agreements dominate
modern commercial activities,377 and securing transactions against currency
fluctuations are among the most important challenges to the law now as
opposed to the time when the BGB was drafted.
Efforts for reform have been made since the early eighties. The Federal
Minister of Justice (Bundesminister der Justiz), has commissioned numerous
expertises and proposals on different areas of the private law.  A commission
was formed (Schuldrechtskommission), a group of experts who worked on the
subject over years.  In 1992 the commission published their final report.378
The proposal received a positive reception by the practitioners on the Annual
Meeting of German Lawyers (Deutscher Juristentag, DJT), who voted for the
proposal to enter the legislative procedure.  However, the proposal was not
taken any further than that, and it was not directly made a basis for the recent
reform of the BGB.379
The reluctance may have stemmed from the fact that the proposal favoured
some fundamental changes and innovations within the system of the BGB.  In
order to rectify frequent problems concerning the interrelationship of the rules
governing defective performance and guarantee (Mängelrecht,
Gewährleistungsrecht), on the one hand and Leistungsstörungen (eg.
impossibility), on the other, the experts considered the notions of fault, ‘breach
of duty' or 'breach of obligation' as a better starting point for developing legal
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  In 1983 DM 10 Billion gross production value was reached by construction businesses
employing 20 and more people.(Statistical Yearbook for the Federal Republic of Germany 1983, p.203).
See also M. Bridge: “Does Anglo-American contract law need a doctrine of good faith ?” Can.Bus.L.J.
9.4 (1984): 385-434, at p.397.
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  "Abschlußbericht der Kommission zur Überarbeitung des Schuldrechts“, 1992.
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  See below Chapter Eight.
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solutions.380  This solution resembles the approach of Anglo-American
contract law treating the 'breach' as a pre-requisite for remedies and has
actually now been incorporated into the new law of obligations,381 leaving the
rules on Werkvertrag and cancellation unaltered.  The Draft Principles of
European Contract Law (PECL), pursue this approach as well.382
Therefore a set of rules like the UPICC may serve as a solution in the field of
international construction contracts in the absence of thorough modernisation
and reform of domestic contract law.  More specifically, relating to
construction contracts, discussions took place among participants and delegates
of the private law section of the 55th German Juristentag in Hamburg, 1984.
Details of payment practice were subject to suggestions to alter and extend the
provisions regulating the matter in the BGB.  Some lawyers, however, are of
the opinion that appropriate solutions can be reached on the basis of the
existing provisions if thoroughly assessed and applied. 383
The provisions regulating building contracts form very complex interplay
between the rules on cancellation, those on late performance, and the right to
withhold performance, as well as the doctrine of 'positive breach of contract'
(positive Vertragsverletzung). They pose difficult questions of classification
regarding the contract type in practice, and the lack of clarity regarding the
relationship of the different areas of law often lead to lengthy court procedures.
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  Palandt/Heinrichs:   "Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch", 1998, Vorb z. §275 No.4 and 5.
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  Legislation enacted on 26 Nov 2001 reforming parts of the BGB (Gesetz zur Modernisierung
des Schuldrechts, BGBl I, p.3138).
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  L. Olsen: “The choice of the aggrieved party - An analysis of the remedies in the Principles of
the European Contract Law.” European Review of Private Law 1 (1999): 21-44, p.25.
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 R. Grimme:  "Die Erfüllung beim Werkvertrag"Vol. 105, 1987, p.24.
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A good example is the judgment of the Federal Court, Bundesgerichtshof
(BGH), of 16 June, 1972. 384  On purchase of a piece of land and house under
a contract of 28 June, 1966, the parties agreed that the vendor should carry out
certain repairs and finish building work in exchange for DM 28000 which
formed part of the whole contract price of another DM 55000.  Being
dissatisfied with the vendor's efforts to realise the desired results the buyer
withheld DM 25000 and had the work carried out by a third party by means of
the sum withheld.  The plaintiff vendor claimed payment of DM 25000 as the
contract price.  The defendant claimed a right to set-off against the plaintiff on
the vendor's delay and a right to damages thereupon.  At first instance
(Landgericht) the plaintiff was awarded DM 23333.90, incl. interest.  The
second instance, the Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe,385 rejected the defendant's
appeal.  The court obviously regarded the contract exclusively as a sales
contract.  Therefore, they could not find any justifications for the withholding
of DM 25000, neither in the provisions on the synallagmatical contract (§321
BGB), nor in the rules on defective performance, Mängelrecht, §§459 BGB
seq. The Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court, third instance), accepted the
revision and discharged the previous decisions on the ground (among others),
that as far as the contract involved building work it was to be construed as
being a Werkvertrag.  The court held that nothing in the contract excluded the
employer's unqualified right to cancellation in §649 BGB.  By employing the
third party this right was exercised successfully.  It was held that the
cancellation can be expressed by a conclusive act by the employer such as
performing the agreed work himself.386
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  ZR 174/70.
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  See also BGH WM 1968, 847.
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Another effect of the different classification of the contract concerned the
maturity of the payment obligation; under a sales contract the defendant would
have had to render performance first.  Only on payment the necessary steps
towards a transfer of the property would have been taken.  Under a
Werkvertrag the contractor has to perform first, § 641 BGB.  The defendant
thus, was not delaying performance by withholding the DM 25000 and there
was no breach.387  The court did, however contemplate matters of delay and
defective performance within the Werkvertrag context, §633 BGB.388  This
question concerns the distinction between breach of contract (Vertragswidriges
Verhalten), and the 'extraordinary' right to cancellation "on important
grounds".389
V.1.1. Standard terms: Do they offer a better solution than the UPICC?
In industry, standard terms are in use.  There are hundreds of standard terms
drafted by the various trade associations of specific branches and published by
the Bundeskartellamt, the federal competition authority, in its official organ,
Bundesanzeiger.  Weyers used a selection of about fifty of these standard terms
in the course of his expertise on the Werkvertrag for the first reform project of
the BGB.390
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  See below  V.1.2.
390
  H.-L. Weyers:  H.-L. Weyers:  “Welche Ergänzungen und Fortentwicklungen sind im
Werkvertragsrecht im Hinblick auf die technischen, wirtschaftlichen und juristischen
Weiterentwicklungen der Rechtswirklichkeit geboten?”, p.1115 et seq, titles and source listed in  Anhang
4, p.1201-1205.
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An example in the area of iron production i.e. large scale transactions are the
1957 ECE (United Nations Commission for Economy), general terms relating
to delivery and mounting for import and export of machinery and plants.391
These seem, however to be mostly overruled by even more detailed contract
drafts of negotiators in practice.392  In the field of construction contracts for
plant building there are "Allgemeine Beschaffungsbedingungen für Anlagen
und Anlagenteile (Musterklauseln)", (General conditions for acquisition of
plants and parts thereof (sample clauses)).393
These are drafted from the point of view of the employer/orderer regarding the
wording and content.394  A working group of representatives of the iron
producing (Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen und Stahl, ESI), as well as the iron
manufacturing industry (Arbeitsgemeinschaft verarbeitende Industrie, AVI),
agreed after negotiations to publish a paper containing clauses relating to the
purchase and order of plants and machinery in 1968, the "Einkaufsbedingungen
der eisenschaffenden Industrie", ("conditions for purchase of the iron
producing industry"),395 the so-called AVI/ESI-conditions.  These types of
rules are the result of balancing certain diverging interests between
employer/orderer and contractor.
Standard terms in general, however, do not seem to be able to replace contract
law, in terms of fairness and thoroughness, easily.396  Although in particular,
standard terms negotiated collectively among trade branches, which seem to
provide an argument for the prevalence of this 'bilateral' and private kind of
                                                 
391
  German and other language versions published by Maschinenbauverlag, Frankfurt/Main.
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  P. Joussen:   "Der Industrieanlagen-Vertrag", 1981, p.397; H.-L. Weyers:  "Welche
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  Text in P. Joussen:   "Der Industrieanlagen-Vertrag", 1981, Anlage I, p.402 et seq.
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  Differing from the practice in the UK: compare IV.2.2. above.
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 Text in P. Joussen:   "Der Industrieanlagen-Vertrag",1981, Anlage 13, p.446-451
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  Further discussion below; see also H.-L. Weyers:  "Welche Ergänzungen..."   eg p.1125, 1123
and 1124 pointing to the problem of effects of certain bilateral arrangements on third parties.
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norms, over the traditional codification,397 maintain a weakness in the area of
the effects on third parties and the problems of gaps in the contractual
agreements, resulting from promoting individual interests through the
negotiating process. 398
V.1.2. The right of cancellation and the modified payment obligation in
§649 BGB
In cases of cancellation, the payment obligation and maturity rule receive a
unique treatment; §649 BGB grants a general right to cancellation.  It gives the
employer/orderer the freedom to cancel a building contract at any time before
the completion of the work without having to give reasons.  On cancellation,
the contractor remains fully entitled to the agreed contract price, §649 S.2
BGB. The employer is still "obliged to pay money" in the sense of Art.7.2.1
UPICC. Therefore, the full contract price can become due before the contractor
has even started to carry out any building work.  Cancellation replaces
acceptance for the purposes of maturity. The employer's right to cancellation
balances the contractor's right to require performance under a building contract.
It serves primarily the interest of the employer not to be forced to proceed with
a project.  This provision represents a unique solution within the part of the
BGB which deals with specific contract types.399  Other ways of terminating
the contract do, of course, exist besides the cancellation option, such as
withdrawal (Rücktritt), and the general provisions discharging a contract.  It is,
therefore, often difficult to establish the appropriate way of interpreting the
facts so as to decide about the contract's destiny.
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The right to cancellation was introduced into the BGB with the express
motivation for considering the orderer's interest in giving effect to changes in
the employer’s individual circumstances.  At the same time, the builder's
(contractor's), interest, not to remain unfairly exposed to this freedom of the
employer in respect of his interest to obtain the contract price, is respected.
There are, of course, cases in which the contractor does in fact have a specific
interest in performing the contract rather than just receiving the agreed contract
price.  These are eg prestigious 'pioneering projects' (Pilotprojekte), or the
objective to maintain employment for the sub-contractors and workers
involved.400   With regard to the role of Art.7.2.1 UPICC, however, it has to
be emphasised that the right to cancellation does not, even under German law,
directly discharge the "obligation to pay money". If the employer is not
"obliged to pay money" under the contract in its original form, he may be
obliged to do so under related provisions, namely due to the fact that the
contractor does keep his right to require performance (§649 S.2 BGB), though
in a modified form.401
The building contract might come to an end on cancellation, not so the
payment obligation.  This is one of the general dogmatic differences arising
from the formulation of Art. 7.2.1. UPICC and its position within the
Principles.
Different from the German Civil Code, the payment obligation is positioned in
isolation from the corresponding delivery obligation arising from a service
contract.  There is no synallagmatic (reciprocal), connection between the two
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obligations, at least not according to the text.  The BGB formulates the two
corresponding obligations in § 631 I BGB, reinforcing its belief in any right to
require performance in the context of a Schuldverhältnis, as a "living
entity",402 as opposed to a concept of mere separate obligations as in the
UPICC.   The BGB provides for a set number of ways in which obligations can
be discharged. They all operate within the framework of the contract.
The other aspect to be discussed comparing Art. 7.2.1 UPICC is that of
compelling performance against the unwilling employer. Cancellation is
certainly a means to avoid this effect.
The parties are of course free to exclude any right to cancellation by
agreement. Most construction contracts will in fact provide for such exclusion,
due to the special nature of these complex and long term projects.403 On such
exclusion a contractor can then actually force the employer to perform the
contract.  The Oberlandesgericht (OLG) Celle, 404 decided in a case where the
plaintiff, an architect, claimed performance under a contract employing him to
design and build property on a plot of land acquired by the defendants, under a
contract which contained a clause obliging them to employ but the plaintiff in
order to guarantee the successful development of the whole area.  The
defendants obviously feared a considerable delay in the performance of the
contract because the architect had subsequently taken on several building
projects and claimed a right to cancellation.  The vendors of the land, however,
had concluded a contract with the plaintiff to design and build property for
them as well as on a number of plots of land which were to be sold separately
(by them), to third parties, such as the defendants, as part of a development
                                                 
402
  See above  before V.1.
403
  H.-L. Weyers:  "Welche Ergänzungen..."  , p.1126,1136: in almost half of the standard terms
Weyers looked at §649 BGB was excluded. These did not even relate to large scale projects.
404
  OLG Celle, judgment of 1 Nov 1960, MDR 1961, 318/319.
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project. The contracts were considered to be Werkverträge.  The clause in the
sales contract together with the fact that the parties agreed that the architect
should provide for all necessary planning permissions, which he had done, was
construed (§157 BGB), as expressing the parties' intention that the architect
should not just be entitled to the contract price, his architect's fee, but also to
the specific performance of the contract.  The right to cancellation was thereby
excluded and denied by the court.  The anticipated delay in performance was
not considered an 'important reason' which would have justified an
'extraordinary' cancellation.  Here, the specific interest of the architect in the
contract was protected.
An extraordinary right to cancellation is generally recognised with respect to
contracts lasting over an extended period of time, such as contracts for
employment or longstanding contracts for the supply of goods.  This doctrinal
development into a general principle of law 405 occurred after the enactment
of the BGB by the courts' practice derived from §242 BGB (the good faith
provision), as well as from provisions of the Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB), the
Commercial Code.  This right cannot be excluded by contractual agreement.  It
is based on the assumption that long term contracts require an intact
relationship between the parties in order to function well. 406  Contracts of this
kind can therefore be cancelled 'on important grounds' by either party, even if
no cancellation provision is contained in the agreement.  The provisions in
§§631 et seq BGB cover the whole range of Werkverträge  with  short term
("discrete"),407 contracts with exchange character at one end, and large
                                                 
405
.  Palandt/Heinrichs:   "Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch", 1998, Ein.l v .§241, No.17.
406
 B. Schmidt: “Zur unberechtigten Kündigung aus wichtigem Grunde beim Werkvertrag.” NJW
20 (1995): 1313-1316, p.1314; RGZ 169, 203(206); BGHZ 50, 312(314); Otto von Gierke published his
influential treatise on long term contracts ("Dauernde Schuldverhältnisse“, Iherings Jahrbücher (Ihering’s
Yearbooks) 1914, p.355 et seq. as early as 1914. In the US Jan R. McNeil contributes to the discussion
about long term contracts in modern contract law. He speaks of "relational contracts” ("The New Social
Contract. An Enquiry into Modern Contractual Relations“, New Haven and London, 1980, see p.10-35.
407
  J.R.McNeil, see previous note.
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projects costing billions and stretching over several years such as the
construction of airports, nuclear power stations, tunnel systems or similar at the
other.
Supplementing the highly abstract regulations of the law of standard terms, are
a regular instrument of parties to construction contracts even from a rather
small scale stage of the range of possible contracts such as TV repair orders or
manufacturing of household appliances.408  Most building contracts
incorporate the VOB/B as standard terms. §8, No.s 2.-6. VOB/B  provide for
special cases of cancellation which are admissible according the 1976 law
relating to standard contract terms, Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der
Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen, AGBG),409 because the building contract
is a Werkvertrag, with characteristic elements of a long term contract
(Dauerschuldverhältnis).410
V.1.3. The modified payment obligation as a disguised damages rule
The BGB creates a complicated relationship between cancellation and damages
provisions regarding the nature of the payment obligation through the wording
of §649 BGB.  The payment obligation, although it cannot be discharged by
cancellation, is modified after the cancellation. The contractor can only claim
the price reduced by the savings he makes as a consequence of the cancellation,
                                                 
408
  See examples of standard terms of different branches in Germany in H.-L. Weyers:  "Welche
Ergänzungen..." , Anhang 4.
409
 "BGB, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch mit zugehörigen Gesetzen und Nebengesetzen“,Beck‘sche
Textausgaben,  München 1999, C.H.Beck, 104th ed, p.593.
410
  BGH BB 1962, 497; BGH WM 1984, 1375 (1376); NJW 1982, 2553(2554); NJW
1993,1972(1973).
203
which means that he does not have to perform.411  Such a saving can be the
opportunity of a compensating contract, and the contractor will have to deduct
the gains from such a cover transaction from the price.  If he maliciously
refrains from taking up a compensating contract he will also not be able to rely
on his right to require performance, §649 S.2 BGB.  The burden of prove
however, is carried by the employer, to establish the fact that the builder did
take up a compensating alternative contract, or to prove that he maliciously and
deliberately failed to take the opportunity to do so. 412  The employer's
modified payment obligation does not differ much, effectively, from a right to
damages qualified by a duty to mitigate.413 This view is supported by several
decisions and provisions relating to the law of cancellation.414
The duty to mitigate is contained in §254 II S1BGB.  It deals with cases of
joint causation of the damage and the influence of the behaviour of the injured
party on the amount of damages.  Cover transactions in general, eg in sales
contracts, are not a regular duty of the aggrieved party,415 but can be required
as mitigation in certain cases.416  If the market price of the rejected goods is
falling a cover transaction can amount to the seller's duty.417 A shareholder
can be expected to take advantage of subsequent positive stock market
developments.418
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  Palandt/Heinrichs: "Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch", 1998, §649, No.4; BGH, NJW 93, 1972.
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 R. Grimme:  "Die Erfüllung beim Werkvertrag"  Vol. 105, 1987, p.255.
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  See I. Schwenzer.  Erfüllung und Schadensersatz nach den Unidroit - Prinzipien.  Basel, 1997,
p.5: a functional damages rule; R. Grimme:   "Die Erfüllung beim Werkvertrag"    Vol. 105, 1987, p. 248.
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  BGH NJW 1973, 1190 (1191); P. Neufang "Erfüllungszwang als "remedy" bei
Nichterfüllung"Vol. 186, 1998, p.313.
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  Palandt/Heinrichs:   "Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch", 1998,§325, No.17; OLG Frankfurt, NJW 77,
1015.
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 Palandt/Heinrichs:   "Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch", 1998, §254, No.44;§325, No.17;  BHG WM 65
102.
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  OLGZ 90, 341; BGH NJW 97, 1231.
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  OLG Cologne, ZIP 90, 433.
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The notion of damages also creeps into the cancellation system by way of the
'extraordinary' cancellation applicable to all long term contracts,
Dauerschuldverhältnisse.  In case of an extraordinary cancellation the
contractor looses his entitlement to the modified contract price as provided for
in §649 S.2 BGB.419  Only the work has to be paid for as agreed which has
actually been performed at the time of cancellation.420   The detailed
provisions of §8 No.s 2-4 VOB/B (which restate parts of the law relating to the
'extraordinary cancellation on important grounds'), even provide for liability in
damages of the contractor.
To demonstrate the complicated nature of the present421 solution of the
BGB the following may serve:
The content of the payment obligation is sometimes disputed due to the
interrelationship between the rules on the right to withhold, §273 and §320
BGB, defective performance in building contracts (§633 I and II BGB), and
delay in §§633 II and §284 BGB.   So, in BGH WM 1972, 1025,422  the
parties litigated about the question as to whether the defendant had a right to
damages arising out of a late performance by the plaintiff, and whether he
could invoke this right successfully since he had not issued a reminder
according to §633 II and §284 BGB.  It was not clear, whether the defendant,
the buyer of the house, was entitled to withhold payment, either on the basis of
§641 BGB or under §273 BGB, or, whether he had refused payment
"unlawfully" (breach), because he himself had to perform first under the
contract of sale.423  In that case the plaintiff (the vendor), would have had a
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  BGHZ 45, 372, at p.375; BGHZ 31, 224, p.229.
420
  Palandt/Heinrichs:   "Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch", 1998, §649, No.4.
421
  Even after the enactment of the new law of obligations as far as old cases are concerned.
Compare Chapter Eight.
422
  Discussed above in V.1.
423
  This was the view taken by the Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe.
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right to withhold and a claim under §273 and §320 BGB, and he would have
been entitled to refuse to finish the building work under §326 S2 BGB.  It was
discussed whether the defendant had a right to cancellation or whether he had
committed a breach of contract by not paying.  The court did not have to decide
whether the way the building work was done, the dissatisfaction of the buyer,
was to be seen as defective performance and thus would have required a
reminder prior to replacement performance by the builder (employer), himself
under §633 III BGB, or, whether the defendant did in fact have a right to
cancellation under §649 BGB, in that case.
V.1.4. Law reform projects
Thoughts relating to a reform of this area of law have concentrated on the role
of long term contracts.  During the work of the reform commission
(Schuldrechtskommission), numerous opinions on the quality of the existing
norms have been published, especially on the forum of the Deutsche
Juristentag (DJT).424  These discussions and written opinions reveal a very
contradictory and heterogeneous picture.  As much as most commentators feel
the need for more detailed regulations as to complex long term contracts,425
they also seem to acknowledge and appreciate the workability of the norms in
                                                 
424
  See eg A. Teichmann: “Empfiehlt sich eine Neukonzeption des Werkvertragsrechts?”
Verhandlungen des 55. Deutschen Juristentages Hamburg 1994 1.Gutachten A (1984): pages A.. In the
same volume Soergel and Brandner published written expertises. Other expertises were commissioned by
the Schuldrechtskommission and published, eg H.-L. Weyers:  "Welche Ergänzungen..."  1115. Another
expertise relating to the Werkvertrag is by Keilholz in the same work, second volume, pp.241 et seq.
There were extensive discussions on the Juristentag   itself as well as in the legal literature.
425
  F. Nicklisch: “Empfiehlt sich..."-.” JZ 39 (1984): 757-808., pp. 575, 759, 765; R. Grimme: "Die
Erfüllung beim Werkvertrag"Vol. 105, 1987, p.23; P. Joussen: "Der Industrieanlagen-Vertrag",
1981, p.7; A. Teichmann: “Empfiehlt sich eine Neukonzeption des Werkvertragsrechts?” Verhandlungen
des 55. Deutschen Juristentages Hamburg 1994 1.Gutachten A (1984): pages A, p.A101; H.-L. Weyers:
"Welche Ergänzungen..." 1115, eg  p.1122.
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the BGB because of their "high degree of abstractness".426  This however, is
mainly emphasised in relation to the short term traditional contract for
exchange, i.e. the traditional type constellation which the code was originally
drafted for, 427 where small scale business is carried out in the form of so-
called on the spot transactions (punktuelle Austauschverträge),428 or 'simple
work contracts', einfache Werkverträge, such as plumbing services or the repair
of shoes. 429
There is a certain contradiction in the emphasis of the abstractness of the rules,
allowing flexibility to adapt to modern practice on the one hand, and the
allegation that the requirements of modern complex contracts which form the
majority of the trade volume, as well as the biggest amount of litigation,430
needs new special regulations on the other.  Most suggestions result, therefore,
after thorough discussion, in the drafting of slightly modified rules to replace
the old law and some new rules relating to long term contracts and
incorporating some of the usage in practice, eg. relating to payment practice.
Nicklisch 431 and Weyers 432 both suggest that the 'extraordinary'
cancellation be part of a new wording as well as a more detailed reference to
the contractor's modified right to payment on cancellation.  Weyers also
includes the contractor's special interest in the performance of the contract in
his draft proposal of a new § 649 I BGB,433 and makes this a reason for an
exception to the employer's unqualified right to cancellation.
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  F. Nicklisch, op.cit.  p.757, p.758, 759.
427H.-L. Weyers:  "Welche Ergänzungen...", p.1115, p.1122.
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  F. Nicklisch: “Empfiehlt sich..."-.” JZ 39 (1984): 757-808., eg p.757; see also “Motive”, II,
p.470.
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  F. Nicklisch: “Empfiehlt sich..."-.” JZ 39 (1984): 757-808, at p.768.
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 H.-L. Weyers:  "Welche Ergänzungen..." p.1115 et seq, p.1193.
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  Ibid. Anhang I, p.1192.
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None of the authors do, however, question the system underlying the rules
relating to the Werkvertrag in general; the mechanism of cancellation leading
to modified payment obligation is not challenged at all.  However, this section
of the civil code contains a dogmatic weakness which could be rectified by
recourse to a modern proposal such the UPICC.  The way the modified
payment obligation in §649 BGB is formulated reminds very much of the duty
to mitigate contained in the damages provision of §254 II S 1 BGB.  The party
affected by a cancellation would possibly be awarded the same amount of
money, which would be calculated as an appropriate damages award in a case
under §§249, 254 BGB.  If a cover transaction can be required as duty to
mitigate and can also be a condition for the entitlement to payment of the
modified contract price as a contractual debt, the action has the same function
in both cases; in the latter case the rule establishing the modified payment
obligation functions as a damages rule to deal with the interest of the injured
party, i.e. the contractor who is affected by the cancellation.  A functional
damages rule is also contained in §324 I S2 BGB; just as the contractor can
expect to be compensated for the work already carried out, the debtor of the
non-monetary obligation, in cases of impossibility,434 is entitled to
compensation.  This, under §324 I S2 BGB, is reduced by what the debtor
saves due to the discharge of his obligation and by what he gains or
maliciously omits to gain by investing his working power otherwise.  There is a
dispute in the literature as to how this provision is to be classified
dogmatically.  Some regard it as a right to performance,435 some as a damages
provision: "However, the right is really an action for damages, an argument
which is supported by the fact that compensation is reduced by investments
which can be saved, and that there is a duty to mitigate." 436  It is not the
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  Compare V.3.2. - below.
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 O. Jauernig, and P. Schlechtriem:   "Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch", 1994, §649 No.3b.
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  I. Schwenzer: “Specific Performance and Damages According to the 1994 UNIDROIT
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compensation itself which resembles the damages award directly, but rather the
notion of the other (injured), party's contribution (by an act or omission), to the
extent of the damage done by the defaulting party's initial act.  This suggests
that there is a factual damages situation to be dealt with by the law.  The
modified payment obligation in the current version of § 649 BGB, is supposed
to affect compensation for the contractor who, under the current regulation,
bears the risk of the employer's unqualified right to cancellation.437
One extreme position under the Werkvertrag provisions is the contractor's
potentially unqualified right to performance which could lead to the employer
having to accept work which is of no interest to him.  The other is the free right
to cancellation, which is only granted to the employer, which leaves the
contractor generally with the risk of facing cancellation.  Both risks are
'insured' under German law to a certain extent by §242 BGB, which would not
allow any party to exercise a right maliciously (rechtsmißbräuchlich), i.e.
which is either of no interest to themselves or causes disproportionate losses to
the other party.
In this way, there is no 'unqualified right to performance' under German law
unless, as we have seen, the parties know that the contractor has a special
interest in carrying out the work.
In order to observe the dogmatic stringency of the system of contract law,
however, a concept had to be found which fits into the pattern of contract law
rather than tort.  The closeness of the two areas of law is described by Prof.
Schwenzer:
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"Contracts in commercial trade are usually reciprocal.  For reciprocal contracts,
the right to performance of the creditor of the monetary obligation is only
justified if he or she has fully performed his or her own obligation to deliver
goods or to do some work.  In such a case there is practically no difference
between the right to performance and the right to claim damages." 438
The difficulty that the BGB faces here is that the concept of contract law does
not know the notion of breach of contract in the wide sense in which it is
understood under English law.  There is only the occasional appearance of the
term 'non-performance' (Nichterfüllung), triggering liability in damages; §325 I
S1 and S2 BGB (impossibility), grant damages to the obligee in cases where
the obligor has failed to perform and is responsible for the default.  But this is
not a paramount remedy.
The principal consequence of non-performance in cases of impossibility is the
discharge of the corresponding obligation in reciprocal contracts.  Non-
performance is not a concept that German law generally supports.  German law
is rather concerned with balancing corresponding obligations in the network of
obligations called contract.  Contractual imbalances have to be resolved by
disentangling the parties from this network rather than by 'termination' and
subsequent damages awards.  The contract has a strong cultural appeal to
German lawyers and is treated as a piece of art by the BGB with its elaborate
scientific structure.  The proposals for a reform of the rules relating to building
contracts do, accordingly, not challenge the boundaries of the system.  They
respect the basis of the BGB which contains the "special law of obligations"
(Recht der Schuldverhältnisse).
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Recognising the changed needs of a modern world almost every writer
emphasises the lack of special rules for complex long term contracts, as well as
their preference of the "extraordinary cancellation" on special grounds, rather
than the unqualified right to cancellation of § 649 BGB.  As a result, the draft
proposals appear as restatements of the current judge-made law which really
only reflects the current state of the existing law, rather than deserving the
name "reform".  Also, parts of standard contract terms frequently used by
contracting parties are suggested for implementation into the existing BGB
regulations.  The weakness of this approach lies in its often insufficient
wording,439 as well as a tendency to perpetuate the process of stifling the
application of the law.  Judge-made law based on underlying principles of the
code, general rules, such as §242 BGB can be adapted to individual cases.  The
attempt to cast all these decisions into sections of paragraphs involves the risk
of leaving cases unconsidered or overrating certain details occurring in
specialised areas of trade.  The great appreciation of the "high degree of
abstractness"440 which makes for the flexibility and openness of the rules
seems all the more convincing in the light of the existing reform proposals and
certainly regarding the finished product, the new law of obligations.441
Regarding the right to cancellation it seems a common concern that the
unqualified right to cancellation unduly ignores any specific interest the
contractor might have in the performance of that specific contract.442
Consequently, Weyers includes just this specific interest of the contractor into
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his draft of a new §649 I BGB, by excluding the right to cancellation, provided
that the employer knew about this special interest at the time of the conclusion
of the contract.  This suggests that a verification of such a specific interest is
regularly required which could effectively over- complicate exercising the right
to cancellation.  Weyers' subsequent mentioning of the right to cancel on
special grounds  ("remains untouched"), creates confusion as to the relationship
he suggests between the contractor’s 'special interest' and the 'extraordinary
cancellation'.  His pointing to §626 I BGB (concerning contracts for services),
in order to clarify the circumstances of an 'extraordinary cancellation' seems
useful, though.  These suggested changes are already in current usage and
practice, are legally embedded in the VOB/B and do not require
implementation into the BGB.
The dogmatic problem which the BGB poses is really the unqualified right to
cancellation coupled with the modified payment obligation.   Cancellation is
the only appropriate mode of ending a contractual relationship given that this
contract type of Werkvertrag was considered to require this special treatment
compared to the other contract types defined in the BGB.  The fact that the
creators of the BGB have inserted the right to cancellation in just the way they
did in the sections on Dienstvertrag (contract for services), and Miet-
/Pachtvertrag (lease/tenancy), shows that they were in fact aware of the time
factor which Nicklisch reminds us of in his article dealing with the
requirements of modern complex building contracts.443   Due to the theoretical
system of the BGB there was no possibility of adopting a solution, assuming a
breach of contract followed by a damages claim.  The oddity is really the
contractor's initially fully remaining entitlement to the contract price on
cancellation, i.e. the right to performance.  Normally a cancellation would lead
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212
to the termination of the contractual relationship ex nunc which means that all
obligations come to an end.444   In building contracts, however, where the
work has not been started, cancellation still leaves the full payment claim
untouched which seems an overly rigid result.  It grants an unqualified right to
performance.  This is systematically to be regarded as the basic rule, according
to its wording.445  The modification of the contractual debt in the special case
of Werkverträge, by way of discounting any savings made or maliciously
missed on cancellation, is justified by the special circumstances in building
contracts where the payment obligation only becomes due on completion of the
work.  The modification by subsequent savings is then practically applied as
the normal rule, so that the builder/contractor has to prove savings, together
with his claim of the contract debt.446  In practice, he can therefore never
claim the full amount originally granted by the rule in §649 S 2, first half, but
he may come out with the full contract price if there are no savings (i.e. in
cases where a unique piece of work is commissioned, i.e. a car made to match
the needs of a disabled person, a special musical instrument, etc.). The
employer then has to prove further savings as a defence requiring further
factual investigation and expense.447
This shows clearly that the concept of the unqualified right to cancellation
serves the objective of systematical consistency in the civil code.   It remains to
be seen whether a systematically different concept would match the factual
requirements of the parties involved in disputes, especially in modern complex
international building contracts, equally well or even better.  If a reform is
welcomed in this area of law the UPICC might be an appropriate model.
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One example might illustrate the significance of systematic compliance for
German lawyers.  Although the oscillating nature of the modified payment
obligation in §649 S2 BGB and in §324 I S2 BGB, appearing formally as a
contract debt, but functioning and operating as a damages rule, is recognised by
the courts and many writers,448 its functional role as a duty to mitigate is
rejected in connection with the right to performance, which is a purely
contractual right belonging into the law of obligations.449  Accordingly, the
mere consideration that the right to performance in Art. 7.2.1 UPICC could be
limited by a duty to mitigate evokes strong opposition:
"But how can these thoughts be harmonised with the unlimited right to
performance (of the creditor) of the monetary obligation as stated in Art. 7.2.1
of the UNIDROIT Principles? A first possible interpretation would seek to
apply the duty to mitigate as stated in Article 7.4.8 paragraph 1 of the
UNIDROIT Principles to the right to performance as well.  However, in that
context there are dogmatic hurdles which cannot easily be overcome.  Virtually
all legal systems apply the duty to mitigate only to damages but not to the right
to performance." 450
Having previously stated that the modified right to performance eg. in §324 I
S2 BGB, is really a disguised duty to mitigate, and the provision a functional
damages rule,451 this appears to be a contradiction.  It only shows, however,
that dogmatic compliance has to be maintained within the legal system, but that
nevertheless there is room for an alternative regulation, drawing on the factual
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situation and offering a solution similar to the common law solution of breach
of contract sanctioned by liability in damages.
The proposals for domestic reform of the law relating to complex building
contracts cannot offer such a step.  An alternative set of rules to apply to
international contracts might therefore be a favourable solution for parties to
international building contracts.  The UPICC can be such a system, a different
mode of law to suit special cases:
"Hardly any national judge would therefore limit the right to performance by a
duty to mitigate." 452
This statement, relating to national legal systems, provides an argument for the
use of the UPICC instead of national law from the point of view of German
law.  It seems that the legislator does, in fact, practically apply the duty to
mitigate to the right to performance, however in a well adapted manner by
using the modified payment obligation.  Due to the above discussed dogmatic
difficulties, the judiciary would therefore possibly tolerate and recognise an
alternative solution, replacing the cancellation and subsequent modified right to
performance by a system of termination and damages.  There are good reasons
for integrating such a concept into the existing legal situation. 453
V.2. Compatibility of the solution provided by the UPICC with German
law and models of law reform
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The previous section V.1. set out the problems arising under current German
contract law and made some comparative reference to the UPICC.  This section
asks what the solutions of the UPICC are with regard to the German position
and whether these would be tolerated within the German doctrinal system
possibly offering a welcome alternative to law reform.
Under Art 7.4.2 UPICC the aggrieved party has a right to damages for non-
performance.  The refusal of an employer in a building contract to proceed with
the contract and pay for the work would be regarded as non-performance since
this is the employer's main obligation in a building contract.  The contractor
can, under Art. 7.4.2 (1) UPICC claim full compensation for his loss.  Full
compensation is described as:
"..harm sustained as a result of the non-performance. Such harm includes both
any loss which it [the party] suffered and any gain of which it was deprived,
taking into account any gain to the aggrieved party resulting from the
avoidance of cost or harm."
Coupled with the duty to mitigate provided for in Art. 7.4.8 UPICC the
contractor would be entitled to claim a sum of very much the same size as he
would get under German law in a case of non-performance by the employer,
under German cancellation or impossibility provisions.
V.2.1. The contractor's right to terminate
216
Termination of the contract would, however, be up to the contractor.  After
taking notice of the intention of the employer not to proceed with the contract,
the employer can choose to terminate the contract under Art. 7.3.3 UPICC.
The rules to restitution which apply under the UPICC after termination take
special account of long term contracts such as international building contracts
for large projects; Art. 7.3.6 (2) UPICC provides that "restitution can only be
claimed for the period after termination has taken effect", "if performance of
the contract has extended over a period of time and the contract is divisible".
In large projects contracts usually are divisible since payment is often done in
instalments on completion of certain sections of the work.  This provision takes
the place of the contractor's right to performance under the German law of the
Werkvertrag.  It means that the contractor is only entitled to payment under the
contract for the work actually carried out, just as he would be under §649 BGB.
Further losses are to be compensated by way of damages under the UPICC.
The employer's liability in damages arising from any (anticipatory) non-
performance corresponds, in the pecuniary sense, effectively to the German
right of cancellation and its consequential remaining modified payment
obligation.
V.2.2. The employer's right to terminate
The right to termination can be exercised by the employer in cases where the
contractor fails to perform in the contractually agreed way.  This right is
comparable to the 'extraordinary cancellation' under German law.  The grounds
for termination contained in Art. 7.3.1. UPICC, include termination on undue
delay (Art. 7.3.1. (3) UPICC).  The guidelines for determining whether a non-
performance amounts to a fundamental one allowing for termination, provide a
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limitation of the use of the right to terminate the contract; the criterion of the
potential occurrence of any "disproportionate loss as a result of the preparation
or performance if the contract is terminated", takes the contractor's interests454
into account.
V.2.3. The rules on termination in the UPICC as a suitable substitute for
cancellation
Termination cannot be invoked by either party without special reasons.  It is a
remedy for non-performance rather than a regular option for the employer.
Termination is not a contractual right as is cancellation.  The UPICC do not
contain such an option which puts the contractual relationship at the disposal of
one party only.  The parties can nevertheless agree a right to cancellation in
their contract.  In practice this is rarely the case.455  The parties regularly
exclude the unqualified right of cancellation in their contracts under domestic
law.  Cancellation on special grounds, however, remains a common provision
which is, at the same time, a common principle of the German law relating to
long term agreements, as we have seen.456  This right is, in effect, sufficiently
reflected by the provisions on non-performance by the UPICC.  This
particularly includes the legal mechanism of compensation and restitution
corresponding to the German modified right to performance.457
Problems arise in cases where the employer, for motivations not related to any
act or omission of the contractor, announces his intention not to proceed with
the contract and not to pay the contract price.  This is the area giving rise to
                                                 
454
  Compare V.3.2. - below.
455
  See above   V.3.2.
456
  See esp. V.1.3.
457
  See IV.1.2. - IV.1.3.
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general doubts as to the workability and acceptability of the UPICC, from the
perspective of the civil law systems recognising a general right to
cancellation.458  Where the employer wants to get rid of the contract for
reasons other than those the contractor gives rise to, he cannot rely on
termination; his intention not to pay could be regarded as amounting to a
fundamental non-performance under Art. 7.3.1 UPICC, especially where it is
"intentional or reckless" (Art. 7.3.1 (2) (a) UPICC).  Because the contractor
will always have to perform first, however, the non-performance can only be
anticipatory except for intermediate payments of completed sections.
Cancellation provisions only allow for cancellation before completion of the
work.  Under the UPICC, the employer would still depend on the contractor's
decision to exercise his right to termination.  The question remains whether the
contractor can force the employer to proceed with the contract by way of his
right to performance under Art. 7.2.1 UPICC.
There are two ways of resolving this conflict. One way is to consider, by way
of inherent interpretation, an underlying principle in the UPICC which would
amount to a duty of the contractor to exercise his right to termination if the
work is of no interest to the employer following special changed
circumstances. This would be an inherent limitation to the right to performance
of the contractor.  Such a limitation could be based on the application of Art.
1.7 UPICC, the duty to "observe good faith and fair dealing in international
trade". This has been discussed in the context of Art.77 CISG; "Art.77 would
mean, in other words, that the aggrieved party must mitigate loss through the
choice of remedy".459  Kastely denies this duty for systematical reasons within
the Convention.  Such a duty to mitigate as a limitation of the right to
                                                 
458
  See German law (§649 BGB etc.) , Swiss law ( Art. 377 OR); French law (Art. 1794 CC).
459
  A.H. Kastely: “The Right to Require Performance in International Sales: Towards an
International Interpretation of the Vienna Convention.” Washington Law Review 63 (1988): 607-651,
p.622.
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performance in articles 46 and 62 CISG was expressly rejected at the 1980
Vienna Conference.  This solution is also discussed by Prof. Schwenzer.460
She sees a disadvantage in the prospects of uniformity in application of the
UPICC.
V.3. Specific performance in German law: the civil law position and the
idea of codification in an international context
This section asks how historic development helps to understand the present
significance of aspects of specific performance in German contract law and
also in a common law system.  It analyses the attitude taken in civil law
jurisdictions towards the notion with regards to the idea of written law as such.
This also serves to confirm and further explain the findings stated in Chapter
Four regarding the situation under English law.  It helps to explain how the two
spheres from different viewpoints can relate the uniform law approach to
specific performance which is suggested in the UPICC.
Dawson has made the following observation about the main differences in
perceiving specific performance as being one between the attitudes typically
held by common law as opposed to civil law jurisdictions:
"The contrast between the French and the German treatment of specific
performance is one among many demonstrations of the great differences
between the 'civil law' systems.  Despite their long exposure to ideas derived
from Roman law, each of the 'civil law' systems is the product of independent,
                                                 
460
   I. Schwenzer: “Specific Performance and Damages According to the 1994 UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts.” ELR 1 (1998/1999): 289-303 p.295.
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conscious choices.  Each has drawn important values and objectives from the
society it purports to regulate." 461
German law provides a rather unqualified support for the keeping of promises;
specific performance is the paramount remedy.  Although the Code Civil had
been in force in some German states,462 when it came to the drafting of the
1877 Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozeßordnung, ZPO, effective from
1879),  a suggestion to adopt Art. 1142 CC was rejected by a governmental
opinion "that this rule of French law...'does not correspond to the German legal
conscience'".463  In fact, the rules concerning enforcement of judgments are
part of the law relating to civil procedure and thereby totally separate from
substantive law.  There is no doubt that any obligation can be required to be
performed specifically, but this does not mean at the same time that there are
harsh methods of enforcement at hand without due consideration by the courts.
The courts can grant a remedy under the law of contract and they still have to
decide in a second step if, and how, this right conferred onto the plaintiff, is to
be enforced.  Again the attitudes of scholars in the nineteenth century have to
be seen in a political context, similar to the debate on the views of Pothier
during the years around 1789, the year of the climax of the French
Revolution.464  The first constitutions arose, limiting the powers of the feudal
system,465 and thereby granting more political influence to the
"bourgeoisie".466  The protection of personal freedom became a value worth
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  Dawson: “Specific Performance in France and Germany.” Michigan Law Review 57 (1959):
495, p.525.
462
   French law, brought to Germany by Napoleon lived on as "Rhenish Law“ much valued by its
subjects, and sought after even by other German states, namely Bavaria and Hessen-Darmstadt and
Würzburg, see U. Eisenhardt:  "Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte", 1984, §55.
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  Protokolle der Kommission des Reichstags 413-414 (1875); Dawson: “Specific Performance in
France and Germany.” Michigan Law Review 57 (1959): 495, p.527.
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  Compare F. Wieacker "A History of Private Law in Europe", p.364 and p.365.
465
  Constitutions of the German states evolved from 1818 (Bavaria); Württemberg (1819), Baden
(1818), Hessen (1820), Kur-Hessen (1831), Saxony (1831), Hannover (1833) and Braunschweig (1832).
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  U. Eisenhardt:   "Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte", 1984, §56.
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considering when deciding about the importance that enforcement of contracts
should have.  From 1868 imprisonment for debt was forbidden by statute.
Nevertheless, the BGB should not be conceived as reflecting a compromise
between the 'bourgeoisie' and the crown and aristocracy, after the defeat of
liberalism in 1848 when the proclamation of the republic in the Paulskirche in
Frankfurt had failed, and despite the absence of a great revolution.  The
aristocratic part of society did not see a challenge in the legislative efforts of
the drafting commissions467  but now the code is rather regarded as the result
of a struggle between the German federal states.468   The fact that Germany
was not, like France, a centralised state has to be borne in mind.  It was not
before 1873 that the Reich was conferred legislative power to regulate the
complete 'civil' (private), law, i.e. the law relating to private individuals,469
comprehensively.470  This happened after years of resistance by the kingdoms
of Bavaria, Württemberg and Saxony.471  The BGB was not commanded by
an emperor at his best, but it was the result of a joint political decision, as well
as the common effort of various individuals representing a remarkable range of
different areas of society, in the course of the drafting history of the BGB.  The
First Commission prepared the first draft (published in 1888), and consisted of
10 members and its president H. E. Pape, a judge, president of the supreme
commercial court of the Reich.  The members were five judges, three civil
servants and two Professors.  One of them was the famous pandectist Bernhard
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  K. Kroeschell:   "Rechtsgeschichte Deutschlands im 20. Jahrhundert"Vol. 1681, 1992, p.19.
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  Bavaria supported the strict form of transfer of land as notary deeds successfully against Prussia
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Law in Europe", p.365.
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  By the "Lex Lasker“ , an Act  of 20 Dec 1873, promoted by the members of the Reichstag
Miquel and Lasker, see U. Eisenhardt:   "Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte", 1984, § 67 II 1.; K. Kroeschell:
"Rechtsgeschichte Deutschlands im 20. Jahrhundert"Vol. 1681, 1992, p.12.
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  K. Kroeschell: "Rechtsgeschichte Deutschlands im 20. Jahrhundert" Vol. 1681, 1992, p.12.
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Windscheid (the only legal scholar in the group), who's name today is closely
related to the creation and theoretical background of the Code.  Although
Windscheid was probably not the most influential personality involved with the
drafting work, but rather Gottlieb Planck, general reporter of the Second
Commission (consisting of up to 24 persons),472 the BGB was later criticised
as being a compendium of pandects cast in legal paragraphs (Otto Gierke),473
by those who favoured the more 'Germanic' approach and the German legal
tradition.  They saw a more 'socialistic' attitude represented by this order, for
example, in the way they conceived of property rights; Gierke474 postulated a
limitation to the 'absolute' right to private property (excluding everyone else),
intrinsic to this right, and formed by, paramount public interests which could
justify disowning property.  Anton Menger, professor of civil procedure in
Vienna and the other most commemorable critic of the First Draft saw a threat
to the besitzlosen Klassen, the underprivileged classes, in the great abstractness
and the demanding linguistic and scientific approach of the BGB, namely in
the structure of land law which was indeed based on the traditional German
laws.475 These critics were mostly "left wing conservative academics"
(Kathedersozialisten, attacked by Friedrich Engels),476 who hoped to
influence the outcome of the codification project.  They had, however, only
little influence at least during the codification period.  Although regard was had
in general to social aspects of legislation at that time, the discussion was not
fully appreciated by Menger's and Gierke's contemporaries. 477
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  See Hattenhauer/Buschmann “Textbuch zur Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit” (1967), p.279
et seq.
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 See Otto Gierke, “Der Entwurf eines BGB und das deutsche Recht” (1888); "Die sociale
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  Anton Menger: “Das bürgerliche Recht und die besitzlosen Klassen.” (1899).
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  K. Kroeschell: "Rechtsgeschichte Deutschlands im 20. Jahrhundert"Vol. 1681, 1992,  p.15.
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 Ibid., p.16 pointing to Planck's sharp reaction towards Gierke's proposals. Compare Part Three
at VIII.2.2.7. and VIII.3.3. below.
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The role of Roman law in German legal scholarship and practice was different
from that in France, since it remained some kind of underlying last resort in
relation to the Partikularrechte, the scattered laws of the numerous German
states (ius commune , Gemeinrecht), throughout the lifetime of the Holy
Roman Empire.  As such it had been subject to continuous research and
criticism.  The Pandectists finally initiated a development that lead to the
scientific movement in the legal science,478 which eventually produced the
1900 Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB).  This codification with its
five 'Books'479 was created according to the Pandektensystem (system of
pandects), which was a common principle in legal science in the nineteenth
century, especially after the writings of Georg Arnold Heise.480 This system
did not directly copy the pandects in 50 books containing the digests, but was
developed on the basis of Roman law as well as the 'common' German law, the
Naturrecht.  This, for example, adhered to the distinction between the law of
obligations and the law relating to 'things', (movables, Fahrnisrecht, and
immovables Liegenschaftsrecht, comprising possession, proprietary and related
rights),481  thereby creating the Abstraktionsprinzip; the principle of
abstraction which contributes so much to the specific scientific appearance of
the system of the BGB.
Due to this scientific approach and aspiration of the BGB, another feature of
the treatment of specific performance arises.   It is the paramount significance
of the contract as an object with a life of its own, and one of special qualities
within the system and network of the BGB, which gives the notion of specific
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  H. Brox:   "Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs", 1985, No.22.
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  Allgemeiner Teil - Recht der Schuldverhältnisse - Sachenrecht - Familienrecht - Erbrecht.
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  “Grundriß eines Systems”, 1807.
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performance its paramount appearance.  Particularly the First and Second Book
of the BGB (Allgemeiner Teil, general part, §§1-240 BGB and Recht der
Schuldverhältnisse, law of obligations, §§241-853 BGB), are derived from the
pandectist findings.  Thus, this notion plays a vital role for the interpretation of
the UPICC because these are to be conceived a 'general part' for international
contract law.  The pandectists' heritage means that the BGB follows in its
structure, a pattern progressing from the general to the specific, visible in the
consecutive appearance of the notions of Willenserklärung - Rechtsgeschäft -
Vertrag - Schuldvertrag - Kaufvertrag within the first two 'Books'.
The high degree of systematic coherence and consistency of the provisions, as
well as their terminological precision and strictness, trying to achieve a kind of
'scientific' logic and accurateness, makes for the character of the BGB.   It is
the abstractness in the detailed formulation of the concrete provision which
gives great flexibility to the Code;482 the abstract formulation is seemingly
unsuitable for real life in a changing world but  still today catalogue or self
service sales, (§ 151, S.2  BGB), computerised banking transactions, ticket
sales via machines on railway platforms are tackled with the tools of the BGB
just because the law does not speak of "Kolonialwarenhändler", "Pferdebahn"
or "Contorgehülfe", which would be inhabitants of a vanished world.  The law
describes the legal conceptions behind the concrete objects. 483
Today, the rules relating to specific performance or, better, the enforcement of
specific obligations, have to be seen in the light of the strict rule of law within
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  See for building contracts in particular: F. Nicklisch: “Empfiehlt sich eine Neukonzeption des
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the constitutional framework of the separation of powers.484  Courts will not
apply measures of enforcement which would cause disproportionate harm or
disadvantage to a judgment defendant.  This corrective belongs to the
procedural world rather than to the world of substantive contract law.485  The
division between the spheres of 'private' and 'public' law in Germany486
contributes to this structure which allows a restriction of unwanted effects of
specific performance outside contract law.487  Specific performance occurs in
two stages; in the prejudgment or trial stage of an action and, after the
rendering of the judgment, the stage of execution, formally distinct and
governed by the code of civil procedure.488  It is the latter stage that causes the
worries within the common law world.  There are not many cases in which
specific performance has been excessively used; "...the court entrusted with
execution will normally be ready, without hesitation, to order specific
enforcement when requested by the judgment plaintiff.  Doubts can only
concern cases where, specific relief is impossible, would involve
disproportionate cost, would introduce compulsion into personal relationships
or compel the expression of special forms of artistic or intellectual
creativity."489  The latter restriction is expressed by §888 ZPO.  Arrest and
fines are limited and cannot be ordered in certain cases, §888 II ZPO.
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However, specific performance is not a compulsory remedy.  In practice the
remedy of damages is resorted to in a large number of cases, particularly in
commercial law and sales of goods.490  This shows how legal systems may
differ much in theory but less in practice.
V.3.1. Specific performance in the language and system of the BGB
The basic provision of the BGB establishing the supremacy of specific
performance is § 241:
"By virtue of an obligation the obligee is entitled to demand performance from
the obligor. The performance may also consist of an abstention."
The provision takes its force from its position in the BGB (general law of
obligations), given the formal and systematic structure of the code.  It also
shows an important aspect to be considered:
'Obligation' is more than just 'being obliged'.  This legal expression and
concept rather denotes a 'relationship of obligation' (Schuldverhältnis).  This is
the source of the entire legal relationship between the parties.491  This
mechanism applies to the whole code; Schuldverhältnisse492 create (single),
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  Dawson: “Specific Performance in France and Germany.” Michigan Law Review 57 (1959):
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obligations and rights that are interrelated.  Whatever affects one obligation,
affects the whole relationship, the network of obligations forming the
Schuldverhältnis, the contract as a specific kind of 'obligation', often a mutual
or 'synallagmatic', 'reciprocal' one. 493 (The contract types are listed in the
seventh section of the BGB, contracts for sales, tenancy, lease, services,
exchange etc.) Schuldverhäl tn i sse  are regarded as living things
('organisms'),494 in that they are a complex entity, a 'meaningful network'
("sinnhaftes Gefüge"),495 or a 'chronologically progressing process' ("finaler
Prozeß").496
One difficulty in applying and interpreting the UPICC arises from this
mechanism and special 'scientific' character of the BGB, as has been explained
above.497
German lawyers, just as common lawyers,498 distinguish as to whether an
action to obtain a sum of money is based on a damages provision (secondary
claim), or on specific performance of a contract debt (primary claim).  Both
awards would grant money, they are not, however, the same type of money
judgment.
The rule in §241 BGB does not literally read 'demand performance', but
demand Leistung.  This word is not identical with Erfüllung, another form of
                                                                                                                                 
"Corbin on Contracts"Vol. 1, 1963, §117, p.508; 11 U.S.C. § 101 (12) and §105 (5) Restatement
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  Compare above Chapter Four.
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legal performance,499  which would literally mean fulfilment or completion
and would be used in connection with a concrete contractual obligation, which
can be described specifically.  Leistung, 500 in this provision is used to
describe a very general form of performance applying to any contractual
agreement.
Not every aspect of the occurrence of specific performance in German law can
be discussed here.  It does not purport to the aim of this study to describe the
details of procedural law relating to the enforcement of specific
performance.501  The degree of tolerance of substantive German law towards
the UPICC is of interest here.
V.3.2. The notion of legitimate interest limiting performance claims
The solutions pursued in the BGB and also in modern German jurisprudence
and court practice often try to give as much effect as possible to the interests of
the parties in a specific situation, as far as they are protected by the law and
subject to the specific legal rule.502  In respect of contracts and specific
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performance of single obligations, the attitude of the obligee can have different
focuses. They are well described and classified by Lena Olsen:
"His (the creditor's) interest could be directed specifically to the contracted
performance, i.e. because it is rare on the market or because of the special
qualities of the debtor himself, specific interest.  His need could also be
functional so that he needs the performance because of the use he can make out
of it, functional interest.   Finally, he could be interested in the performance
solely because of the profit he intends to make, profitable interest.   Even if
there is no sharp distinction between these three interests it is important to
realise the distinction to be able to fully acknowledge the needs of the parties."
503
These specific interests are given effect, and protected by, the rules relating to
the assessment of damages under German law, eg. in cases of pre-contractual
liability, 'c.i.c.' (culpa in contrahendo), or cases of injury or damage caused in
the course of a transaction, positive Vertragsverletzung, covering consequential
d a m a g e .   They would determine whether a plaintiff can claim
Erfüllungsinteresse ('positive interest' in the consummation of the contract),  or
just claim the Vertrauensschaden, the damage incurred in reliance on the
contract, a 'negative interest', §249 BGB.
The exact degree to which German law supports the unqualified right to
specific performance by giving effect to a creditor's interest in a contract can
only be derived by taking the whole of the contractual rules, including all
remedies and defences, into account.  See, for example, how the system of
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rules dealing with all kinds of Leistungsstörungen (§§320-327 BGB),504
operates. These are irregularities, 'disturbances' occurring in the course of the
performance and consummation of contractual transactions.505 They
correspond to the system of remedies for breach of contract and excused non-
performance in the UPICC.  But 'breach of contract' is not a terminus
technicus, a technical term, in the BGB and not a pre-requisite506 for a
remedy. §320 BGB only gives the right to withhold a party's own performance
as a defence against non-performance in a synallagmatic/reciprocal contract.  It
does not discharge the debtor's obligation to perform.
V.3.3. Direct limitations to the right to performance
A general direct limitation to the general right to require performance is
contained in §275 BGB, for cases of subsequent impossibility (or incapability,
§275 II BGB), for the innocent debtor, i.e. if no failure on the debtor’s part  can
be  established.  In these cases, the debtor becomes free from his obligation to
perform, § 275 I BGB.
An obligor of a payment obligation, however, can rarely rely on these
exceptions to the rule of §241 BGB because there are some fundamental
differences between monetary and non-monetary obligations.  Payment cannot
become 'impossible in law or fact', "unreasonably burdensome or expensive";
                                                 
504
  This rather sophisticated term was first introduced by Heinrich Stoll in his work „Die Lehre von
den Leistungsstörungen“ (The doctrine of the Leistungsstörungen), 1936 now published as Heinrich Stoll,
“Die Lehre von den Leistungsstörungen,” in: "Interessenjurisprudenz", ed. Günther Ellscheid.  Wege der
Forschung, (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974) Vol.345: pp. 153-216.
505
  See Palandt/Heinrichs:   "Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch", 1998, Vorb. z. §275.
506
  L. Olsen: “The choice of the aggrieved party - An analysis of the remedies in the Principles of
the European Contract Law.” European Review of Private Law 1 (1999): 21-44, p.24/25.
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the party entitled to it cannot be expected to "obtain performance from another
source", it is not of 'an exclusively personal character' (Art.7.2.2. litt. (a) to (d)
UPICC).507  Money is never short like goods can be in times of shortage, or
where they are made to match special specifications or the like.  Money is
never 'ascertained'.
The rules relating to impossibility do not apply to debts.508  It is thought to be
an axiom of the legal order that economic incapability cannot be an excuse for
non-payment.509  Money represents, "abstract economic power by virtue of
wealth represented in units of a specific currency",510 it is a "quantum
(quantity) of purchasing power", although the debtor does not have to
guarantee the inner value, the exact value of a currency on its market within its
economy; the debtor owes the nominal, not the economic value of the
money.511
The five express limitations listed in Art. 7.2.2. UPICC are thus specifically
designed to fit non-monetary obligations.  Art. 7.2.2 UPICC grants a right to
specific performance due to the special interests a party can have in the
performance by one specific debtor.  These interests are, however, protected to
the degree expressed in Art. 7.2.2. (a) to (e) UPICC.  The Erfüllungsinteresse,
the specific interest in performance, ends where these limiting circumstances
occur.  The absence of express limitations of the right to require performance
of monetary obligations thus arises out of the need for special treatment.  But
                                                 
507
  See I. Schwenzer:  Erfüllung und Schadensersatz nach den Unidroit - Prinzipien, 1997, p.4
(unpublished).
508
  Palandt/Heinrichs:   "Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch", 1998, §245 No.8; K. Schmidt:   "Geldrecht:
Geld, Zins und Währung im deutschen Recht"Vol. XXXIII, 1983, C 29.
509
  Palandt/Heinrichs:   "Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch", 1998, §245, No.8; K. Larenz:   "Lehrbuch des
Schuldrechts. Erster Band: Allgemeiner Teil", 1982,§12 III.
510
  Palandt/Heinrichs:   "Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch", 1998, §245 No.2; Karsten Schmidt:
„Geldrecht“, A 14 et seq.
511
  K. Larenz:   "Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts. Erster Band: Allgemeiner Teil", 1982,§12 III; BGH
61,38; 79,194; BVerfG 50, 57.
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since German law does not know any isolated limitation of the right to require
performance, the question arises; if, and why, this limitation is being missed
and desired by German lawyers? 512  The only case of an isolated limitation of
the enforceability of a right to require performance is the defence of time limit.
(Verjährung), §§194-225 BGB.
Apart from this, express limitations of the right to require performance itself
are unknown to German law.  It is therefore a doctrinal inconsistency to
demand such a technique to reach a result which might be inherent to the
UPICC anyway, and can be realised by due application and interpretation.
Express limitations such as those in Art. 7.2.2 UPICC are alien to German law,
and it has therefore to be asked in which way these can be integrated into
domestic law, and if they are compatible with and acceptable to German legal
theory and practice.
V.4. Conclusion
The discussion in Chapter Five has revealed that there is no clash in the
substantive law between the UPICC and German law.  A thorough analysis of
the Principles helps to reveal their full potential.  Since legal science plays a
formative role in the German legal system, this analysis itself can contribute to
the integration of the UPICC into domestic German law and can form a method
of applying uniform contract law rules successfully.
                                                 
512
  See  I. Schwenzer:  Erfüllung und Schadensersatz nach den Unidroit - Prinzipien, 1997.
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The UPICC are particularly interesting for German law under the aspect of law
reform with regard to international building contracts (sections V.1. and V.2.).
They can contribute considerably to creating improved legal solutions in this
area even after the recent reform enacted in the form of the revised BGB
(Schuldrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz, the reform of the law of obligations with
effect from 2001).
The flawed method of applying uniform law by unwittingly applying double
standards as described in Chapter Three can be explained as follows with a
view to German contract law:  The right of cancellation which Prof. Schwenzer
says is lacking in the UPICC and potentially serving as a limitation to Art.
7.2.1. UPICC, does by no means discharge the employer/orderer from his
payment obligation arising out of the synallagmatical contract under German
law. Consequently, such a legal effect cannot be demanded from the UPICC by
invoking standards of German contract law, thereby accusing the Principles of
lacking a right to cancellation and supporting an overly rigid right to
performance.  The neutral formulation of § 649 BGB disregarding any further
subjective or objective requirements corresponds to the generous concept of
non-performance and termination in the Principles.  Under German law
relating to building contracts, the orderer’s unqualified right of cancellation
leaves him with the generally unqualified, though potentially modified,
payment obligation.  This result has already been criticised in German legal
science and legal profession.513 The way this payment obligation is
subsequently to be settled according to German law corresponds to a great
extent with the way the Principles tackle the situation, yet, from a different
angle: under the UPICC the orderer has the opportunity to be discharged from
his obligations or be liable in damages as specific factual circumstances arise
                                                 
513
  See R. Grimme:   "Die Erfüllung beim Werkvertrag"    Vol. 105  , 1987,p.247.
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under the provisions on termination and non-performance.  Overall the
outcome, in terms of the actual sum of money to be paid, under the various
factual circumstances is almost identical relying on either the domestic or the
international legal provisions.  The rule of Art. 7.2.1. UPICC is therefore
compatible with German law and also offers an excellent model for law
reform, incorporating a simplified formulation and method, as well as an
international background.
The traditional understanding and use of specific performance in German law
implies sufficient limitations to the right to performance to prevent coerced
performance, and at the same time recognises a special and distinct treatment
of payment obligations (section V.3.).  Therefore, this understanding ought to
be applied to Art.7.2.1. UPICC in order to justify its content.
CONCLUSION
Part Two of the thesis has proven that Art. 7.2.1. UPICC is compatible with
domestic law on the level of substantive national contract law.  Chapter Three,
Four and Five (Part Three), have demonstrated a comprehensive method of
interpretation allowing for the successful application of the UPICC within each
domestic legal system and thus, their integration into the domestic legal
process.  This method consisted of reviewing and analysing underlying
concepts of current legislation and case law, and also taking recourse to legal
history using standard domestic methods of application and interpretation to
the uniform contract law, treating those as an independent comprehensive body
of law rules.  This technique resulted in the removal of obstacles in the area of
substantive law by revealing preconceived expectations towards uniform law
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which are owed to a superficial understanding.  Reviewing positions which
assume limitations that are in fact not there, can remove those limitations by
assuming a non-static view on national legal concepts.  This is extended




THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES IN THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS
INTRODUCTION
The previous sections, Parts One and Two, have identified two barriers against
an easy application of contemporary transnational uniform contract law within
domestic legal systems.  These barriers arise in connection with general
contract doctrine (Chapters One and Two), and in the course of specific
application of individual rules within domestic legal systems (Chapters Three,
Four and Five).  Parts One and Two have suggested ways of removing these
barriers in traditional contract doctrine and in legal practice, by applying
familiar concepts according to an extended autonomous methodology of
international contract law.
This concluding section, Part Three now asks how uniform contract law is
treated in the conflict of laws.  The issues are; what is the status quo in English
and German conflict of law (Chapter Six), how do the conflict rules of each
national law act as a gateway for the application of uniform rules, do they
hinder or facilitate the application of the UPICC in practice, particularly in
arbitration (Chapter Seven), and what can be done to remove difficulties to
make it easy and desirable for international contractors to apply UPICC to their
contracts?  The core questions are therefore, whether such law rules are
regarded as a source of law (Chapter Six), and whether the UPICC as an
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example for uniform law can be applied as the law governing the contract via
choice of law rules (kollisionsrechtliche Verweisung), rather than merely as
contract terms (materiellrechtliche Verweisung)?  How are these questions




Status quo of transnational law in the conflict of laws
The chapter asks about the current status quo of current conflict of law
legislation, case law and doctrine in English and German legal systems, with
regard to the source of law function of uniform contract law.  It also asks what
solutions can be derived from this lege lata as it presently is and thereby what
can be suggested for advancing the integration and applicability of uniform
contract law, such as the UPICC, which are designed to facilitate international
contracts and trade.
In order to provide a basis for discussion, this chapter commences with a
summary, recapitulating the relevant law relating to the conflict of laws in
England and Germany.   This allows for the highlight of the relevant
considerations, which can lead to a suggested method of integrating application
of national conflict law in order to use UPICC in international commerce
(section VI.1.).  The chapter then discusses the question as to whether the
UPICC can be a source of law so as to make for a governing law, lex
contractus, under current conflict rules (sections VI.2. and VI.3.).
VI.1. Choice of law under English and German law in the light of the
Rome Convention
This section asks what the current status quo of the lex lata, the existing law in
the area of choice of law, is.  It recapitulates the role of the Rome Convention
as well as traditional conflict law looking at the choice of law aspects in
contract law matters.  This helps to investigate the attitude of current national
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conflict law towards introducing uniform law in order to deal with matters of
commercial contracts.
Both the United Kingdom and Germany have adopted the 1980 Rome
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations.514  Although
"harmonisation" of the domestic conflict of law rules was the aim of this
Convention, there are still differences between the legal systems, which lead to
different observations regarding the potential of the UPICC to be recognised as
governing law.
VI.1.1. The Scope of the RC in the UK and traditional English choice of
law
Despite the adaptation of the 1980 Rome Convention and its implementation
by the Contracts (Applicable Law), Act, 1990, common law still plays a role
and has to be discussed here.
The time factor, as well as the scope of, and certain exclusion clauses, in the
Rome Convention still leave room for the traditional rules for the choice of law
in English law.  The scope of the Rome Convention as set out in its Art. 1 (2)
(b), excludes arbitration agreements from its application.  The United Kingdom
did exercise the right to exclude Art. 7(1) (concerning mandatory laws), and 10
(1) (e) (effect on nullity of contracts), under Art. 22 (1) (a), (b) of the Rome
                                                 
514
  The Rome Convention of the European Economic Community on the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations of 19 June 1980 first came into force, as regards the United Kingdom and
Germany, on 1 April 1991, and has been amended by the Third Brussels Accession Protocol of 29 Nov
1996. For the German text see E. Jayme and R. Hausmann, eds.  "Internationales Privat-und
Verfahrensrecht".  11th ed, 2002.
Hereinafter abbreviated RC.
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Convention.  Section 2 (3) of the Contracts (Applicable Law), Act provides
that the Rome Convention does not apply to cases of "conflicts of different
parts of the United Kingdom", following Art 19 (2) of the Rome Convention.
VI.1.2. The scope of the RC in Germany and traditional choice of law
rules
German choice of law rules are regulated in the Einführungsgesetz zum
Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch. 515  This codification was thoroughly reformed in
1986516 effecting the incorporation of the Rome Convention.  The rule stating
the method to determine the applicable law regarding contracts is contained in
Art. 27 and 28. Art. 28 (1) EGBGB, and states that the contract is subject to the
law of the state with which "the contract is most closely connected". ("...
unterliegt dem Recht des Staates, mit dem er die engsten Verbindungen
aufweist.")  Art. 28 (2) EGBGB then establishes a guideline for the application
of section (1) in that, "The contract is deemed to have the closest connection
with the state in which the party, who is to perform the characteristic
performance, is resident at the time of the conclusion of the contract ...", ("Es
wird vermutet, daß der Vertrag die engsten Verbindungen mit dem Staat
aufweist, in dem die Partei, welche die charakteristische Leistung zu erbringen
hat, im Zeitpunkt des Vertragsschlusses ihren gewöhnlichen Aufenthalt hat...").
                                                 
515
  Abbreviated EGBGB, "Introductory Law to the BGB", first enacted on 18 August 1896.
for a German text of the relevant provisions see E. Jayme, and R. Hausmann, eds.  "Internationales
Privat-und Verfahrensrecht".  9th ed, 1998. Full German text see eg  "BGB - Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch mit
zugehörigen Gesetzen und EG - Richtlinien", 1999, pp. 503-578.
516
  By  the Gesetz zur Neuregelung des internationalen Privatrechts  of 25 July 1986. German text
of the relevant provisions of the current version in E. Jayme, and R. Hausmann, eds.  "Internationales
Privat-und Verfahrensrecht".  9th ed, 1998, No.1, pp1-19; full text in BGBl 1994  I, p.2494 and in
Palandt/Heldrich:   "Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch", 1998. or later editions.
241
This general rule is however accompanied by a provision applying to cases
where the characteristic performance in a contract cannot be established (Art.
28 (2) 2nd phrase); the rule is not to be applied in those instances ("Dieser
Absatz ist nicht anzuwenden, wenn sich die charakteristische Leistung nicht
bestimmen läßt").  This will often be the case in modern international
commercial contracts.
The rules preceding this version of Art. 27 and 28 EGBGB, the law as it was in
force before the enactment of the Rome Convention, still applies to cases
which arose before the 1 September 1986, Art. 220 (1) EGBGB.  This law
consists of customary and judge-made law to a great extent.517  It still applies
to contracts concluded before the 1 September 1986.518  The original EGBGB
contained but a few express provisions mainly regulating family and
inheritance matters.519  The law of obligations and other contractual conflict
of laws was unregulated by statutes and thus only manifested in case law.
VI.1.3. Traditional English and German choice of law rules
VI.1.3.1 The role of contractual obligations as a criterion to determine the
applicable law
Traditional English choice of law rules are governed by the doctrine of the
proper law of the contract.  This doctrine can lead to results which are quite
                                                 
517
  See Palandt/Heldrich:   "Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch", 1998, EGBGB Einl Art3, No.5; G. Kegel
and K. Schurig:   "Internationales Privatrecht", 2000, §4I, p.183.
518
  See Palandt/Heldrich:   "Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch", 1998, EGBGB Art 220, No4; BGH NJW-
RR 90,249.
519
  See G. Kegel and K. Schurig:"Internationales Privatrecht", 2000, §4I for an account on the
history of the 1896 conflict of laws legislation.
242
different from the ones based on the rules of the Rome Convention itself as
well as on the pre-Rome-Convention German conflict law.  German traditional
law used the test of the closest connection of the "typical obligation" arising in
a contract as a general rule.  The legal system which this is most closely related
to is to govern the contract.  This method of determining the governing law
was often criticised by scholars.  It also conflicts with fundamental English
views on contract.  Just as English law does not conceive a contract as being a
network of individual and potentially separate obligations520 it will not
determine the proper law of the contract by relying on a single obligation, but
rather, by looking at the contract as a whole.  The distinction between "typical"
or "essential", from not so typical or less essential, obligations in a contract
thus seems somewhat artificial, especially, when looking at a variety of types
of international commercial contracts.521
VI.1.3.2. Finding a legal system for the contract
Under English law traditionally the test applied to establish the proper law of
contract is:
"If no system of law has been expressly selected and it is not possible to infer
one, the court will look for the system with which the contract has its closest
and most real connection." 522
                                                 
520
  See above Chapter Four, eg at IV.1 and IV.1.1.
521
 See above Chapter One and at IV.1.4. below.  See also S. Shackleton: “The Applicable Law in
International Arbitration Under the New English Arbitration Act 1996.” Arbitration International 13.4
(1997): 375-389, p.375: "...recognition of the specificity of international transactions as distinct from
purely domestic contracts,..." .
522
  J.G. Collier:   "Conflict of laws",1987,p.158.
243
In Amin Rasheed Shipping Corporation v. Kuwait Insurance Co.,523 this leads
to the application of English law by establishing that the contract "was redolent
of English law"524 although it had nothing to do with England.  This means
that it not only selects English law a system of law, rather than a country whose
law is to apply, but that English judges look at the contract in a more
comprehensive way seeing the contract as a complex entity.
VI.1.4. Finding a state for the contract under the scope of the Rome
Convention
Following Swiss law, the Rome Convention has adopted, and brought about,
the civilian approach of the "characteristic performance" (Art. 4 (2) RC), which
determines the country with which the contract is "most closely connected";
Art. 4 (1) RC.  This means that after the enactment of the Contracts
(Applicable Law), Act, 1990, there is a change of view in English law to the
extent that there is a "country" to be determined rather than a "system of law".
The underlying confession that law is very much a "state owned" thing and that
law is national seems thus to be emphasised by the RC.  Can there be any
support for the UPICC being the proper law of the contract from the point of
view of the RC then?
The concept of the "characteristic performance", or better, the habitual
residence of the party who has to perform the characteristic performance in a
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 (1984) A.C. 50.
524
  J.G. Collier:   "Conflict of laws",1987,p.161.
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contract, Art. 4 (2) RC, is at the same time the limit of the scope of the RC and
the main argument for the application of a set of rules such as the UPICC.
In international commercial contracts it is sometimes not easily established
which obligation is the "characteristic" one.  They can be delocalised in nature.
Their performance may spread over many countries and legal systems525
(whose existence cannot be denied even if ignored by the RC).  Parties to a
contract change frequently and the actual performance of such a contract may
not even be its main purpose.526  What is the argument in these cases to insist
on establishing a characteristic performance?  It appears very likely that this
argument serves to determine a country at all expense whose jurisdiction is
called to settle the dispute.  The parties' intention and the nature of their
contract is not given first priority.  The decision to allocate the contract has
been made before the parties set up their contract with its specific
characteristics and its potential specific requirements.  The determination of a
states' dispute settlement procedure reflects therefore, not only the intention to
serve the parties' need to reach a solution or an agreement regarding their
problem, but also to bring state jurisdiction into play.  This attitude can,
however, in a large number of cases, especially in modern international trade
create quite a considerable gap and incongruence between the nature and
requirements of the matter to be dealt with and the "tools" at hand.
As has been demonstrated above527 domestic law does in some areas not meet
the requirements of international trade because its rules are designed for
                                                 
525
  Compare R. Goode: “Usage and its Reception in Transnational Commercial Law.” International
and Comparative Law Quarterly 46 (1997): 1-36, p.30/31 who gives the example of a pipeline running
through six different countries. See also the example of string sales as described above in Chapter Four.
526
  See above - Chapter Four, regarding string sales where the typical obligations of the sales
contract - traditionally delivery of the goods - is of minuscule interest compared to the payment of the
price (unless, of course, the goods are lost or damaged).
527
  Above Chapter One, at II.1.
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domestic use.  Also domestic rules necessarily involve matters of public policy
and incorporate a general social component in order to fulfil any state's general
task to provide an order for people's lives in their community.  Matters of
consumer protection, for example, nowadays play a role in almost every area of
private law.  The judge is part of the state's order and bound to protect this
order, be it by way of strict constitutional order (Art 20 GG), or by legal
tradition.528
Parties to international commercial contracts, however, very often cannot be
said to be part of the "social sphere" (Sozialsphäre), of a particular state; in this
particular context they act in a way which cannot be allocated to a specific
country in the traditional way.  This resembles very much the situation of the
mediaeval "Hanse", where merchants travelled far and wide setting up
residences and trading posts in distant countries and could hardly be
"protected" by their country of origin.529  They were also mostly strictly
separated from the local community.  They required their own legal cosmos
since their domestic law could not be enforced where they required it.  This
lead to the original development of lex mercatoria which was recognised by
local governments who often mutually granted privileges to foreigners within
their own territory, regardless of any strict jurisdiction claims.530
The determination of the "characteristic performance" in a modern
international commercial contract can hardly be established in a convincing
                                                 
528
 See below for further discussion, eg Chapter Seven.
529
  Compare U. Ziegler: "Die Hanse - Aufstieg, Blütezeit und Niedergang der ersten europäischen
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft", 1996. The term Hanse was actually derived from an old English word for
merchant.
530
 Compare R. Goode: “Usage and its Reception in Transnational Commercial Law.” International
and Comparative Law Quarterly 46 (1997): 1-36, p.27; see also U. Ziegler:   "Die Hanse - Aufstieg,
Blütezeit und Niedergang der ersten europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft", 1996; LJ Mustill: "The New
Lex Mercatoria: The First Twenty-Five Years", in Martin Bos and Ian Brownlie (eds), "Liber Amicorum
for Lord Wilberforce".
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way, anyway, looking at the various obligations created by such an agreement
it is hard to justify giving priority to one of them.  Why should the place of
business of the seller regularly determine the law governing the contract rather
than the seat of the buyer?  In many commercial contracts there is a chain of
buyers and sellers and the common purpose of commodities contracts may be
its assignment so that the actual delivery of goods might not be the
"characteristic" performance eventually.  In barter contracts, joint ventures,
financial services this operation of establishing the "characteristic
performance" and localising the contract looses its attractiveness completely.
It is worth considering, therefore, the recommendation of the application of a
set of rules like the UPICC which is designed to meet the requirements of
international trade and even addresses some special problems domestic law
does not refer to. 531
A certain "advantage" regarding potential flexibility in dealing with
international commercial contracts did exist in the German conflict law before
the incorporation of the Rome Convention into German law in 1986.  The law
applicable to contractual obligations was to be determined by finding the
"hypothetical intention" of the parties.  There was a rich and complicated
system in use to determine this intention, which was not expressed in the
contract, but to be derived from it by the judge.532   The criterion of the closest
connection was at least to be investigated by looking at different aspects of the
contract.  Under the Rome Convention the criterion is now pre-selected
("characteristic performance"), although it allows exceptions in Art 4 (5).  Art
4 (5) RC resembles the common law solution for establishing the "most real"
connection, by granting discretionary room for deviation from the rule in Art.4
                                                 
531
  Frank Vischer recommends especially Art. 6.1.14 and 2.22 UPICC:  F. Vischer:  Die Relevanz
der UNIDROIT Principles für die richterliche und schiedsrichterliche Beurteilung von Streitigkeiten aus
internationalen Verträgen, 1997, p.16.
532
  See G. Kegel:   "Internationales Privatrecht", 1987, p.425 et seq.
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(2) RC in case "it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract
is more closely connected with another country".   The emphasis is, however,
on the country rather than on the system of law as at common law.
Overall, thus, the wording of Art. 4 RC gives so much room for exceptions
from the "characteristic performance" rule, that the question arises whether it
would allow the original German, or the common law solution, to be
applied.533  Traditional German law used the seat or residence of the party
performing the 'typical' obligation in a contract as an appropriate criterion for
determining the law applicable to the contract, thus letting the parties' interests
determine the applicable law, rather than a pre-defined legal policy.  The
common law solution seems to try to establish a more 'objective', i.e. a fact
orientated rather than intention orientated procedure to find the proper law.   It
seems that the wording of Art. 4 (5) RC comes closer to this common law
approach.
In the following, it will be discussed as to what way any of the two domestic
legal systems would allow the UPICC to be applied as being the proper law of
the contract, in addition to being implied into the contract as part of contractual
stipulations.
VI.2.  Current use of the UPICC; experience in practice
The previous section VI.1. looked at the lex lata and current scholarly positions
in a general sense.  This section explores the lex lata and current scholarly
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  See below for further discussion and compare J. Basedow:  “German National Report on the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts.” pp.125-150, p.146-147.
248
positions, i.e. the attitude of national lawyers in more detail.  It asks
specifically what the current position is regarding the source of law function of
the UPICC and similar uniform law models for the use of UPICC as governing
law in cases involving commercial contracts.
On the XVth Congress on Comparative Law in Bristol a broad account was
given by the national reporters on the current use of the UPICC worldwide and
on instances of their application in practice.534  In January 1999 a symposium
took place in Hamburg at the Max-Planck-Institute for international and
foreign law, where the latest developments in the area of uniform law rules and
especially the UPICC were discussed.535  This should serve as a first reference
for an investigation into the conflict of laws aspects of the UPICC in Germany
and England.   Another source of guidance is a review of selected cases which
have been resolved using the UPICC either in a state court or in arbitration.
VI.2.1. Source of Law Function of the UPICC in general legal doctrine
The paper delivered to the Hamburg symposium by C.W. Canaris 536 on the
legal nature of the UPICC and the PECL is of special interest in the context of
this paper.  Canaris comments on the source of law function of the UPICC
from within the German forum of discussion and gives account of recent
developments.  His contribution reflects the traditional and currently prevailing
position under German law regarding the status of the UPICC from a conflict
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  All available national reports and the General Report are published in M.J. Bonell, ed.  "A New
Approach to International Commercial Contracts", 1999.
535
 Contributions published in J. Basedow, ed.  "Europaeische Vertragsrechtsvereinheitlichung und
deutsches Recht", 2000.
536
 C.-W. Canaris:  “Die Stellung der "UNIDROIT Principles" und "Principles of European
Contract Law" im System der Rechtsquellen”, pp. 5-31.
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of laws perspective.537  His article draws on the views of a number of
influential writers on the subject and can therefore serve as a vehicle to explore
the status quo, as well as the possibilities for further development of the
German legal position in this respect.  Furthermore, the position described in
this article is to a great extent representative, not only for civil law
jurisdictions, but also overlaps in parts with common law positions so that
useful contributions for the development of a suitable doctrine of a-national
law can be derived from it.
Along with most legal writers in Germany,538 Canaris rejects the idea of the
UPICC serving as the governing law under conflict rules (kollisionsrechtliche
Verweisung/vocation).  He recognises three categories of sources of law
(Rechtsquellen); Rechtsgeltungsquellen, Rechtserkenntnisquellen and
Rechtsgewinnungsquellen.  All of these form the law within a jurisdiction.
This catalogue of terms corresponds to English legal theory according to Prof.
Goode who comments on the "elements" (meaning sources of law in the
context), forming the lex mercatoria:
"Some create law, some declare law, some are not themselves law but are
sources of rights and some are evidence of law...This is the theory of the
common law but it is recognised that in reality the existing law represents a
framework within which the judge has a limited power to create law." 539
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  Compare C.v. Bar:   "Internationales Privatrecht"Vol. 1, 1987, §2 III; G. Kegel, and K. Schurig:
"Internationales Privatrecht",2000, §1 IX d): Palandt/Heldrich:   "Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch",1998, Art 27
EGBGB, No.3 (fig.2)a).; see also U. Drobnig: “The UNIDROIT Principles in the Conflict of Laws.”
Uniform Law Review 2/3 (1998): 385-295, p.387, Fn 7 for further references.
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  See previous note.
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  R. Goode: “Usage and its Reception in Transnational Commercial Law.” International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 46 (1997): 1-36, p.4 and note 7.
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Only formal rules of law however, which create law, can form the first
category of sources of law mentioned by Canaris, Rechtsgeltungsquellen,
because they have passed through the parliamentary legislation procedures
according to constitutional rules.  These sources possess direct authority in a
strict "specifically juridical" sense "spezifisch juristisch",540 meaning that they
are presupposed in any discussion about the law, not derived from any other
concept.541
Because the UPICC are clearly not of this nature, they cannot serve as the
proper law of the contract in Canaris' view.542  They fail the "test of pedigree"
as Canaris puts it quoting Dworkin.543  The authority, which a legal norm has
to have, to qualify for this category of source of law must be derived from an
institutional organ competent to issue legal norms, so that the norm follows the
maxim auctoritas non veritas facit legem which Canaris quotes after Hobbes'
"Leviathan".544  In Germany specifically, norms of this formal nature must
necessarily be part of the whole of the "hierarchy of norms", the Stufenbau der
Rechtsordnung.  This hierarchy is formed by the constitution at the top of the
hierarchy and the institutions of legislative, judicial and administrative powers
shaped under its provisions.
Although Canaris accepts the existence and legitimacy of other sources of law,
which do "not originate from formal legislation but are nevertheless of a legal
nature" ("nicht gesetzlicher Herkunft, gleichwohl aber rechtlicher Natur"),545
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 C.-W. Canaris:  “Die Stellung der "UNIDROIT Principles" und "Principles of European
Contract Law" im System der Rechtsquellen”,  pp.5-31, p.9.
541Ibid.
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 C.-W. Canaris:  “Die Stellung der "UNIDROIT Principles" und "Principles of European




 (1651) Chapter XXVI; see C.-W. Canaris:  “Die Stellung der "UNIDROIT Principles" und
"Principles of European Contract Law" im System der Rechtsquellen”, pp.5-31, p.13.
545
 C.-W. Canaris:  “Die Stellung der "UNIDROIT Principles" und "Principles of European
Contract Law" im System der Rechtsquellen”,   pp.5-31, p.10.
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he does not see that any of these norms or legal rules qualify for their being
considered the law applicable to a contract under Art. 27 and 28 EGBGB and
Art.3 and 4 of the Rome Convention.  German law doubtlessly recognises
sources of law which are not expressly laid down in formal legislation and does
therefore not adhere to a strict positivistic concept.  This is reflected in the
constitution, in Art 20 III GG, which states that the courts are to observe
"Gesetz und Recht", legislation and the law.  Thus, there must be an "extra -
legislative" legal order, an außergesetzliche Rechtsordnung which has already
been described by Wieacker.546
The term Rechtsquelle, literally translating as source of law, does not have a
precisely defined meaning in German legal doctrine or legislation.  Larenz
makes it clear that Rechtsquelle is not the law itself but describes its origins,
the source conferring its normative function onto it.  This normative function
being the force of law, which is equally and objectively binding for
everyone.547  In this sense Larenz considers the term Rechtsquelle a
misnomer.  The real source of the law would be the act of formal legislation or,
in the case of customary law, the manifesting common conviction of the
validity of specific rules.548  Nevertheless, the use of the term Rechtsquelle
refers to all types of legal norms and other law rules in German legal discourse.
There is legal discourse about the precise extent of the normative function of
different forms of law 549 using inconsistent terminology and very differing
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 Franz Wieacker: "Gesetz und Richterkunst, Zum Problem der außergesetzlichen
Rechtsordnung", 1957.
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 Compare K. Larenz:   "Allgemeiner Teil des Deutschen Bürgerlichen Rechts", 1983, p.7:
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see also R. Goode: “Usage and its Reception in Transnational Commercial Law.” International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 46 (1997): 1-36 for a comprehensive account of the development of trade
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  See for an introduction K. Larenz:   "Allgemeiner Teil des Deutschen Bürgerlichen Rechts",
1983, pp.7-14.
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results.550  Hübner, for instance, distinguishes "formal" and "substantive"
legal norms.551  The prevailing view, however, distinguishes the effect of
binding force of law of formal legislation from the non-binding quality of other
legal notions, which may well be creating law as a practical effect
(Rechtsfortbildung), such as usages of trade, judgments, different kinds of
agreements, self-governing rules.  Under this system only
Rechtsgeltungsquellen are law, the other two types introduced by Canaris,
Rechtserkenntnisquellen and Rechtsgewinnungsquellen, would not be law but
could be called potential sources of law (if and when their substantive content
materialise into the first category of sources of law).
VI.2.2. Significance of the doctrines of sources of laws in practice
Admittedly this discussion introduces very abstract concepts and might at first
sight appear confusing, rather than clarifying the legal nature of the UPICC.
Indeed, German legal science undertakes great efforts to set up and distinguish
clear cut categories in this field of legal theory.  It seems an important
foundation for the operation of law rules.  A careful analysis of the practical
side of the legal profession has shown, however, that the theoretical concept
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  See for example the view of Meyer-Cording about voluntary submission of individuals under a
legal regime and that of Fikentscher regarding the binding force of supreme court decisions,
Fallnormtheorie, which effectively does make judgments a directly binding legal norm, meaning that they
create law, while they are merely Rechtserkenntnisquellen Canaris' system, see W. Fikentscher,
"Methoden des Rechts", vol.IV., pp.336 et seq.and Meyer-Cording: "Die Rechtsnormen", 1971, pp.70 et
seq.
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  "Gesetz im formellen und materiellen Sinn", see H. Hübner:   "Allgemeiner Teil des
Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches", 1996, p.16.
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does not consistently reflect the practice of the application of the law.552
Indeed, the theoretical concept as described by Canaris and others may not be
followed in practice because it might not live up to, or completely ignore, the
mechanisms of judicial practice and the complexity of the human decisions
prior to the eventual delivery of a judgment.  Court decisions sometimes
amount to Rechtgeltungsquellen even in German law according to their
practical impact,553 rather than confining themselves to
Rechterkenntnisquellen.  After all, these instances are then called judge-made
law or richterliche Rechtsfortbildung in German.  Although there is extensive
reasoning and discourse about the borderlines between interpretation and
creation of the law by the judges,554 German court practice does not differ
very much from that of other legal systems in that there is necessarily the
creative determination of human individuals, the homines judicantes, behind
each decision.555  The Rechtserkenntnisquelle might therefore be but a
confession.  Judges do in fact strive to merely "find" the law and not to create it
themselves:
"A Common Law judge will say that he applies a principle already existing in
the Common Law to the case....A Continental judge will assert that he applies
                                                 
552
  See O. Lando: “Homo judicans.” Uniform Law Review 2/3 (1998): pp. 535-544, who draws on
his own insights but also refers to both the Cornell project and the work of the Trento group under U.
Mattei and M. Bussano, see also Chapter Two (II.2.1.).
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  For example the case law developed under §242 BGB with its numerous findings regarding pre-
contractual liability, change of underlying circumstances, protection of the weaker party and consumers.
554
  See for an introductory account K. Larenz:   "Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft", 1991,
Chapter 5.
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 See O. Lando: “Homo judicans.” Uniform Law Review 2/3 (1998): pp. 535-544, p.541 and
542.
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existing legal values which are to be found in the law....The legal values are not
invented: they are already there." 556
But this is not the entire reality of judicial decision-making.  The ideal situation
might in fact be but a convention; the fact that law rules sometimes exist over
long periods of time and that they are sometimes quite general or vague in their
wording ("open-textured"), requires a considerable amount of interpretation.
This can even be the purpose of the wording of statutes especially in Germany
and in the BGB so as to make them adaptable to changing times.
"In some cases there is no statute to guide [the judges]. They cannot refuse to
decide, so they have to establish the rules and change them later as needed. The
same applies when the statutes are unclear.  Their true meaning will not emerge
until the courts have spoken. Some statutory provisions are general clauses
which expressly leave it to the courts to fill them in. And when the ancient
statutes are interpreted to mean something quite different from what they
actually say, this does not provoke the legislator. He sees it and tolerates it."557
This is a very useful account of the reality and practice of judicial decision
making.  It demonstrates the conflict between legal theory and practice.  This
insight devalues the category of Rechtserkenntnisquelle due to its lack of
precise definition and practical relevance.
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"Continental Europe boasts a hierarchy of sources.  Doctrines on this hierarchy
as established by legal writers abound, but the judges have seen to it that no
hierarchy can be rigidly maintained."558
This weakness of doctrine might provide the necessary space for the
development of a method for the integration of rules like the UPICC into
domestic legal theory and practice.
It shows that there is no final and convincing determination or definition of the
sources of law and that there is room for discussion.  Due to the strong
significance of doctrine in German law, it is therefore possible to attribute an
appropriate space and position for the UPICC within German legal theory and
practice by providing a convincing theoretical conception.559
The further discussion in this section therefore continues to follow the line of
Canaris' considerations on the special occasion of the Hamburg symposium,
discussing the nature of the UPICC de lege lata, before discussing possible
ways of integrating the UPICC into the theoretical conceptions of the German
and English conflict of laws.
VI.2.3. The UPICC in the traditional doctrine of sources of law
The non-legislative legal order to which Canaris refers, is formed by rules
which derive authority from their persuasive force; veritas non auctoritas facit
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 See Chapter Eight for further discussion.
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legem.  These can also be Rechtsgeltungsquellen in Canaris' system560 and
would therefore also qualify as Vertragsstatut.  The required degree of
persuasive force, however, is only recognised in single individual norms within
the UPICC (and the PECL), by Canaris; he does not attribute this quality to the
whole set of rules.561
Other than Basedow,562  Canaris purports to the view that only state legislation,
the law of a country, rather than "a legal system", can form the Vertragsstatut;
the law applicable to the contract, because exclusively the law of a state can be
employed by virtue of the conflict of law rules.  Particular instances, where
parties to a contract seek clarification before a state court, provide an argument
for Canaris to require state law to be applied to an international contract under
the conflict of law rules.563
The admission of the UPICC as a mere private set of rules would mean to
allow the parties to escape from the law of any state and submit their affairs
exclusively to a private set of rules.  Canaris reminds us that to accept such a
solution would mean to apply Art. 27 I EGBGB to any other potentially lesser
kind of "soft law", which could well be much less of a masterpiece which is
what he sees in the UPICC and PECL.564
Canaris does, however, recognise the UPICC to be applied directly in
arbitration under § 1051 III ZPO.  This provision allows the arbitrator to
stipulate the applicable law under considerations of reasonableness
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 C. –W Canaris: “Die Stellung der ‘UNIDROIT Principles’ und ‘Principles of European
Contract Law’ im System der Rechtsquellen.” pp. 5-31, p.12
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 See VI.3.1. and VII.1.2., below.
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(Billigkeitsentscheidung).565  Canaris rejects the view that the UPICC could be
applied directly to a contract under § 1051 I ZPO mentioning Rechtsnormen,
legal norms, because he does not regard the UPICC as formal legal norms.
The other two categories of legal sources, Rechtserkenntnisquelle and
Rechtsgewinnungsquelle are both attributed to the UPICC by Canaris.  The first
category comprises judgments, as they confirm what the law is.  Restatements
would also fall into this category.  The latter category is a more contour less
one.  It describes legal reasoning and legal theory.  "General principles of law"
would certainly fall within it, also comparative legal argumentation.566  Canaris
sees elements of both types of sources of law in the UPICC.  Where the UPICC
are more than just the strict "common core" of the legal systems which served
as a basis for the Principles, they should be regarded as a
Rechtsgewinnungsquelle.567
The recognition of the UPICC as a source of law, however, does not make
them automatically a suitable legal instrument to govern international
contractual disputes before national courts.  The option of including the UPICC
by the parties as contractual terms does not necessarily lead to an unqualified
application of the whole comprehensive set of rules, according to Canaris, but
might rather, subject the UPICC to the AGBG,568 the law protecting against
unfair contractual terms.569
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 AGBG: “AGB-Gesetz – Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen
Geschäftsbedingungen (Law regulating Standard Terms)”, of 9 Dec 1976, now integrated into
the BGB (§§305-310), incorporating EC Directive 93/13/EWG of 5 April 1993, regulating
Unfair Contract Terms.  For text, see Palandt/Heinrichs: “Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch”, 1998, pp
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compare C. –W Canaris: “Die Stellung der ‘UNIDROIT Principles’ und ‘Principles of
European Contract Law’ im System der Rechtsquellen.” pp. 5-31, p. 21-23.
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VI.3. Evaluation of the consequences under the prevailing view regarding
the application of the UPICC as governing law
The previous sections VI.1. and VI.2. mainly recapitulated the current positions
in current legislation, case law and doctrine regarding the source of law
function of the UPICC in a descriptive way.  The following section VI.3. asks
what consequences can be derived from these observations and the given set up
in modern national conflict of laws.  It investigates possible solutions from a
doctrinal point of view in general conflict doctrine.
Overall, Canaris explains that under the current status quo of the theoretical
foundations relating to sources of law, the UPICC definitely fulfil the criteria
of legal norms in Germany, but that they cannot de lege lata be applied to
international contracts as the governing law of the contract, as Vertragsstatut,
kollisionsrechtliche Verweisung or vocation.   As contractual stipulations they
would be subject to mandatory German law and could therefore not necessarily
apply as a whole comprehensive set of rules.  As a result, Canaris seems to
assume that in certain instances individual rules within the UPICC can serve as
a source of law in the extra-legislative sense, as a so-called
Rechtsgewinnungsquelle, where legal argumentation and further reasoning is
sought perhaps based on a gap - filling function of the UPICC.570  The other
instance would be where the Principles doubtlessly restate the "common core",
of a number of (national), legal systems, rather than adding any novel notions
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or ideas of their creators, a group of scientists who lack legislative
competence.571   Here, the UPICC would qualify as a Rechtserkenntnisquelle.
VI.3.1. Considerations permitting further evolution of the UPICC towards
sources of law
Although this results in a very restricted role of the UPICC as sources of law
before national courts, Canaris nevertheless emphasises the superior
qualification of the creators of the UPICC and thus their "persuasive force", so
that certainly veritas non auctoritas facit legem in this case, or, following Kötz
and Drobnig, they derive validity "imperio rationis" rather than "ratione
imperii .572
Canaris does refer to the UPICC as a Regelwerk, a set of rules, but still only
seems to conceive of individual legal rules within this set, which can be and
sometimes have to be, assessed and applied regardless of their comprehensive
context, eg in instances where either the attributes of "restatement" or
"alternative legal solution" are identified.  He discusses instances of conflicting
substantive solutions under German national law and the UPICC, and
concludes that the UPICC might be considered to offer novel solutions to
specific areas in German law where the lex lata is too vague and lacking
uniformity.573 He accepts a potential beneficial influence through the
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persuasive force of some of the solutions offered in the UPICC on German
national law, and even recognises that this question has as yet attracted very
little attention within scientific discussion.574
Basedow, on the other hand, recognises that the UPICC require a genuinely
new approach in legal doctrine, and comments in his National Report for the
XVth International Congress of Comparative Law;
"The traditional approach in German law.... would be to characterise the
Principles as forming part of a certain group of norms - statutes, conventions,
customary law, commercial usages and practices - and to draw conclusions
from the respective place in the hierarchy of legal norms. Such an investigation
would be of little avail, however, since it would be clear from the very
beginning that the UNIDROIT Principles do not fit into any of the traditional
categories. Their normative quality can only be assessed by a new theoretical
reflection. It has to cross the traditional borderline between law and fact, and it
must overcome the positivistic concept that law making is an exclusive
prerogative of the state to the effect that normative texts can only produce a
binding effect if they have been approved in the proper constitutional way." 575
The legitimation of the UPICC functioning as a potential novel source of law
must be derived from their broad acceptance:
                                                                                                                                 
and its relationship to §123BGB, the avoidance of the contract for reasons of mistake and
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UNIDROIT Principles if International Commercial Contracts.” pp 125-150, p128.
261
"...it should be clear that the constitutional enactment can only be dispensed
with if a certain text is supported by the broad approval of those applying the
law and of those who are subject to it."576
This seems to be a different condition than that postulated by Canaris, who
accepts only those rules of the UPICC which can be said to be a pure essence
of a variety of legal systems.577   Basedow's idea is to derive legitimacy from
the consensus among legal subjects, rather than from the origin of the legal
norms.  The UPICC would gain acceptance to the degree of normative effect
from their use, and "general approval by commercial circles and their
lawyers".578  This again refers to the persuasive force of the UPICC which
appears to be the most prominent category of a formative aspect, for sources of
law in respect of the UPICC.
VI.3.2. Suggested focus of research to establish the origin of source of law
function of the UPICC
In my view the main novelty and important formative part of the persuasive
force of the UPICC is the fact that they are designed as a comprehensive set of
rules.  These rules can be applied in a consistent way, which I have shown in
Part Two of this study in one specific instance.579




 “Quantitative method”, compare F.D.Ly: “Dutch National Report”, pp 203-235, p.232 and
see below.
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seq.  Also see Chapter Seven.
579
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The legitimation of their application should be derived from the specific nature
of their subject; international commercial contracts.  Even though the UPICC
might not serve to find, and establish, the gap in the legislation as Canaris
criticises,580 they certainly should have a gap filling role.  The gap in the law
seems to be the lack of recognition of specific needs of parties to international
commercial contracts, and the failure of legislators to refer to international
commercial contracts as an emerging species of legal concept.581  The gap
originates from the factual sphere, not from the sphere of substantive law.
The result of the recent German reform of the law of obligations has shown
that international model laws, or restatements such as the UPICC, have still not
had a convincing influence on the process of drafting modern rules.  Although
the German legislator was prepared (and probably forced), to implement the
novel notion of "consumer" into the BGB, no need was seen for the
introduction of the international contract as special type of contract.  This
reform therefore was in fact pursued ratione imperii, since it was affected
following EU Directives, and thus, institutional law rather than an adaptation to
modern trade developments.  The long-standing Anglo-American influence on
uniform laws such as the CISG, and subsequently the PECL and the UPICC,
by way of the notion of breach of contract, which has lead to the development
of the notion of "non-performance" in uniform law, has now resulted in the
creation of the notion of "Pflichtverletzung", breach of "duty" or "obligation" in
the BGB.  This concept might, or might not, be an adaptation to, or integration
of, "international" standards.  It seems to be at best an attempt to combine the
idea of a network of obligations in the tradition of the civil law with the Anglo-
American conception of the contract as a more wholesome entity, which offers
more simplicity as regards its "breach".  At worst it might be a
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misunderstanding of these models or a confusing aliud, hence another
peculiarity and certainly no assimilation to and not inspired by current
international drafts of contract law.582
It is submitted that there is a need for reform and for updating existing legal
solutions.  A set of rules such as the UPICC should be considered as a
legitimate source of law where there is no legal environment provided by
national law, even before national courts.  A draft provided by an independent
study group, as is the case with the UPICC and the PECL, certainly has a novel
persuasive force imperio rationis.
Certainly, the model of the UPICC should not suggest that assimilation of
national contract law to "international standards" is a goal in its own right.583
But it ought to be, or rather has always been, a goal to provide for specific rules
relating to specific circumstances, and following globalisation of trade there
should be the recognition of "globalised" commercial contracts in national
legislation and legal proceedings.584
It is therefore my submission that a gap in national law exists where national
contract law fails to recognise specific requirements of parties to international
contracts, and that the UPICC should serve as a source of law complete as a
comprehensive set of rules in those instances.  This source of law has the
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quality of a lex specialis applying to the special contract type of international
commercial contract.  The effort of establishing legal categories should be
focusing on developing the category of international commercial contracts, in
addition to that of the nature of the UPICC as a (national), source of law.
Definitions can be developed starting from the ones provided by Art. 1 CISG
and eg. the collection of transactions listed by Labes and Lörcher in their
edition of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Arbitration.585
National law should then serve to fill the gaps of the more specific rules of the
UPICC.
This method does not mean to suggest a hierarchy of norms where the
international set of rules prevails but to assume a qualitative ranking, a logical
order on the substantive level.
The main problem corrupting the persuasive force of the UPICC is actually the
habit of using them as a quarry for legal solutions and answers where national
laws, including conflict rules do not offer a convincing solution.  The tendency
is to use only individual rules rather than applying the whole set.586   Canaris
seems to adhere to this method by attaching two different categories of source
of law to different parts of the UPICC, depending on when the UPICC are
definitely purely a restatement, and when they might be the product of original
"legislation" by their creators.587
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Perhaps Basedow's view is similar to that of Lookofsky, expressed in the
National Report presented by Denmark on the reception of the UPICC to the
XVth International Congress of Comparative Law, that the UPICC can
contribute to a process of;
"progressive (rule-improving), harmonisation by consent, a clearly stated
alternative to the more wooden, lowest-common-denominator kind of
unification..."588
It seems that the more traditional view expressed by Canaris does not consider
the possibility of the emergence of a novel process of law-making, a modern
type of "legal formant" in the sense of Rodolfo Sacco.589   Modern legal science
and doctrine should observe and analyse this process open-mindedly and ought
to help to prepare the ground for a successful outcome of this process by
optimising the theoretical foundations in the interest of the commercial
community.
The basic properties of the UPICC are nevertheless well acknowledged even
by the more traditional view in German legal science of which Canaris can
certainly be taken as a suitable representative; he does see the persuasive force
of the Principles, especially in terms of quality of the legal material, its
consistency and its creators.  Although he attributes a source-of-law-function to
the UPICC, he still cannot prepare the ground for a sphere of application within
national law.  This is because there is a missing link to bridge the gap between
the Rechtsgeltungsquelle, i.e. formal legislation and customary law, and the
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other two types of sources of law, the Rechtserkenntnisquelle and the
Rechtsgewinnungsquelle.
This missing link has to be developed by an active complimentary research-
based doctrine and practice.
VI.4.  Conclusion
Although not clearly admitted in conflict of laws legislation, the UPICC are
attached to a source of law function even under traditional legal doctrine.  This
applies especially due to their high degree of consistency and
comprehensiveness as well as the high quality of the drafting technique.  A gap
in national law exists where national contract law fails to address specific
requirements of parties to international contracts.  The UPICC should serve as
a source of law complete as a comprehensive set of rules in those instances.
This source of law has the quality of a lex specialis applying to the special
contract type of international commercial contracts.  The effort of establishing
legal categories should be focused on developing the category of international
commercial contracts, in addition to that of the nature of the UPICC as a
(national) source of law.  Definitions can be based on Art. 1 CISG and the
1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Arbitration.590
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 H.W. Labes and T. Lörcher, eds: “Nationales und Internationales Schiedsverfahrensrecht”,
1998, p.185, note 3.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Methods of integration in the general conflict of laws
While the previous chapter has reviewed the status quo of current national
conflict law regarding the position of uniform contract law, this chapter asks
what suggestions have been made by scholars and in legal practice that would
allow the UPICC to be applied to international contracts and disputes as the
law governing the contract, applying as a whole set of rules.
The chapter first reviews suggestions and theories taken from current
legislation, by scholars who support the view that the UPICC have a source of
law quality (section VII.1.).   It then looks at what answers can be found in
arbitration to the question of the UPICCs source of law function (section
VII.2.).  The last section (VII.3), looks at those suggested choice of law
methods which are based on traditional conflict law doctrine, such as
complementary choice of national laws and the theory of gaps in uniform law,
and asks whether these can succeed in introducing uniform law.  The chapter
concludes with the author's suggestions on how to achieve a more successful
legal environment for the use of uniform law, within the national conflict of
law rules (section VII.4).
VII.1  Review of the current discussion regarding the status of
transnational law
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This section asks what has been put forward by scholars in order to overcome
the traditional rejection of the UPICC as a source of law and serving as
governing law for international commercial contracts.  This question is more
specifically pointed towards the use of UPICC as lex contractus compared to
the investigations of the previous chapter, Chapter Six.  The chapter
investigates theoretical suggestions supporting the use of uniform law as
governing law which are based on the traditional approach described above in
Chapter Six.
A number of suggestions have been put forward on how to give effect to the
UPICC as being the law governing international contracts before state courts,
by way of "kollisionsrechtliche Verweisung" or vocation (according a to choice
of law clause by the parties), as "Vertragsstatut"  (absent choice of law and by
choice of the judge or arbitrator).
The UPICC have, of course, received widespread interest and recognition in
international legal science.   Merely looking at the fact that 17 National Reports
were received from all over the world in response to the questionnaire
preparing the 1998 Congress of Comparative Law, demonstrates that the
UPICC receive attention virtually worldwide.591  Out of these, a few
comments by civil lawyers on legal theory and practice might contribute to the
formation of a modern approach to handling international contractual disputes
employing transnational rules.
                                                 
591
  See M.J. Bonell:  “General Report.”   1-17, at p.2.
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VII.1.1.  Art. 3 RC
Katharina Boele-Woelki592 suggested allowing parties to stipulate the UPICC
as the law governing their contract by extending an argument used by the
Dutch Supreme Court; Parties to a contract were allowed under the Rome
Convention to submit their contract to the 1956 CMR Convention,593 and a
general rule was derived from this decision saying that parties to a contract can
choose any international uniform law Convention to govern their contract
regardless of whether this Convention would otherwise be applicable according
to its scope.  Boele-Woelki suggests that this choice be extended to other
uniform law rules.  Even under the regime of the Rome Convention Dutch
legal writers maintain that parties can choose any international uniform law
Convention as the law governing their contract.594
"Uniform rules that are both coherent and indicate ways of filling possible
lacunae - and the Principles meet both these requirements - may be chosen by
the parties as the law governing the contract, in the sense that that system of
law which would have been applicable had no choice been made, is substituted
in its entirety, including the mandatory rules it may encompass, by the
designated uniform law."595
Boele-Woelki conceives this argument as a "broad interpretation of Art. 3 of
the 1980 Rome Convention".596  Such a broad interpretation is supported by
another Dutch author who comments that if parties can choose a national law
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 K. Boele-Woelki: “Principles and Private International Law”, Uniform Law Review 4 (1996): 652-
678.
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  Decision of 26 May 1989, published in NJ 1990, p.105. The Netherlands are a party to this
Convention since 1961.
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 K. Boele-Woelki: “Principles and Private International Law”, Uniform Law Review 4 (1996):
652-678, p. 665.
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which is completely unrelated to their contract or their own places of business
or residence, they must be allowed to choose conventions covering the
substance of their contract.597  This idea seems to bridge the gap between the
narrower interpretation of Art. 3 RC (that only state law can be the governing
law), and the view that a-national law should be an option to choice of law by
the parties before a state court.  This view draws on the formal and official
qualities of conventions, regardless of whether or not they are in force in the
state of the forum in any given case.
This view has been criticised by Prof. Goode598 who remarks that because not
every draft convention gets ratified by any particular state and eventually
enters into force, the application of its provisions might indeed contravene the
intentions of these states and thus not at all carry the required formal legal
authority.  Goode however, distinguishes between national judges and
arbitrators, the latter having the liberty to try a case with Convention rules
forming the governing law of the contract.  One such example is an ICC case
decided in 1989,599 where the Tribunal applied the Vienna Sales Convention,
although at the time of the conclusion of the contract this had not been
published and long not ratified.  This served to establish a trade usage relating
to examination of the goods in due time in international sales.
Prof. Basedow supports the view that the UPICC can be chosen as governing
law under Art. 3 RC, because party autonomy is of such fundamental
importance under the RC that it cannot be limited by a restricting interpretation
of Art. 3 (1) RC.  Such an interpretation is often based on Art. 7 RC which
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  K. Boele-Woelki: “Principles and Private International Law”, Uniform Law Review 4 (1996): 652-
678, p.666 quoting L. Strikwerda in "Kroniek van het internationaal privaatrecht", NJ 1996, p.411-412
598
  R. Goode: “Usage and its Reception in Transnational Commercial Law”, International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 46 (1997): 1-36, p.24.
599
  ICC case No. 5713  partly reported in (1990) XX. ICC.A.Y.B. 70, in Jarvin et al., "Collection of ICC
Arbitral Awards“, Vol.II p.223.
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strengthens the application of certain mandatory rules of individual signatory
states.  This however, would, according to Basedow, be sufficiently guaranteed
by an appropriate interpretation of Art.7 (1) RC in conjunction with Art. 1.4 of
the UPICC, which confirm the application of domestic mandatory rules.
VII.1.2. No source of law function without state legislation
Basedow implicitly ignores in his argumentation the conventional
understanding of the term "law", as referring to formal legislation and state
law, as opposed to "rules of law", allowing including "other", a-national law
such as the UPICC.   Indeed, this understanding of "law" ought to be subject to
re-discussion.  There is, however, a high degree of "consent" within legal
writings on the use of this terminology.
The UPICC however, are not vested with any more authority by Basedow's
argument based on Art. 3 RC, than the persuasive force of their quality and
comprehensiveness which they entail.  The lack of legitimation through state
legislation cannot be overcome by this argumentation.
Most authors therefore accept that the UPICC cannot be the law governing the
contract in countries where the RC is in force and that this is the generally
accepted prevailing and traditional approach. 600
                                                 
600
  U. Drobnig: “The UNIDROIT Principles in the Conflict of Laws.” Uniform Law Review 2/3 (1998):
385-295, p.391; K. Boele-Woelki: “Principles and Private International Law.” Uniform Law Review 4
(1996): 652-678, p.664;  M.J. Bonell: “The UNIDROIT Principles of International Contracts and CISG -
Alternatives or Complementary Instruments?” Uniform Law Review 1 (1996): 26-39, p.38;  M.J. Bonell:
“The UNIDROIT principles of international commercial contracts: Why? What? How?” Tulane Law
Review 69.5 (1995): 1121-1147, p.1144; unclear F. Ferrari: “Defining the sphere of application of the
1994 "UNIDROIT principles of international commercial contracts".” Tulane law review 69 (1995):
1225-1237, p.1231,1232; R. Goode: “Usage and its Reception in Transnational Commercial Law.”
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 46 (1997): 1-36, p. 28.
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There are a few German authors, however, who contest this interpretation of
Art. 3 and 4 of the Rome Convention and who attribute source of law functions
to the UPICC which make them a suitable option to govern international
commercial contracts.
VII.1.3. Party autonomy as source of law
J.C. Wichard 601 bases his argument on the motivations behind the traditional
conception in German choice of law rules.  These manifest in two theses; 1.
Only a state can create a law which protects equally and fairly the interests of
parties to a contract and which provides legal certainty and is comprehensive
enough; 2. Only state law rules are "law" in the sense incorporated in Art .3 RC
and Art 28 EGBGB because only law rules as recognised by a sovereign state
can be enforced by a state.  Other law rules are applied by way of equitable and
arbitrary decisions which state courts are not allowed to do.  Regarding the
second statement, Wichard also reminds us that party autonomy itself is
conferred and guaranteed by the state through Art. 27 I EGBGB.  The state is
free to grant the choice of a-national law, and rules of a-national law are in fact
enforced by state courts indirectly by way of arbitral awards based on a-
national law rules such as the lex mercatoria, including the UPICC.602
Regarding the first statement, Wichard refers to the substantive quality of the
UPICC, namely their comprehensiveness and the fact that they can derive
authority from a thoroughly prepared draft in a similar way to that in which the
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 J.C. Wichard: “Die Anwendung der UNIDROIT- Prinzipien für internationale Handelsverträge durch
Schiedsgerichte und nationale Gerichte.” Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales
Privatrecht 60 (1996): 269-301.
602
  See Chapters Seven and Eight below .
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ius commune used to operate for a long time in European jurisdictions, as ratio
scripta.603
More important than the formal observation of actual enforcement of a-national
law in a state is Wichard's argument that the purpose of choice of law rules is
not the protection of the interest of a state to apply its own law but rather the
idea of letting the parties find the best law to govern their contract according to
subjective considerations.604   The idea behind this "political" choice is that the
parties know the best way of regulating their own affairs and that they will find
the correct balance between competing interests.  This argument is supported
by the fact that parties are free to choose the law of any country, even if it is
totally unrelated to themselves and their contract, and even if their contract is
purely domestic.
VII.1.4. Substantive argument
It is obvious that law rules such as the UPICC should be regarded as the
preferable choice of law when compared with the law of a country which none
of the parties knows anything about and which is usually chosen simply for
reasons of neutrality.  This is true from the point of view of protection of the
parties' interests such as fairness and balance of rights.605  To the extent that a
state doctrine sets out to protect these interests by way of exclusively admitting
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  J.C. Wichard: “Die Anwendung der UNIDROIT- Prinzipien für internationale Handelsverträge
durch Schiedsgerichte und nationale Gerichte”, Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales
Privatrecht 60 (1996): 269-301, p.283.
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  Compare the discussion referred to above at I.2.1.2. and note the similarity of this opinion to the one
expressed by Collier in J. G. Collier: "Conflict of laws",1987, p.357.
605
  In a substantive sense, not in terms of procedural fairness and guarantees, see below discussing
arbitration proceedings.
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state law to govern the contract, the UPICC must prevail on the ground of the
quality of their substantive solutions.
The question of the doctrine behind private law rules as such, and the
relationship between the state and the private individual as a contracting party,
is dealt with above in Chapter One.
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VII.2. Arbitration awards as source of law: ICC case No. 7110
The previous section VII.1. has introduced scholarly opinions suggesting ways
of using the UPICC as governing law in conflict cases.  This section asks how
case law, and specifically arbitration disputes, can provide an answer to the
question of uniform law as a source of law in matters of international
commercial contracts.   Specific tension is added to this discussion in the
context of absence of choice of law.  The traditional view exclusively applies
conflict of law rules in order to find the applicable (state), law.  Other views
want to derive an implicit choice of a-national rules of law.   An intermediate
case is where the parties choose "general principles of law", the lex mercatoria
or the like, to govern their contract.  This choice of law might not lead to the
acceptance of a-national law as Vertragsstatut, or the law applicable to the
contract, but it can be conceived as a deliberate exclusion of national laws
("negative choice of law"), for reasons of neutrality.
A rewarding example for the treatment of such a choice of law and the
subsequent successful application of the UPICC is a sequence of two partial
arbitration awards which were introduced and analysed at the 1998 Bristol
Comparative Law Congress by Prof. de Ly from Rotterdam.606  De Ly
comments on ICC case No. 7110, Partial Award of 13 July 1995 and Partial
Final Award No.2 rendered on 4th May 1998 in The Hague.  At the time of de
Ly's report, the quantum stage of the case was still pending.607
                                                 
606
  Filip de Ly:  Dutch National Report on the UPICC,  published in M.J. Bonell, ed.  "A New
Approach to International Commercial Contracts", 1999, pp.203-235.
607
  The cases are unpublished and Prof. de Ly reported the issues in his capacity as counsel and
expert witness for the parties.
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The case concerned a series of contracts between an English company and a
Middle Eastern State party, a trading agency.  The terms of the contract, or
rather several (nine), contracts, contained no express stipulation of any
municipal law but instead referred to"natural justice" and "laws of natural
justice".608  The conflict of laws issues were discussed extensively by the
parties, so that useful considerations could be recorded.
VII.2.1. Application of the UPICC and general principles of law under
procedural aspects
The important aspect in the reasoning of the Arbitral Tribunal in these
proceedings is the treatment of the choice of law clauses in the contracts.
The prevailing domestic legal doctrine relating to the choice of law and party
autonomy does not accept general principles of law to govern the contract
absent choice of law for the reasons explained above so far.  Also, the
assumption that the parties want to deliberately exclude municipal laws from
governing their contract, by either not mentioning any national law, or by
referring to general principles of law, the lex mercatoria or similar, is not
accepted in legal science and practice because of the general rejection of the
criterion of "the implicit, implied, presumed or hypothetical intention of the
parties".609  Such a choice would not lead to the appropriate law with enough
certainty, so that prevailing conflict of laws doctrines, at least after the
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 F.d. Ly:  “Dutch National Report.”   pp. 203-235, at p.217
609
  F.d. Ly:  “Dutch National Report.”   pp. 203-235, at p.219
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enactment of the RC in various countries, try to follow "objective" criteria such
as the closest connection or characteristic performance test.610
Therefore, the Preamble of the UPICC does not contain the express option that
the Principles should apply in the absence of an express choice of law by the
parties, but does state that they are to apply if the parties have so chosen.  This
was a deliberate decision taken by the UNIDROIT Governing Council taking
controversial positions in various legal systems into account.
VII.2.2. Construction of choice of law clause
In this Award, however, the Tribunal construed the contract clauses also by
referring to the negotiation process, and managed to arrive at the conclusion
that the parties deliberately wanted to exclude national laws from their contract
settlement procedures by also deliberately opting for arbitral adjudication.
Since the facts of the case provided enough reasons to conclude that general
principles of law were to govern the contracts the Tribunal overall presented
the following two propositions as formulated by de Ly:
"1. Natural justice - language in choice of law clauses without references to
municipal law is a strong indication that the parties wanted a neutral non-
national law to apply.  Thus, general principles and Unidroit Principles may be
applied.
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  Compare VI.1.4. above.
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2. Absent a choice of law clause, the law governing State Contracts is general
principles of law and the Unidroit Principles." 611
Arbitrators may follow these maxims on two grounds; the state law allowing
them to apply general principles of law regardless of municipal conflict
rules612  (voie directe), and the general authorisation of the parties submitting
their dispute to arbitration.  As is shown exemplary in this Award, the
arbitrators base their argument on the "consensual starting point of
arbitration"613 and can therefore specifically derive their argument from the
construction contract clauses in conjunction with the negotiation process.  The
subjective component which is employed is thereby better shielded against the
criticism it has received in the traditional and modern (ie post RC), conflict
doctrine.  The argument takes into account the need for the award to persuade
the parties for it to be accepted and not be challenged and subject to setting
aside procedures afterwards.
The general acceptance and success of Arbitral Awards demonstrate that this
effect is legitimate, very typical for, and an important factor of, arbitral
adjudication.  It is obvious that such a solution is justified in cases of a contract
clause referring to general principles which de Ly describes convincingly as
"natural justice language", but less so in cases where no choice of law and no
such clause is present at all.  An important factor is of course also the
involvement of a State party, where the requirement of neutrality of the
applicable law, as well as the concern that one State does not want to submit
itself to the law of another state, is an obvious criterion of contract drafting.614
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  F.d. Ly:  “Dutch National Report.”   pp. 203-235, at p. 225. Compare also VIII.2.3.8. below.
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  See Chapter Eight for further discussion.
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  F.d. Ly:  “Dutch National Report.”   pp. 203-235, at p.219.
614
  Compare also Chapter Eight.
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VII.2.2.1. Scope of the UPICC according to their Preamble
Another more procedural aspect of the application of the UPICC to the
substance of the contract is the interpretation of their Preamble.  It seems to be
common ground that although the Preamble does not mention this voie directe,
absent choice of law, the Principles cannot determine their own scope of
application:
"As a non- binding instrument, the intention of the drafters can be helpful to
determine the objectives of their venture but cannot by itself determine its
scope of application".615
Thus the final procedural stepping stone on the way to a direct and
comprehensive application of the UPICC as law governing the contract can be
formulated as follows:
"[2.] The Unidroit Principles cannot decisively determine their own criteria for
application. The Preamble of the Unidroit Principles (as amended by the
Unidroit Council), does not control and does not prevent arbitrators to make
their own determinations on the basis of the arbitration agreement and the
application rules." 616
VII.2.2.2. Substantive aspects supporting application of UPICC
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  F.d. Ly:  “Dutch National Report.”   pp. 203-235, p.224.
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  Ibid., p.225
280
On the substantive side, the Tribunal took into account that criticism is often
made regarding the potential clash of the UPICC (or any other a-national law),
with national laws in particular with so-called mandatory rules of law.  For
German law this could be certain provisions of the AGBG (now incorporated
into the BGB).  For the UK it could be provisions of the Unfair Contract Terms
Act.  Although the UPICC contain mandatory rules themselves (eg Art.1.7 (2)),
and they expressly refrain from excluding municipal mandatory rules of law
(Art. 1.4), the possibility of their being subject to modification by national law
is generally considered enough reason for abstaining from employing them in
contract conflicts.617  In addition, national mandatory rules are regarded as
providing a superior quality of protection within their intended scope than the
UPICC.618   The Tribunal reasoned as follows in the case discussed here, as
reported by Prof. de Ly:
"[1.] A clash between the Unidroit Principles and municipal legal systems is
unlikely because the parties did not want municipal laws to apply.  For that
reason, the Unidroit Principles can be applied in the absence of a choice of law
provision in the contract without this being a threat to municipal legal
systems;..." 619
The second substantive reason for the application of the UPICC is, of course
their comprehensiveness, accessibility and the quality of the solutions they
offer:
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  See C.-W. Canaris:  “Die Stellung der "UNIDROIT Principles" und "Principles of European
Contract Law" im System der Rechtsquellen.”   pp.5-31, at p.21-27.
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  C.-W. Canaris:  “Die Stellung der "UNIDROIT Principles" und "Principles of European
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the case that the UPICC could be incorporated into the contract by only one party. This is quite unlikely
within the present context, and certainly following the construction method used by the Arbitral Tribunal
in ICC case No.7110. See also below.
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  F.d. Ly:  “Dutch National Report.”  pp. 203-235, at p.225.
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"[5.] The Unidroit Principles are clearly articulated and are organised in a
coherent and systematic way. Thus, rather than providing vague rules and
general guidelines, their very nature makes them well fit for application to
concrete cases.
[1.] ...They were made by a distinguished group of international experts
coming from the most important legal systems of the world who are
independent from states or governments. Thus, the Unidroit Principles are
characterised by high quality and neutrality.  Furthermore, the Unidroit
Principles reflect the present stage of consensus regarding international legal
rules and principles with respect to contracts and particularly express fairness
and provide appropriate solutions for international contractual problems." 620
VII.2.3. Application to the substance of the dispute
In particular, specific provisions of the UPICC were employed in the following
way in the arbitral procedure.  After the applicability of the UPICC was first
decided by rendering the Partial Award on 13 July 1995, a second stage of the
proceedings lead to Partial Final Award No.2 of 4 May 1998 upon a hearing in
September 1997.  In the course of this hearing the UPICC were orally
discussed on nine counts, but only seven of them were discussed and reported
in the Award.  These drew on Art. 1.7, 2.18, 2.4., 7.1.3, 7.4.5, 7.4.8, and
Chapter 4 on termination.




The discussions are included into this section because they demonstrate another
example of how to apply the UPICC consistently and successfully to the
substance of a dispute.   The award also contains considerations relating to the
source of law function and the legal nature of the UPICC on the part of the
Arbitration Tribunal.
The considerations relating to the scope and value as source of law which the
Tribunal attributed to the UPICC in this instance may amount to a contribution
to the development of an integrated doctrine of the application of a-national
law rules in Germany and England.621
VII.2.3.1. Primary or Secondary sources of law: Ambiguous situation
The Tribunal seemed to take quite an ambiguous view.  One option was to
regard the Principles as restatements rather than primary law.  This means that
the Principles would have only "secondary authority" and simply help to find
general principles of law.  The other option, attributing primary source of law
qualities to the UPICC, is to be seen in the so called better law approach which
is based on qualitative criteria.  Rather than merely "collecting" the views on a
particular question of law in several jurisdictions and deriving general
principles of law from them only if these are recognised in a (which?), number
of them, (the so called quantitative method), the latter method gives effect to
the formulation of a rule of law which is drafted to achieve the best solution.
Some of the rules in the UPICC, are in fact, of this nature according to the
express report of its creators.  Following the former approach, the quantitative
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  See Chapter Eight for further discussion of the role of arbitral awards as "sources of
law " in England.
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method, and considering the legitimacy of the UPICC as stemming from their
being a restatement means to decide individually for every single rule whether
or not it is a restatement or a conscious determination by its creators.
According to this method the UPICC can obviously not be applied as a whole
without more even in arbitration procedures where the arbitrators are amiables
compositeurs, i.e. ruling ex aequo et bono.  It seems that even in these
instances a very cautious approach prevails.
The Tribunal in ICC Case No. 7110 took different views in single instances
while deciding different questions of the dispute.  There were instances where
a contradiction was seen between rules of the UPICC and general principles of
law, and there were other instances in which the Tribunal favoured one
particular legal solution in fact as the better law.
VII.2.3.2. Four counts of analysis of UPICC provisions
The first question was one of limitation issues which was decisive for the
further course of the proceedings.  It was discussed intensely therefore.  Had
the decision to apply the UPICC to the facts of the case not been made in the
preceding Partial Award the Tribunal,622 dealing with this next stage of the
proceedings, the hearing in September 1997, would perhaps have rather not
taken this decision since the UPICC now faced the arbitrators with a gap.623  It
was resolved to be common ground that the UPICC do not deal with limitation
issues, so that general principles of law had to be found.  The Tribunal then
dismissed the idea that a general principle of the application of time-limits was
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  The Chairman of the  Tribunal had changed subsequently.
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  Gaps in international uniform laws will be dealt with below.
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to be derived from a comparative view on a number of national laws.  It also
rejected the idea of deriving such a general principle from the 1974 New York
Limitation Convention.624  Another general principle, the one of an obligation
to bring an action within a reasonable time span, was considered and the issue
resolved relying on the facts of the case.625  Whether this principle is backed
by Art 1.7.(2) of the UPICC was not decided.
The next issue was decided by relying on Art. 7.1.3 of the UPICC, stating that
this provision reflected a general principle of law, namely the civil law concept
of exceptio non adimpleti contractus.  The formulation to be noted is "as
confirmed by Art. 7.1.3. of the UPICC".626  The discussion of this point
continued with the defendant raising concerns about the seller having sold the
(tailor-made), goods on invoking his rights as unpaid seller and claiming to
comply with his duty to mitigate damages.
The sale of the goods was discussed under the head of Art. 7.4.8 and 7.4.5. of
the UPICC.  This discussion as reported by de Ly demonstrates that the UPICC
do provide a basis for legal reasoning and argumentation even in a case where
"gaps" seem to arise within the application process.627   It shows that the
UPICC are a suitable basis for legal reasoning if only the parties draw on the
full potential of the provisions, i.e. undertake to apply them exhaustively just in
the way they would do if they were in fact municipal law.  The UPICC can
technically be handled like a statute.
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   New York UN- Convention on the limitation in contracts for international sales of 13 June
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  By stating that there was no reason to assume an inexcusable delay.
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  As reported in the formulation of Prof. de Ly, F.d. Ly:  “Dutch National Report.”  pp. 203-235,
p.229.
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  Compare F.d. Ly:  “Dutch National Report.”   pp. 203-235, p. 229.
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Dealing with the fourth issue the Tribunal avoided discussing questions of
contractual interpretation under the rules spelled out in Chapter 4 of the
UPICC.  Instead, it was resolved that the conclusive evidence clauses contained
in the contracts were not successfully challenged because the Claimant failed
to bring any evidence.  De Ly sees a tendency of the Tribunal to reinforce the
prevalence of contractual terms over general principles and the UPICC by this
manoeuvre,628 and thereby an emphasis of the principle pacta sunt servanda.
This implies that the application of the interpretation rules contained in Chapter
4 of the UPICC might be conceived to exercise a correcting function and could
result in modifications of the contractual contents by way of interpretation.
This understanding probably favours the interests  of contracting parties in that
it wants to see parties vested with the authority to create their own legal
cosmos and thereby a kind of sovereignty with the contract taking the highest
rank in the hierarchy of private law rules.  I do not believe, however, that the
Tribunal saw a conflict here between contract clauses and general principles
which would have required a deliberate choice between pacta sunt servanda
and contractual interpretation (governed by the good faith principle under the
UPICC).  The Tribunal merely wished to optimise their role in the dispute
resolution sought by the parties, and therefore preferred to decide according to
factual analysis and close application of the contract terms,629  in order to
achieve a persuasive effect for the parties which is an important factor in
arbitration:
"...in tackling the many substantive issues, the Tribunal found that many issues
could be solved in a way convincing to the parties and in a generally acceptable
way by applying factual analysis and contract terms rather than standards such
as general principles and the Unidroit Principles.  Given the State contract
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  Thereby complying with Art. 17(1) and (2) of the ICC arbitration rules of 1 Jan 1998.
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nature of the disputes, these pragmatic solutions  do have important redeeming
virtues." 630
VII.2.3.3. First conclusion: Questionable role of arbitration tribunals as
pioneers of integrating a-national law rules into domestic doctrine
This constellation and relationship between the Tribunal and the disputing
parties is important to note in comparison to the role of state courts and
litigants there.  The source of law function of any rule must be analysed in the
context of its application.  It is however worth discussing whether the attitude
of state courts and state law as it generally is, serves to resolve disputes in
international trade satisfactorily.  This involves also the question of the nature
of private law as discussed above in Chapter One.  As a matter of fact,
arbitration tribunals do achieve high levels of successful dispute resolution
with only a small percentage of awards being challenged in state courts.  This
aspect of economy is not the highest priority in state litigation and in state
legislation.  This situation should be reviewed, however, in the light of the
existence of the UPICC.
Arbitral tribunals could be conceived as pioneers in applying the UPICC.  This
practice could then be introduced into state law by way of giving effect to the
findings of the Tribunals through enforcement or upholding awards in state
litigation.631  The gateway through which the UPICC could be introduced into
                                                 
630
  F.d. Ly:  “Dutch National Report.”   pp. 203-235, p. 234.
631
  "This approach has been adopted in case law" (R. Goode: “Usage and its Reception in
Transnational Commercial Law.” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 46 (1997): 1-36, p.29)
compare Deutsche Schachtbau- und Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbH V. R' As al-Khaimah National Oil Co.
[1987] 3 W.L.R. 1023
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national law would then be the standard of the applicable municipal arbitration
law. The way the UPICC are dealt with and classified in arbitration would then
form a model character for state litigation.  Due to the special circumstances
with arbitration procedures as set out above, however, it is questionable as to
whether this can be accepted without further analysis.  The way in which
arbitrators apply rules of law of formal or informal nature differs in important
aspects from the way in which state judges have to work.  The need to comply
with a given framework of legal rules is much greater for state courts as well as
the requirement to comply with traditional standards of reasoning.  The impact
of a state judgment on the formation of the entire legal system is greater than
an arbitration award which only binds the parties to the dispute.632  This
applies especially to legal systems based on precedent.  This factor is also
reinforced in state litigation by the appeal system and its standards of judicial
review.
With a view to the need to improve and develop the qualitative aspect of
applying the UPICC, creating a high standard for their reception, it seems
therefore, that arbitration is not the prime gateway for the UPICC to enter the
traditional world of the conflict of laws.633
ICC case No. 7110 in conjunction with Prof. de Ly's report, however,
contributes to the shaping of the legal nature of the UPICC with regard to their
source of law function and their compatibility with municipal law.
                                                                                                                                 
"The courts increasingly accept arbitral awards as sources of law and the arbitral process and
independent of the courts." (S. Shackleton: “Challenging Arbitration Awards - Part III: Appeals on
Questions of Law.” New Law Journal dec.6 (2002): 1834-1835 at p.1835 at p. ; see also J.C. Wichard:
“Die Anwendung der UNIDROIT- Prinzipien für internationale Handelsverträge durch Schiedsgerichte
und nationale Gerichte.” Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 60 (1996):
269-301, at p. 283, who believes that the UPICC become positive law rules by choice of law and
subsequent enforcement under national law, they receive"state blessings through enforcement",
"Staatliche Weihe...im Wege der Vollstreckung..." . Compare Chapter Eight.
632
  Compare VII.2.3.5. below.
633
  Compare VII.2.3.5. below.
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VII.2.3.4. Fifth and sixth count of reference to UPICC and analytical
evaluation
The way of applying Art 7.4.8 UPICC to resolve the fifth issue reported by de
Ly, again leaves it open as to whether the Tribunal regarded this rule as
"confirming" the general principle of exceptio non adimpleti contractus and
thereby applied this general principle (the mitigation of harm maxim), to the
facts of the case, or whether it decided the case "under Art. 7.4.8. UPICC", i.e.
applied the UPICC as a positive rule of law.  The latter formulation is
employed by de Ly dealing with the sixth instance of referring to the UPICC in
this Award.634  It could be called "law language", describing a primary source
of law whereas the former, i.e. the UPICC "expressing" or "confirming" a
general principle of law could be called "restatement language", describing the
UPICC as being a restatement.  This language of law and restatement is
actually mixed within the award.  The fifth issue discussed therein relating to
the selling of unpaid goods by the Defendant was resolved relying on the
principle of exceptio non adimpleti contractus", as adopted by Article 7.1.3. of
the Unidroit Principles".635   While the Tribunal accepted Art. 7.4.8. UPICC as
a "generally accepted principle of mitigation of harm",636 the arbitrators
dismissed Artt. 6.2.1. to 6.2.3. as expressing general principles of law.  They
did expressly reject the idea that the theory of changed circumstances form
"part of widely recognised and generally accepted legal principles as referred
to in the July 13, 1995 award".637   De Ly, however, still seems to classify Art.
                                                 
634








6.2.1. - .6.2.3. UPICC "which restate the law on hardship" as in line with
general principles of law.  This clearly means that there is no general
acceptance of the UPICC as the law governing the contract absent choice of
law without further analysis.  The UPICC seem only in parts to coincide with
the general principles of law pointed to by the "natural justice language" of a
certain type of international commercial contract.  This is, at least, the view
taken by the Tribunal in ICC case No.7110.  For the application of the UPICC,
this obviously means that every single rule has to be analysed as to its quality
as a restatement which obviously even includes the option of differing results
regarding individual rules.  The better law approach thereby seems to be
dismissed for the purposes of offering a genuinely neutral ground for settling a
dispute absent choice of (municipal), law and choosing "natural justice
language", as is typically favoured in state contracts (contracts involving a state
party).  This attitude at least gives the utmost priority to the parties' intentions
to settle their dispute according to "neutral" principles of law, i.e. to party
autonomy.  This benefit is clearly not conferred to the same extent by state
legislation which refuses to give effect to this interest unconditionally and
thereby possibly at the same time refuses to recognise the existence of such
typical contractual relationships.
The Tribunal also named the general principles of law by their Latin origin
rather than quoting the wording of the UPICC rules which had been deemed to
restate ("confirmed" or "expressed"), these principles.  This clearly illustrates
the superior position of the general principles as the law governing the contract
rather than the written rules of the UPICC.
This choice made by the Tribunal in this reported case may, however, not have
been intended to make general (and binding), assumptions relating to the
UPICC.  It is more likely that above all the Tribunal followed the purpose of
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rendering a convincing award in the way described above.  This pragmatic
approach seems the appropriate attitude in this instance.  However, the
proficient use of factual analysis and application of contractual terms in this
case does not necessarily diminish the merits of the UPICC here.
The fact that such a large number of issues were intensely discussed under their
headings, although on the part of the defendants counsel, indicates that the
written quality, comprehensiveness, and practical manageability of the UPICC
are welcomed by litigants, and have a convincing force notwithstanding the
parallel existence of general principles of law.
More concern should arise from the arbitrary manner in which the Tribunal
employed the UPICC on the basis of vague and sometimes even contradictory
explanations or motivations.  The rules on hardship in the UPICC were rejected
because they do not reflect a general principle of law since they are for instance
not recognised in French, Belgian and English law.  "In case of a conflict
between these general principles and the Unidroit Principles, the former should
control."638  This attitude towards a hierarchy seems to be deliberately and
consciously taken by the Tribunal.639  The conclusion to be derived therefrom
is not, however, that the UPICC are "secondary" sources of law in terms of
suitability for disputes of this kind but rather that the Tribunal did not feel
authorised to apply the UPICC instead of general principles of law.  The
problem, i.e. the flaw in consistency of the argument in this specific case is
induced by the fact that the Final Partial Award was rendered by a different
panel than the preceding Partial Award, stating that the UPICC were to govern
the contract. A contradictory use of the a-national law results into this
inconsistency.  This is a weakness which is typical, yet legitimate and
                                                 
638
  F.d. Ly:  “Dutch National Report.”   pp. 203-235, at p.232.
639
  The issue was explicitly discussed within the hearing.
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acceptable in commercial arbitration but not in state litigation.  This
methodological flaw is the reason for the lack of recognition of rules like the
UPICC in national legal systems.  The discussion about the hierarchy of norms
and subsequent authority derived from general principles of law on one hand,
and the UPICC on the other, is not aimed at their legal nature but at the
underlying choice of law argument.  In  ICC case No. 7110 a shift from one
underlying decision (the UPICC to govern the contract), to another (general
principles law to govern the contract), took place on the part of the arbitral
tribunal but not on the part of the litigating parties, especially the Claimant,
without being expressly discussed.
The underlying decision of the arbitral tribunal as to the legal nature of the
UPICC can be described as follows:
The UPICC are an aliud from general principles of law.
The UPICC contain restatements of general principles in individual rules but
not as a whole.
The application of general principles of law does not authorise the arbitrator
automatically to apply the UPICC exclusively.
This qualification seems to be justified. It is often criticised that arbitral
tribunals jump to the application of a-national law too readily whenever no
choice of law clause is contained in an international commercial contract.640
The reasons behind this absence are not always the intention of the parties to
exclude any national law but often the parties want to leave it to arbitration to
find the applicable law.  The application of a-national law can therefore lead to
the award being set aside if it is found that the arbitrator exceeded the authority
                                                 
640
  Compare K.P. Berger:   "The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria",1999, at
p.81 and note 333 quoting a number of relevant awards.
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conferred to them by the parties and disregarded their party autonomy.641
Such an analysis was carefully undertaken in ICC case No.7110, however.
There were good reasons to assume that the parties wanted to exclude national
laws due to the state contract nature of the venture as well as the "natural
justice language" in the contracts.  The second panel did obviously place the
utmost priority on the selection of the appropriate law rules and therefore
resorted to "general principles of law" as the ultimate authority.   They did not
seem to be insecure in terms of the contents of these principles, and in
particular seemed quite proficient in the use of the comparative method to
establish the substantive law within the general principles.
VII.2.3.5. Second conclusion
De Ly reports the overall treatment of individual issues by the Tribunal in the
following way:
"...two conclusions may be drawn. One is that the Tribunal's view that the
Unidroit Principles are not primary law governing the contract but only may
help the Tribunal to find general principles of law.  Secondly, the Tribunal
seems to suggest that a quantitative approach should be taken to general
principles of law.  Hardship for instance is not such a general principle since it
is unknown in a number of countries such as France (for civil and commercial
contracts), Belgium and England.  Thus, the better law approach based on
qualitative criteria and implying a judgment regarding the merits of a particular
solution is implicitly rejected....One may note, however, that the Tribunal
                                                 
641
  See below .
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rejected the quantitative comparative survey approach in relation to limitation
which deems to be contradictory to the approach taken here with respect to
hardship." 642
However, this inconsistent approach suggests that arbitral awards are not a
prime source of a novel international doctrine of conflict law.  Commercial
arbitration can therefore not serve as the main gateway for the UPICC to be
introduced into domestic litigation and to be integrated into municipal legal
systems.  The transformation of arbitration awards based on the UPICC by way
of enforcement can be regarded as an admittance through the back door but due
to the methodological flaws in the application of a-national law this technique
will not open the front gates of the fortresses of domestic law.
Advocating the integration of the UPICC into national law does not necessarily
involve the postulation of the use of a-national law at any expense.
Reservations against the "premature" use of a-national law can only be met by
the development of a more clear-cut doctrine of international private law.  It is
questionable, however, whether this doctrine, judging by the currently
prevailing views in legal science and practice, is elaborate enough at present to
support Berger's view that a decision of arbitrators to apply the lex mercatoria
absent choice of law is not actually a decision ex aequo et bono (needing
special authorisation in the arbitration agreement), since the lex mercatoria is
not part of "equity" anymore, due to the high degree of codification and other
standards  in  international legal doctrine.643
                                                 
642
 F.d. Ly:  “Dutch National Report.”   pp. 203-235, p.232.
643
  Compare K.P. Berger:   "The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria",1999, at
p.86: "...a decision based on the lex mercatoria may not be equated with a decision based on
equity.", see also ibid. p. 85. Under the present English conflict of laws and arbitration law, this
question does not even arise since there is no distinction made between these two notions, see
eg sec. 46 (1) (b) of the Arbitration Act 1996 and see below for further discussion.
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More analysis is therefore undertaken in the following in order to establish and
arrange the relevant material which might form such a new approach to a-
national law in the conflict of laws and domestic legal theory.
As much as arbitration tribunals provide a testing ground 644 for the UPICC,
the chances for the outcome of the use in arbitration to infiltrate domestic legal
doctrine directly are small, due to the characteristic irrelevance of doctrine and
analysis for arbitration proceedings.
VII.3. Reconciliation of UPICC with domestic conflict of laws
This section asks which tools are needed to build up an appropriate doctrine of
choice of law allowing the use of uniform law to govern international
commercial contracts.  It investigates a way forward using concepts of current
conflict of laws in an integrating way, contributing to a modern methodology
of international contracts.
VII.3.1. Combination solution in choice of law clauses
Paving the way for international uniform law instruments within municipal
systems of law can only be achieved by reconciling them with domestic law.
                                                 
644
  U. Drobnig: “The UNIDROIT Principles in the Conflict of Laws.” Uniform Law
Review 2/3 (1998): 385-295, p.395.
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This view is supported by Spellenberg in his commentary of the German
conflict law.645  He suggests "tolerating" a-national law as lex contractus if
"combined with the subsidiary choice of a national legal system".646  As much
as such a restriction would be unacceptable for parties wanting to exclude
municipal laws from their dispute resolution, this statement positively suggests
combining the two sets of law rules in exactly the opposite way to that
traditionally suggested.  This technique was actually employed by an arbitral
tribunal in a case which was decided before the "Hamburger Freundschaftliche
Arbitrage" on 29 Dec 1998.647  The tribunal reasoned:
"Nur soweit Fragen weder im CISG geregelt noch nach den Grundsätzen des
CISG lösbar sind, ist gemäß Art. 7 Abs.2 CISG ergänzend das nach dem
internationalen Privatrecht bestimmte innerstaatliche Recht anzuwenden, d.h.
das gewählte deutsche Recht." 648 (Only as far as questions are neither
regulated in the CISG nor answerable under the general principles of the CISG,
Art. 7 (4) CISG provides that the domestic law applicable under private
international law is to be applied supplementary, i.e. the chosen German law.)
This is not in keeping with the analytical position adopted in domestic legal
science.649  But it indicates that this technique appears to its "users" to be the
natural way of applying uniform private law.
The gap filling role is not attributed to the international rules anymore but to
the domestic law rules.  This technique requires two conditions to be accepted;
                                                 
645
  Spellenberg in Münchener Kommentar, No. 24 preceding (vor) §11 EGBGB.
646
  U. Drobnig: “The UNIDROIT Principles in the Conflict of Laws”, Uniform Law Review 2/3
(1998): 385-295, p.392.
647
 “Schiedsverfahren der 'Hamburger Freundschaftliche Arbitrage' - anwendbares Recht:
Schiedsspruch vom 29.12. 1998.” RIW 5 (1998): 394-396.
648
  Ibid. p.395 (IV 3.).
649
  See below; compare P. Mankowski: “Rechtswahl für Verträge des internationalen
Wirtschaftsverkehrs”, RIW 1 (2003): pp.2-15, p.10, 2nd col.
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the national law must provide the procedural and doctrinal space for the
UPICC to apply legitimately, and the combination of the UPICC with the
substantive law rules must actually work.  The latter problem has been
discussed above in Part Two, where examples from construction contract law
have been successfully resolved under both regimes.  The former issue is under
consideration here.
VII.3.2. The doctrine of gaps in international uniform laws and
supplementary application of domestic law
The actual transition from one sphere to the other is supposed to take place
when a gap arises in solving a case under the international uniform law
instrument, in this context the UPICC.  Following the results of the above
analysis in Part Two, a gap can only arise after thorough interpretation and
application of the whole of the UPICC as a comprehensive set of rules.  This
technique has also been successfully demonstrated by the discussion of various
Articles of the UPICC in ICC case No.7110,650 between the Tribunal and
namely the defendant's counsel.
In relation to international uniform conventions such as CISG and the Ottawa
Conventions on international factoring and leasing contracts, gaps are assumed
under two headings:
Lacunae intra legem, internal gaps, are to be distinguished from matters which
are not covered by the conventions, as for example described by Art. 4 and 5
CISG, formation of contracts or the transfer of ownership.  The former are gaps
                                                 
650  Compare F.d. Ly:  Dutch National Report.   pp. 203-235, p.229 and 230.
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arising in the course of the application of international law when an issue,
generally within the scope of the convention, turns out to be unanswered by its
rules.  In this case, most conventions provide for a gap filling role of the
underlying general principles of law,651 to which the text of the conventions
usually refer.652  The domestic law applicable under conflict rules is then
another default standard for finding the appropriate solution under the
international convention, as expressly provided for in Art. 7 (2) CISG and  Art.
4 (2) of the 1988 Factoring Convention.
Both under domestic law and under international conventions it is common
practice to fill gaps by analogous application of the relevant rules to
comparable cases.653   There is an established practice of dealing with gaps
once they have been specified.  More problems will arise from the definition of
a "gap" in an international convention or uniform non-binding instrument.
Before a gap can be assumed, all possibilities of interpretation under the
applicable rules of the relevant codification should be exhausted,654 as has
been demonstrated above in Part Two and also in ICC case No. 7110 as
reported by de Ly.  The mere "silence" of a set of rules regarding a specific
question is not necessarily a sign for a missing link or incompleteness.  Under
domestic German legal theory, a gap should only be assumed where
completeness was an express objective of a codification in the first place.655
Matters can be left unregulated deliberately though for the sake of specific
legal policies.  In dealing with international uniform law rules such as the
                                                 
651  See F. Ferrari: Das Verhältnis zwischen den Unidroit-Grundsätzen und den allgemeinen
Grundsätzen internationaler Einheitsprivatrechtskonventionen. Juristenzeitung 1 (1998): 9-17, p.10 and
11.
652 Eg Art 7 (2) CISG.
653 F. Ferrari: Das Verhältnis zwischen den Unidroit-Grundsätzen und den allgemeinen
Grundsätzen internationaler Einheitsprivatrechtskonventionen. Juristenzeitung 1 (1998): 9-17, at 11; K.
Larenz:   "Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft", 1991, p.381et seq.
654  For an account of the definition of gaps in domestic (German) law see K. Larenz:
"Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft", 1991, pp. 370 et seq. Larenz emphasises that the "silence" of
the law relating to a specific question is not necessarily a gap in terms of an incomplete regulation.
655  Compare K. Larenz:   "Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft", 1991, p.371.
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UPICC it will be important, therefore, to guard against an attitude which
considers the presence of "gaps" as deficiencies.  The treatment of Art
7.2.1.UPICC by Prof. Schwenzer, as discussed above in Part Two, is an
example for this regrettable but frequently taken attitude towards uniform law,
which results in an inappropriate application of the UPICC and other uniform
law instruments.
The importantance of highlighting this flaw in the treatment of uniform law
cannot be emphasised enough. Why should a legal phenomenon, which is
characteristic for the law in general and commonly dealt with in domestic
law,656 give rise to substantial criticism on the level of uniform codifications?
One reason might be that the objective of exhaustive regulation of a specific
matter (eg the whole of contract law), is not present in international
conventions or other uniform law.  This might be regarded as a deficiency
which seems to justify a lesser standard of methodology.  The filling of gaps is
therefore an important tool for the work with international uniform private law
rules, particularly due to the limited scope of most international instruments.
VII.3.3 Suggested Method for an integrating conflict of laws doctrine
Regardless of whether the technique to arrive at a complementary law, be it the
underlying general principles of law or the lex fori or the law applicable by
                                                 
656 Compare Münchner Kommentar, Einleitung, No.64 quoting Heck: "Gesetzesauslegung und
Interessenjurisprudenz", 1914: "dass ein sehr großer Teil, vielleicht weitaus der größte Teil der
zweifelhaften Rechtsfragen, auf dem Vorhandensein von Gesetzeslücken beruht.", the biggest part of
doubtful legal questions of law arises from the presence of gaps in the law. See also S. Shackleton: The
Applicable Law in International Arbitration Under the New English Arbitration Act 1996. Arbitration
International 13.4 (1997): 375-389 p.387: "In reality, however, all legal systems are incomplete..."
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virtue of conflict rules, the combination of the uniform law with the
complementary (municipal), law must be performed in a consistent way.  For
this technique a high standard should be applied based on thorough
international legal research and practice.
National legislators might aid this process by providing supporting conflict of
law rules.  Therefore, law reform might be required to update existing rules
relating to choice of law for international commercial contracts.  In the area of
judicial review transnational commercial law might be integrated into domestic
legal systems by decisions confirming its application and interpreting statutory
law accordingly.  Doctrine, specifically in Germany, can prepare the ground for
such case law.
The following specific issues are to be realised in order to achieve a method to
apply the UPICC appropriately:
1. The complementary application of municipal law as suggested here requires
the awareness that it is not intended to switch from the application of uniform
law to domestic law entirely.  The uniform law instrument still remains the law
governing the contract.  The assumption of a gap takes place on the level of
substantive law and therefore does not represent a conflict rule appointing
domestic law for the entire dispute.
2. The underlying theoretical foundations (the legal nature), of municipal law
must be made conscious.  Municipal law is for providing solutions for specific,
possibly partial aspects of a dispute, in addition to the solutions provided by the
uniform law.  Any assumption of a superior degree of legitimacy and
superseding force of law should be eliminated from methodology in those
instances.  Therefore, mandatory rules of the domestic law should only apply
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where the mandatory rules of the uniform law leave room for their application.
The scope of the uniform law should prevail.  Domestic law can take different
meanings and be subject to different interpretations in the light of the uniform
law.  There might be instances in which terminology has to be assigned a new
meaning different from the familiar one in the domestic context.
These two aspects are in fact very specialised postulations made from the point
of view of an international forum of legal research and practice.  In a purely
domestic context they require a very high degree of adaptation, acceptance and
education on all levels of legal research and practice.  It is an important task to
accomplish a higher standard of international legal practice, however, in the
interest of modern developments of internationalisation of trade both on a
small and large scale.657
VII.4.  Conclusion
This chapter has recapitulated different suggestions in legal theory of how to
reach a position where the UPICC are granted a source of law function.
Contributions by German scholars have been put forward (VII.1.), examples of
case law taken from arbitration (VII.2.), and traditional methods in
international private law which are established in respect of other uniform law
such as the CISG and other international conventions and model laws (VII.3.),
have been considered.  All of these, however, do not seem to provide a
                                                 
657
  Contrary to the view taken by P. Mankowski: “Rechtswahl für Verträge des internationalen
Wirtschaftsverkehrs.” RIW 1 (2003): pp.2-15, at p.13, 1st col there is no general disadvantage within the
transnational commercial law sphere for smaller enterprises. Taking part in cross border trade and
commerce is by no means an exclusive experience of "global players", "repeat players" or otherwise giant
businesses.The UPICC provide progress especially in the area where no trade associations and branch
specific agencies operate, thereby counteracting any potential discrimination arising from the dominating
position of these bodies.
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consistent solution to the question of UPICC as source of law, and none of
these theories are as yet accepted by traditional prevailing views in legal
science neither in England nor Germany, and not by the courts in respect of
UPICC.  They have also not as yet led to express provisions in legislation
relating to the choice of law neither in international arbitration nor in domestic
conflict law and the relevant procedural rules.
The aim of integrating uniform contract law into domestic law can, however,
be achieved even under the prevailing doctrine by applying certain standards to
its application.  These are set out in the concluding section VII.4. of this
chapter.  Common mistakes in the use of current domestic law must be made
obvious and eliminated, such as the misinterpretation of substantive rules of
uniform law as being conflict rules.  The preservation of the international
character of the uniform law has to be emphasised and the correct application
of such rules needs to be postulated.  In the course of this method, irrational
ideas about the general superior quality of domestic law in relation to
international uniform law have to be identified and dropped because they are
unfounded in the context of contract law.  This eventually allows for the
correct use of existing methods of applying uniform law such as the theory of
gaps and that of complementary law.  These already exist and are
acknowledged methods which can be used successfully if uncluttered by
prejudice and preconceived limitations.
Further support and justification for the advancement of the standing of
international uniform contract law can be derived from the efforts already
made in doctrine and case law, as set out in sections VII.1. and VII.2. above.
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Then uniform law can be successfully integrated into domestic law and rules




Methods of integration through commercial arbitration
The previous section, Chapter Seven has shown how uniform contract law can
have a source of law function in the general conflict of laws and thereby make
the law governing the contract to the exclusion of national contract laws.
Chapter Seven analysed the position under current doctrine of conflict law in
domestic legal systems and in arbitration and suggested ways to integrate the
findings into national laws in order to use the UPICC more easily and more
securely as the governing law of an international commercial contract.
This chapter finally looks at procedural aspects of the integration of
transnational uniform law.  It investigates the way in which decisions, which
have been reached by employing a-national rules of law such as the UPICC,
are dealt with in national legal systems.  Such decisions are frequently
arbitration awards.  The chapter therefore focuses on the question of whether
arbitration awards can be based on UPICC as the law governing the contract
(lex contractus  or kollisionsrechtlice Verweisung), and whether they can be
upheld and enforced under domestic laws, or whether they are likely to be
overturned by the national courts in England and Germany.
The current state of the scholarly discussion on this issue is discussed in this
chapter as well as a suggested approach for facilitating the use and successful
application of uniform contract law in the context of both contract and
procedural laws of modern nation states, particularly arbitration law.
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The chapter also asks if practitioners and merchants are likely to actually
include a-national law into their contract rather than domestic law, this time
from an empirical and forensic viewpoint.658
Due to the significance of doctrine within the German legal system, legal
science has to prepare the ground for future court decisions in this area.659
Analytical considerations are therefore central regarding German law.  English
law is subject to different formative aspects.  The Courts play the leading role,
and are much less influenced by doctrine and analytical writing.  A different
pattern therefore applies to the treatment of a-national law in commercial
arbitration.
The first section of the chapter (VIII.1.), therefore sets out the current English
and German law regulating choice of law in arbitration proceedings.  It
particularly addresses doctrinal questions of recently reformed law in Germany
and compares other national, specifically English, legislation on the subject to
prepare further discussion.  The second section (VIII.2.), asks if and how
arbitration awards can be overturned under national laws on the grounds that
they are based on a-national contract law such as the UPICC and what the
prospects of development in this area are.
The third section (VIII.3.), asks what the desirable standard of arbitration law
ought to be and what could be done to overcome existing difficulties and
obstacles to employ the UPICC more securely and easily in international
arbitration or even state litigation and certainly other alternative dispute
resolution.  The concluding section (VIII.4.), refers especially to the German
                                                 
658
  Compare Chapter Two.
659
  See for an example of recourse to legal science in decisions of the Federal Court BGH in NJW
1986, p.1436 and p. 1437, jurisdiction on the law of arbitration proceedings.
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national legal system because of the significance of doctrine there, as
mentioned above.
VIII.1. Choice of law in commercial arbitration
This first section of Chapter Eight asks what the current English and German
national law on arbitration (VIII.1.1. and VIII.1.5.), stipulates with regard to
choice of law questions.  It investigates the current opinion of legislators
(VIII.1.1.and VIII.1.4.), courts (VIII.3.),  and scholars (VIII.2.), expressed in
the written law, as well as in doctrine and case law, about choice of law in
arbitration under the heading of enforcing and upholding awards in nation
states.  This review includes some comparative analysis looking at other
European jurisdictions (VIII.1.5.).
VIII.1.1. Current German law of arbitration
The new German law regulating arbitration procedures and the enforcement of
awards is regulated in the Code of Civil Procedure, the ZPO, in §§ 1025-1066
(10th book), reformed as of 22 Dec 1997 and in force since 1 Jan 1998.660
There is no case law applying the new provisions in the area of recourse
against arbitration awards regarding questions of law as yet.  A number of
documents, however, contribute to the shaping of an understanding of the new
                                                 
660
  For a text of just the 10th book See H.W. Labes, and T. Lörcher, eds.  "Nationales
und Internationales Schiedsverfahrensrecht", 1998, pp. 53-70. For a full text of the ZPO and
other procedural law see H. Thomas, and H. Putzo:   "Zivilprozeßordnung", 2003.
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legislation: The report of the reform commission,661 and the official reasons
published by the government (ministry of justice),662  as well as some recently
published comments by academic teachers.
The new law does not import the formulation of Art. 28 (2) of the UNCITRAL
Model Law on arbitration into the new legislation but incorporates a different
wording into §1051 (2) ZPO:
 "Haben die Parteien die anzuwendenden Rechtsvorschriften nicht bestimmt, so
hat das Schiedsgericht das Recht des Staates anzuwenden, mit dem der
Gegenstand des Verfahrens die engsten Verbindungen aufweist." (If the parties
have not chosen the applicable rules of law the arbitration tribunal has to apply
the law of the country with which the subject matter of the procedure has its
closest connections.)(§1051 (2) ZPO)
This rule is mandatory; the tribunal has to apply the law of a state absent
choice of law.  There is no room for any ex officio considerations by the
arbitrator as to the application of a-national law, the lex mercatoria or similar
unless chosen by the parties.  Even though the expression  "Rechtsvorschriften"
(rules of law), in § 1051 (1) ZPO can be construed to include a-national
rules,663  it seems that in the absence of a choice of law clause the options of
the applicable law are thereby narrowed so that only the law of a state can
apply.
                                                 
661
    "Kommission zur Neuordnung des Schiedsverfahrensrechts: Bericht mit einem
Diskussionsentwurf zur Neufassung des Zehnten Buchs der ZPO", 1994.
662
  “Bundestags- Drucksache (BT-Drucks.) 13/5374:”  published by Deutscher
Bundestag, available via internet.
663  Although possibly not as governing law but merely as contractual terms, see below.
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VIII.1.2. Doctrinal requirements disregarded by legislator
It is unclear why the legislator left §1051 (2) ZPO without the further
provisions and guidelines following the otherwise identical Art 28 (1), first
sentence EGBGB.  This seems inconsequential given that the legislator
intended to both integrate the UNCITRAL Model Law as well as comply with
Art. 3 and 4 of the RC.664  This wording poses interpretation problems.  From
the official records accompanying the draft ZPO,665 no clear answer can be
derived.666  It remains open as to why the further provisions of both the
EGBGB and the Rome Convention were not included into the new paragraph,
and to what exactly the intention of the legislator was regarding the treatment
of choice of law matters.  The legislator seems to have suggested that a choice
of a-national law is possible under Art. 28 EGBGB,667 but leaves the important
question of status668 un-discussed.  The official reasons also state that the
solution incorporated into the new draft §1051 (2) ZPO corresponds and
harmonises with Art. 27 (1) first sentence EGBGB.669  This is clearly not the
case according to the prevailing view in German legal science and case law.
Especially in conjunction with the limits of choice of law contained in Art. 27
(3), Art. 29 and 30 EGBGB additional explanation on the part of the legislator
                                                 
664
  Compare BT-Drucksache 13/5274.
665
  BT-Drucksache 13/5274 contains the reasons of the government published with the draft, and
the report of the law reform commission contains their recommendations, see "Kommission zur
Neuordnung des Schiedsverfahrensrechts: Bericht mit einem Diskussionsentwurf zur Neufassung des
Zehnten Buchs der ZPO",1994.
 The draft provisions were later enacted without any further changes to their wording.
666
  For a full discussion of the wording of §1051 ZPO-E and a detailed analysis of its relationship
to the EGBGB, the Rome Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law see D. Solomon: “Das vom
Schiedsgericht in der Sache anzuwendende Recht nach dem Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Neuregelung des
Schiedsverfahrensrechts.” RIW 12 (1997): 981-990.
667
  “Bundestags- Drucksache (BT-Drucks.) 13/5374.” : published by Deutscher Bundestag, at p.52.
668
  Contractual term or governing law.
669
  “Bundestags- Drucksache (BT-Drucks.) 13/5374.” : published by Deutscher Bundestag, at p.52.
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would clearly have been advisable.670  The official reasons thus create more
confusion than clarification.  There is no answer to the question as to whether
or not any limits to the choice of law were intended to apply by recourse to the
general conflict rules of German law and to what extent.  The reasons merely
present the vague explanation that it was self-evident that "unlimited choice of
law" was certainly not admissible.671  This does not only avoid the question of
the limits but also clearly differs from the common understanding of the
UNCITRAL Model Law provision of its Art. 28.672
Most possibly the legal background of the matter to be regulated and the
impact of their reform on it was not familiar to the legislator in its depth or at
least to the legal team who drafted the official reasons.
A lack of understanding of the role of the conflict law in arbitration as
compared to general contract conflict law also shows in the official reasons
relating to the scope of the new §1051 (2) ZPO.  Subject matter of choice of
law in arbitration disputes can actually be not only contracts but also certain
related and preceding questions of family matters, inheritance, movables or,
indeed, questions of tort and restitution where a choice of law is generally
                                                 
670
  Especially since there had already been case law relating to arbitration clauses in
consumer contracts. See OLG Düsseldorf, RIW 1994, 420; OLG Düsseldorf RIW 1996,
681,683, BGH in NJW 1987, 3193,3195.
671
 "Unlimited choice of law" is a favourite enemy of traditional legal science: "Ein von
den Parteien ad libitum aus den verschiedensten Rechtsordnungen zusammengestelltes
Schuldstatut, so eine Art rechtlichen Potpourris oder Mosaiks, ist nicht zu dulden." (A
governing law compiled ad libitum by the parties like a potpourri or mosaic is not to be
tolerated.") , Raape: "Internationales Privatrecht", 5th ed., 1961, at p.472; Another opinion sees
signs of immaturity in potential users of unlimited choice of law: "Die Lehre von der
Teilrechtswahl bedeutet nicht, daß sich die Parteien Gesetze wie Kinder die Rosinen aus dem
Teig herauspicken dürfen." (The doctrine of a cumulative choice of law does not mean that the
parties are allowed to pick the raisins from the dough like children do.), C.v. Bar:
"Internationales Privatrecht: Besondere Lehren"Vol. 2 of 2 vols, No.426.
672
 It also differs from the view taken by the reform commission who delivered
preparatory work preceding the draft ZPO: "Kommission zur Neuordnung des
Schiedsverfahrensrechts: Bericht mit einem Diskussionsentwurf zur Neufassung des Zehnten
Buchs der ZPO",1994, at p. 167.
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accepted.673  These questions are not per se and entirely excluded from
arbitration.  It is therefore doubtful whether the unqualified reference to Art. 28
EGBGB, which regulates contract conflicts of laws, is appropriate and
sufficient to regulate the entire conflict of laws in arbitration.
The reference to the practice of Swiss law made by the government in the
official reasons is misleading; under Swiss law the rules relating to conflict of
laws in arbitration are regarded as lex specialis and apply exclusively and
superseding the general provisions of the IPRG on conflict of laws in
contracts.674  The wording of these applicable rules is identical to the new
§1051 (2) ZPO, but is consciously and deliberately not qualified by the further
provisions of Art.117 IPRG, which contains similar guidelines to Art.
28EGBGB. The reference to Swiss law therefore results into a self-
contradiction in respect of the aforementioned opinion expressed by the
legislator that Art. 28 EGBGB applies self-evidently to arbitration.
The picture of the legislator's attitude gets more and more blurred.  Art. 28
EGBGB might apply by way of the law of the forum if one were to assume that
the arbitration tribunal is subject to the lex fori and its conflict law.  In this case
§1051 (2) ZPO would have to be construed as of a purely declaratory nature so
that a reference to Art. 28 (2)-(5) EGBGB would indeed be "self-evident".
The reform commission at least supported the view that arbitration tribunals
are not bound by the law of the forum simply via a reference to the seat of the
                                                 
673
  See J. Kropholler:   "Internationales Privatrecht", 2001; compare for torts
Palandt/Heldrich:   "Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch", 1998, Art. 38 EGBGB, No,13 .
674
  Compare 187 (1) IPRG and see below. Compare also D. Solomon: “Das vom
Schiedsgericht in der Sache anzuwendende Recht nach dem Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur
Neuregelung des Schiedsverfahrensrechts.” RIW 12 (1997): 981-990, p.985 1st col. and further
references.
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arbitration.675   The choice of the seat of the arbitration is not to be construed
as a hypothetic choice of the lex fori by the parties.  Arbitration tribunals
cannot be said to have a forum in the same way as state courts because they are
not acting within their capacity as organs of the judicative power, and as
regards Germany, are not subject to Art. 20 (3) GG.  The parties cannot be
deemed to regularly mean to choose the law at the seat of the arbitration since
often this seat has been chosen for reasons of neutrality and convenience rather
than for reasons of the applicable law.  Arbitration tribunals do not derive their
authority from the state legislator but from the parties.  Therefore their
intentions regarding choice of law, is to be established by reference to the
individual case and not to general state legislation at the seat of the arbitration
tribunal.
It is therefore the arbitrator's primary duty to establish the choice of law
according to the parties' intentions, not necessarily referring to national conflict
rules.  The arbitrator de facto enjoys wide discretion due to the common
(international), practice not to subject arbitration awards to the so-called
revision au fond , i.e. full judicial review as to questions of law.
The decision of the arbitrator to apply a particular law is subject to judicial
review exclusively under aspects of enforceability of the award and recourse
against it.  Even then, however, the decision of the arbitrator will be largely
upheld unless it contravenes the ordre public or exceeds the authority
conferred by the parties.  The fact that the "wrong" law was applied according
                                                 
675
  Compare D. Solomon: “Das vom Schiedsgericht in der Sache anzuwendende Recht
nach dem Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Neuregelung des Schiedsverfahrensrechts.” RIW 12
(1997): 981-990, at p.986. This is in line with the traditional practice and case law.
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to conflict rules of the enforcing state does not give rise to a ground for setting
aside under any of those two headings, though.676
VIII.1.3. Case law
The decision which is frequently cited in this (and other), contexts is BGHZ
96, 40 et seq of 26th Sept. 1985, also published in NJW 1986, p.1436 et seq.
This is one of the very few judgments rendered by German courts that
concerned recourse against arbitration awards.  This decision does not
expressly decide whether the application of the "wrong" law would give rise to
setting aside of the award.  The decision concerned the question whether or not
the arbitration tribunal had applied law or equity.677  The court did not review
the decision of the tribunal to apply English law but simply accepted it:
"Ob die übereinstimmenden Meinungsäußerungen der Parteien das
Schiedsgericht verpflichteten, englisches Recht anzuwenden, kann letztlich
dahinstehen. Denn das Schiedsgericht hat seiner Entscheidung englisches
Recht zugrundegelegt." 678 (Whether or not the unanimous opinions expressed
by the parties679  obliged the tribunal to apply English law can remain
undecided.  Because the tribunal did in fact apply English law.)
                                                 
676
  § 1059 ZPO, see BGHZ 96,40 = NJW 1986, 1436, see D. Solomon: “Das vom Schiedsgericht
in der Sache anzuwendende Recht nach dem Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Neuregelung des
Schiedsverfahrensrechts.” RIW 12 (1997): 981-990, at p.987 1st col.
677
  This was answered in the affirmative, see NJW 1986, at p.1437 and see below.
678
  BGH in NJW 1986, at p.1437.
679
  Responding to an ICC questionnaire which was asking to submit legal opinions as to the
applicable law at least for the recourse procedures.
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Obviously the question whether English law was the "right" (correct), law was
not disputed and did not need a definitive answer.  The idea of a "correct law"
does, however, appear in the decision in the following way:
"...; denn unrichtige Anwendung des (richtigen) materiellen Rechts ist kein
Grund für die Aufhebung eines Schiedsspruchs." 680  (...; because the wrong
application of the (correct) substantive law does not provide any reason for the
setting aside of an arbitration award.)
The correctness of the law applied to the substance of the dispute depends on
the intentions of the parties.  It is to be established by giving effect to party
autonomy which authorises the decision of the arbitrator.  The law at the seat
of the tribunal is not the prime reference to decide this question.
The Federal Court does not express a view on the question as to the correct law
and how it is to be established in the above quoted decision, but gives
guidelines as to an aspect connected with it:
The facts that the parties had (implicitly in the course of the arbitration
proceedings and in accordance with the Rules of Arbitration of the ICC681),
chosen German procedural law as well as that the seat of the arbitration
(obviously), was in Germany 682  did not lead the Court to infer that German
substantive or conflict law had been chosen as governing law by the parties or
was to be applied ex officio by the tribunal.  This view was also not influenced
by the fact that because of this choice of procedural rules the award was
considered a domestic award and accepted for the recourse procedures of the
                                                 
680
 BGH in NJW 1986,  p.1437.
681
  BGH in NJW 1986, p.1436.
682
  Compare BGH in NJW 1986, p.1437.
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then §1041 ZPO (Aufhebungsklage).  At the time of the decision §1051 ZPO
did not exist, and the previously governing ZPO did not contain a comparable
provision.  Since it has to be assumed that the decision of the Federal Court of
26th Sept. 1985 either created or reflected the applicable German law at that
time,683 the official reasons accompanying the draft §1051 ZPO should have
stated whether or not it was intended to alter the existing lex lata by the new
provisions.
Again, the full significance of the wording of §1051 (2) ZPO was most
probably not recognised by the drafters.
VIII.1.4. Status quo regarding the application of the UPICC in arbitration
proceedings under German law
This legal situation does not provide legal certainty for arbitral tribunals and
parties to an international contract to decide on the applicable law other than
municipal law.   As a result the ZPO does not encourage the application of a-
national law absent choice of law in arbitration proceedings.
A specific uncertainty is created by the following view which most of the
traditional writers take towards the application of a-national law rules; absent
choice of law such a choice by an arbitrator subjects the award to the heading
of ex aequo et bono decision under §1051 (3) ZPO unless rules like the UPICC
were to be qualified as "trade usages".
                                                 
683
  See also D. Solomon: “Das vom Schiedsgericht in der Sache anzuwendende Recht
nach dem Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Neuregelung des Schiedsverfahrensrechts.” RIW 12
(1997): 981-990, at p.988 1st col. for further reference.
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Trade usages are regularly to be observed, as are contract terms under sec. 4 of
§1051, which is in line with Art. 28 (4) of the UNCITRAL Model Law and
Art. 17(2) of the ICC rules.  As far as the UPICC are not regarded as "law" or
"trade usages", however, they could be deemed to have been unduly applied
without the express authorisation by the parties to rule ex aequo et bono.684
Arbitration awards based on the UPICC or other a-national terms of reference
would then be open to setting aside under §1059 (2) d) ZPO on the ground of
tribunal exceeding the contractual or arbitral agreement as to the applicable
law.
This is a detrimental outcome for the cause of the integration of the UPICC
into domestic legal doctrine and practice under German lex lata.
VIII.1.5. Comparing other national legislation relating to choice of law in
commercial arbitration
Other national laws as well as international institutional arbitration rules accept
a wider discretion of arbitral tribunals as to the applicable law.
French law provides for the famous "amiable compositeur" role of the
arbitrator in the very scarce provision of Art. 1474 of the new Code of Civil
Procedure (Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile, NCPC), in force as of 12 May
1981.  It provides for the arbitrator to decide "according to the rules of law
unless the parties have vested in him the office to rule as amiab le
compositeur".  This wording obviously leaves room for discussion as to
                                                 
684
  See below for further discussion.
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whether the rules of law referred to are necessarily state law or might imply a-
national law.  It is important to note, that under French procedural law the
judge in the case of an appeal or application for setting aside against the award,
decides "within the limits of the arbitrator" (Art. 1485 NCPC), and especially
decides as amiable compositeur  if this "office" was conferred to the arbitrator
by the parties (Art. 1483, second phrase).  This means that the French state
recognises cases in which the state judge is not exclusively guided by formal
state legislation, but additionally by certain other rules of law which are
recognised by the litigating parties by way of preceding agreements.  Appeal
procedures and remedies against arbitral awards involving amiables
compositeurs can only take place if the parties have agreed to it in their
arbitration agreement, Art. 1482 NCPC.  State courts are thereby voluntarily
included into the private dispute settlement allowing for a great deal of
freedom as to the applicable law governing the substance of the dispute and
thereby strengthening party autonomy.
The UNCITRAL Model Law, adopted by UNCITRAL as of 21 June 1985,
provides for the application of those "rules of law" which have been agreed
upon by the parties, Art. 28 (1), first sentence.  In the event that no choice has
been made, the arbitrator is free to decide on the conflict law which takes him
to decide on the governing law, Art. 28 (2).   The same is provided by Art. 16
of the "Vienna [Arbitration] Rules" of the Austrian Chamber of Commerce.
The ICC arbitration rules in force from 1 Jan 1998, even provide for a
completely free choice of law by the arbitrator without arriving at the
substantive law via conflict rules.  The governing law can be applied directly
(voie directe), Art.17 (2) ICC rules.
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The Swiss Chamber of Commerce rules for international arbitration, of 1 Jan
1989,685 incorporate a similar provision as the German civil code.  Art. 4
points to the Swiss conflict of law rules of the IPRG.686  The IPRG provides in
Art.187 (1) that the law applicable to the substance of the dispute is "the law
with which the matter is most closely connected".  The choice of this wording
("law") again suggests that exclusively state law is meant to apply.687  The
scope of this wording in relation to the conflict rules applying to contract law
has already been explained above and so has the relationship of this provision
with the identically worded German provision in §1051 (2) ZPO.688
The English Arbitration Act 1996,689 in force since 31 Jan 1997, expressly
allows for disputes to be resolved under "provisions other than law";690
section 46 (1) (b) provides: "The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute...if
the parties so agree, in accordance with such other considerations as are agreed
by them  determined by the tribunal."
Further to this, section 46 (3) gives the arbitrators absent choice of law a
discretion as to the applicable conflict rules.  There is thus no general and
express authorisation under English Law to apply a-national law directly to the
substance of a dispute (voie directe) in the absence of an express choice of such
rules by the parties.
                                                 
685
 German text printed in H.W. Labes, and T. Lörcher, eds.  "Nationales und Internationales
Schiedsverfahrensrecht", 1998, pp. 308 to 322.
686
  Bundesgesetz über das Internationale Privatrecht , IPRG, of 1 Jan 1989 for original text see
Journal des Tribunaux 1989 I, pp.98 and 544; or Receuil des arrets du Tribunal fédéral 115 [1989] II p.97.
687
  Contrary to the view of S. Shackleton: “The Applicable Law in International Arbitration Under
the New English Arbitration Act 1996.” Arbitration International 13.4 (1997): 375-389, at p.382 who lists
Switzerland together with a number of countries who have adopted more liberal arbitration laws as to the
applicable law the Swiss code restricts the choice of law depicting the provision of Art 4 (1) first sentence
of the 1980 Rome Convention.
688
  Compare VIII.1.2.
689
  The magnificent elephant, see V.V. Veeder: “La nouvelle loi anglaise sur l' arbitrage 1996: la
naissance d'un magnifique éléphant.” Revue de l'Arbitrage 1 (1997): p.24.
690
  Schedule 2 (4) of Arbitration Act 1996 (Commencement No.1) Order 1996.
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It is disputed by commentators whether this provision promotes the evolution
of a modern arbitration law.691  The formulation ..."the conflict of law rules
which it considers applicable", in sec.46 (3), as opposed to "considers
appropriate",692 thereby suggesting that the establishment of the applicable
conflict rules ought to follow recognised methods.  Sec. 46 (3) of the English
Arbitration Act 1996 does not prescribe any further details as to the applicable
conflict rules, though.  It is not clear from the case law and the comments to
date to what extent this provision is meant to subject the arbitrator to the
conflict of laws of the lex fori and/or just to the same "regime" as a state judge
would be in his place693 and thereby aims to guarantee the equivalent outcome.
If either of these options were the objective of Parliament it would indeed be, if
anything, a more elegant solution than the one pursued in the recently reformed
continental statutes, where a mere copy of the provisions relating to contract
conflicts was imported into arbitration legislation regardless of the different
spheres of application. 694
Section VIII.1. has thus identified the status quo of the current law of
arbitration with regard to choice of law and the main areas of difficulties within
this legislation.  The current, even recently reformed German law shows severe
                                                 
691
  If modern can be understood as internationalisation and harmonisation of English
arbitration law and its "universal adaptability across legal cultures": compare S. Shackleton:
“The Applicable Law in International Arbitration Under the New English Arbitration Act
1996.” Arbitration International 13.4 (1997): 375-389, at. p.387 as opposed to fit to supersede
and make obsolete any alleged lex mercatoria, compare Lord Mustill in Mustill & Boyd: "The
Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in England", 1989, at p.81.
692
  Compare S. Shackleton: “The Applicable Law in International Arbitration Under the
New English Arbitration Act 1996.” Arbitration International 13.4 (1997): 375-389, at p.389.
693
  S. Shackleton: “The Applicable Law in International Arbitration Under the New
English Arbitration Act 1996.” Arbitration International 13.4 (1997): 375-389, at p.377. cf also
this quote from the   “Report on the Arbitration Bill.” : Departmental Advisory Committee on
Arbitration Law, 1996, at p.49:
"In such circumstances the tribunal must decide what conflict rules are applicable and use
those rules in order to determine the applicable law . It cannot simply make up rules for this
purpose."
694
  See above.
318
deficiencies on the doctrinal side, whereas the English arbitration law, although
leaving room for interpretation, seems to rely on traditional views on choice of
law whereby state law, determined under general choice of law rules, is the
first point of reference absent choice of law.  Other national laws leave more
room for a wider interpretation and use of a-national contract law to govern
international contracts, but these are wrongly referred to in German law as
models and points of reference for the current national legislation.
Section VIII.1. thus reviewed the status quo of the current law of arbitration
with regard to choice of law and identified the main areas of difficulties within
this legislation, if the use of uniform contract law is intended.  The current,
even recently reformed, German law shows severe doctrinal deficiencies,
whereas the English arbitration law, although leaving room for interpretation,
seems to rely on traditional views on choice of law whereby state law,
determined under general choice of law rules, is the first point of reference
absent choice of law.  Other national laws leave more room for a wider
interpretation and use of a-national contract law to govern international
contracts, namely the French, but these are wrongly referred to in German law
as models and points of reference for the current national legislation.
VIII.2. Challenging Awards based on a-national law under domestic
arbitration law
The previous section has given account of the current status quo of express
choice of law provisions in national arbitration laws and their position in legal
doctrine.  This section asks more specifically what the current law allows state
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courts to do with arbitration awards which have been reached relying on a-
national uniform contract law (VIII.2.1.).  It investigates specific instances in
case law where arbitration awards have been challenged or constellations
where they might be challenged under domestic English (VIII.2.2.), and
German (VIII.2.3.), law with specific regard to instances of employing the
UPICC as governing law.
Enforcement, appeal and recourse procedures under national laws are the
second column on which the arbitration award, and with it the underlying
(legal), reasoning, rests.  Only if the chances of an award employing a-national
law to pass the test of transformation into domestic laws are reasonable, can
arbitrators refer to those a-national rules of law confidently and legitimately.
VIII.2.1. Scope of judicial supervision in selected arbitration laws
In a number of legal systems the only criterion giving rise to judicial review on
questions of law is whether or not the arbitrator or arbitration tribunal have
exceeded the competence conferred to them by the parties.  This principle is
incorporated in Art. 34 (2) iii) of the UNCITRAL Model Law which many
countries worldwide have been striving to incorporate into their domestic
arbitration law within the last 18 years since it was adopted by UNCITRAL in
1985.  It now appears in the English (Section 68 (2) (b) and (e) Arbitration Act
1996), French (Art. 1484 No.3 NCPC), and German (§1059 (2) d) ZPO), law
relating to arbitration.  The Swiss IPRG, however, only provides for an appeal
against the award on the grounds of violation of the ordre public, Art.190 (e)
IPRG and not in case the arbitrators exceeded competences such as deciding ex
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aequo et bono absent an express authorisation under Art.187 (2) IPRG.
Questions arising out of the application of substantive law in arbitration
procedures are thus not subject to judicial review at all according to the black
letter rules of Swiss procedural law.695
VIII.2.2. Judicial review of arbitration awards based on a-national law
rules under current English law
This situation is probably most distant from English law as contained in
sections 66 to 71 of the Arbitration Act 1996.  The above mentioned excess of
powers as incorporated in sec. 68 (2)(b) and (e), are one of a wide range of
grounds to challenge arbitration awards and appeal against them.  Other than in
Germany, Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands and a number of other civil
law countries (not France, Belgium and Luxemburg), besides challenging the
award on the grounds of substantive jurisdiction and serious irregularity,
"appeal on point of law", i.e. a review on the merits of the ward, is still an
option under English law after the enactment of the Arbitration Act 1996.
From the literal wording of the rules in section 69 (2) (c) (i) and (ii) and (2) (d)
it does not follow that awards based on a-national law such as the UPICC will
be considered unlawful without more.  A decision by an arbitral tribunal
employing the UPICC need not necessarily be "obviously wrong" (section 69
(2) (c) (i)), "open to serious doubt", or raise concerns of "general public
importance" (section 69 (2) (c) (ii)).  It will therefore depend on additional
                                                 
695
  Unless, of course, one were to assume that deciding ex aequo et bono without
express authorisation generally violates the ordre public.
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factors, such as existing authority and some views in legal literature how this
question has to be answered.
VIII.2.2.1.  Significance of judicial review for the development of English
commercial law
The use of a-national law in arbitration awards might turn into an opportunity
for state courts to apply and revise decisions based on the UPICC and thereby
render legally binding opinions as to the legal nature of these provisions and
the methods of application.  This would probably eventually meet the
objectives of the political and official organs judging by some words taken
from the "Donaldson Report":696  Judicial review of arbitral awards is an
"opportunity which it has afforded to the Courts of developing English
commercial law in line with the changing needs of the times." 697
Even though the "continued production of English law" 698 is rather an ironic
remark by critics of the traditionally overly strong tendency of English courts
                                                 
696
 The 1978 Commercial Court Committee Report on Arbitration, named after its Chairman, Mr
Justice Donaldson.
697
  Ibid. , para. 15; quoted after S. Shackleton: “The Applicable Law in International Arbitration
Under the New English Arbitration Act 1996.” Arbitration International 13.4 (1997): 375-389, p.388.
698
  S. Shackleton: “The Applicable Law in International Arbitration Under the New
English Arbitration Act 1996.” Arbitration International 13.4 (1997): 375-389, at 388, note 60,
thereby unwittingly picking up the idea put forward by P. Mankowski: “Rechtswahl für
Verträge des internationalen Wirtschaftsverkehrs.” RIW 1 (2003): pp.2-15, at p.6, 2nd col. who
sees a "public asset" in the creation of a body of case law within common law jurisdictions and
attributes an economic value to it! but with a different value judgment attached to it.
This was also seen by Lord Diplock: "...the abolition of the [case stated] procedure in
England would 'cripple the continued development of commercial law that has made it the
favoured choice as proper law of international contracts even where they have no territorial
connection with this country' " (A. Samuel: “The 1979 Arbitration Act - Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards on the Merits in England.” Journal of International Arbitration 2.4 (1985),
pp.53 and 56 quoted after O. Chukwumerije: “Judicial Supervision of Commercial Arbitration:
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to readily review arbitration awards and interfere with arbitration procedures,
this mechanism could still lead, on a positive note, to the eventual (and
evolutionary), acceptance of a-national law in domestic legal systems.  Such a
process would also be evidence of the much appraised capability of the
common law practice to adapt to changing standards of the times, while
preserving traditional and proven values, as the above cited quote does not
forget to emphasise.
VIII.2.2.2.  Traditional position in English law set forth in the Arbitration
Act 1996?
The tradition of extensive judicial review and intervention in relation to
arbitration proceedings has most prominently manifested in Charnikow v. Roth
Schmidt & Co..699  It is only necessary to note that central statements on the
acceptance or rejection of "a-national" rules of law are expected to arise from
decisions in the area of arbitration law, whereas in German law such
evaluations are almost entirely developed by legal science.700  In the
Charnikow decision Lord Justice Bankes expressed the view that there can be
no law created by commercial entities like trade associations (in that case the
Refined Sugar Association), or commercial arbitral tribunals:
                                                                                                                                 
The English Arbitration Act of 1996.” Arbitration International 15.2 (1999): 171-191, p.187) ;
see also below.
699
   [1922] 2 KB 478 .
700
  See below.
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"...and to secure that the law that is administered by an arbitrator is in
substance the law of the land and not some home-made law of the particular
arbitrator or the particular association." 701
His view was supported by LJ Atkin:
"If it [i.e. special statutory jurisdiction of the court] did not exist, arbitration
clauses...would leave lay arbitrators at liberty to adopt any principles of law
they pleased...the result might be that in time codes of law would come to be
administered in various trades differing substantially from the English
mercantile law." 702
The objective behind this reasoning was;  "to prevent and redress any injustice
on the part of the arbitrator",703 and thereby indeed contributing to maintaining
a high standard of the established and generally welcomed arbitration
proceedings in England:
"Among commercial men what are commonly called commercial arbitrations
are undoubtedly and deservedly popular.  That they will continue their present
popularity I entertain no doubt, as long as the law retains sufficient hold over
them ..."704
Since so-called ex aequo et bono decisions by arbitrators as incorporated in
French law in the form of the "office" of amiable compositeur has been
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  LJ Bankes in Charnikow v. Roth Schmidt & Co.  [1922] 2 KB 478 , p.484.
702
  Ibid., p.488.
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unknown, however, to English law, the decision in the Charnikow confirms
this position:
"To release real and effective control over commercial arbitrations is to allow
the arbitrators...to give...them a free hand to decide according to law or not to
law as he or they think fit, in other words to be outside the law...At present no
individual or association is, so far as I am aware, outside the law except a trade
union."705
This decision is usually said to enshrine the traditional attitude of English
law706 towards arbitration, and this attitude is sometimes characterised as
"hostile to legal pluralism",707  "historically suspicious of the arbitral
process"708 and as adhering to a "unitary conception",709 and a "statist
character".710
It is hence seen to be the basis of a presently existing rejection of the
application of "autonomous" transnational rules from the point of view of
English law, which has remained the position throughout the development of
arbitration law even under the new Arbitration Act 1996.
                                                 
705
  LJ Bankes, ibid., p.484.
706
  Even officially incorporated into the 1978 Commercial Court Committee Report on Arbitration,
compare S. Shackleton: “The Applicable Law in International Arbitration Under the New English
Arbitration Act 1996.” Arbitration International 13.4 (1997): 375-389, p.379, note 13.
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 S. Shackleton: “The Applicable Law in International Arbitration Under the New English
Arbitration Act 1996.” Arbitration International 13.4 (1997): 375-389, p.379.
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  O. Chukwumerije: “Judicial Supervision of Commercial Arbitration: The English Arbitration
Act of 1996.” Arbitration International 15.2 (1999): 171-191, p.171.
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 S. Shackleton: “The Applicable Law in International Arbitration Under the New English
Arbitration Act 1996.” Arbitration International 13.4 (1997): 375-389, p.379.
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  Ibid. p.385.
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"Having excluded reference by arbitrators to principles of lex mercatoria, ...the
1996 Act retains limited authority for English courts to decide questions of
English law that have been decided by an arbitral tribunal where the court is
satisfied that the question is one of 'general public importance'. This provision
can only be understood from the perspective of the logic operating in
Czarnikow: the state reasserts its role as the sole legitimate normative authority
for English law." 711
The critical views of the author of this statement can well serve as a starting
point for a discussion of the position of transnational law under the current
English law and court practice.
VIII.2.2.3.  Legal situation under the Arbitration Act 1996
The stipulation of transnational rules as the law governing the contract is either
clearly rejected by some influential legal writers,712 or not supported in that an
in-depth discussion and clear distinction of the relevant problems is avoided.
The latter attitude is to be found in the DAC Report;713 along with some other
commentators, it does not distinguish the "other considerations" of Sec 46 (1)
(b) from ex aequo et bono decisions and thereby assumes that ruling according
to lex mercatoria or a-national law is the same as a procedure employing the
                                                 
711
  Compare S. Shackleton: “The Applicable Law in International Arbitration Under the
New English Arbitration Act 1996.” Arbitration International 13.4 (1997): 375-389.
712
  Eg by Lord Mustill and the editors of Dicey & Morris as quoted below in this
section.
713
  Departmental Advisory Commitee (DAC),Chairman Lord Justice Saville:   "Report
on the Arbitration Bill", February 1996, published in abidged version as “Supplementary
Report on the Arbitration Act.”, Arbitration International 13.3 (1997): 317-330.
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amiable compositeur.  Just as in the German official report714 one gains the
impression that the subtleties of the subject matter are not in the awareness of
the departments' legal team.  Another such instance of insufficient
consideration is the article by Chukumerije:
"In this regard it is notable that the Act now clearly permits arbitrating parties
to choose the lex mercatoria as their governing law or to invest their tribunal
with the power to act as amiable compositeur." 715
The former of these alternatives is by no means undisputed and therefore needs
further explanation.  The question whether the application of a-national rules of
law, such as the UPICC, will be considered governing law or implied terms is
decisive for their integration into domestic commercial law.  The position
under English law seems clearly rejective:
"In England, an express choice by the parties of lex mercatoria will be given
effect, but will not be viewed under the new Arbitration Act as choice of an
applicable law and it would appear that any implied choice by the parties of lex
mercatoria as the applicable law, either alone or in addition to a designated
municipal law, cannot be given effect." 716
This position has been adopted by influential commentators even before the
enactment of the 1996 Arbitration Act:
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  See VIII.1.2. above.
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  O. Chukwumerije: “Judicial Supervision of Commercial Arbitration: The English
Arbitration Act of 1996.” Arbitration International 15.2 (1999): 171-191, p.189.
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"If the transaction is governed by an international agreement or a standard form
of rules which require the arbitrator to choose the 'law' which he deems
applicable to the substance of the dispute, is he thereby enabled to apply the lex
mercatoria or general principles of law?...I suggest that the answer must surely
be no." 717
Dicey & Morris also confirm this position for the application of a-national law
absent choice of law:
"...there is no scope for the arbitrators to apply (in the absence of the agreement
of the parties) the lex mercatoria or general principles of law".718
This is a clear vote.  Its quotation by S. Shackleton,719 in the specific context
of his article again shows, however, that there is only little appreciation of the
distinctive potential instances of application of a-national law rules, perhaps
according to their nature, certainly according to conflict of law rules and under
judicial review considerations, and subsequently a different life of such rules
within domestic law in these different instances.  The distinction between
values of trade usages, ex aequo et bono decisions, lex mercatoria, general
principles of law and other a-national law, is therefore essential, especially
since the Arbitration Act 1996 aimed to integrate some features of international
arbitration practice that had been alien to English law before, and have
therefore not been categorised on this level.  Measuring the English Arbitration
Act according to its "internationalisation", however, does require a
differentiation as to the notions imported from the international (i.e. foreign),
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  Lord Mustill in Mustill and Boyd:   "The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in
England",1989, p.96/97.
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  Dicey, and Morris, eds.  "The Conflict of Laws".  4th Cum.Supp. to the 12th ed, 1997, p.102.
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  S. Shackleton: “The Applicable Law in International Arbitration Under the New English Arbitration
Act 1996.” Arbitration International 13.4 (1997): 375-389, p.385.
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level.  All depends therefore on the treatment of arbitration awards involving a-
national rules of law under English arbitration law as regards judicial review
and supervision.
VIII.2.2.4.  Case Law: Authority following the Channel Tunnel litigation
One example of such an award being brought before English courts was the
litigation ensuing the Channel Tunnel project performed by a consortium of
British and French companies.720   Not only is this litigation an example for
the significance of "neutral" choice of law clauses in commercial contracts, as
discussed above in Chapters Seven and One, but it also demonstrates how
British courts have dealt with a-national rules of law and will possibly deal
with them in the future.
When the case came before the House of Lords the court was asked to set aside
the stay of action in favour of pre-arbitrational proceedings and to decide on
the facts of the case.  This was considered by the Lords to be an attempt to
evade the arbitration agreement in the contract and thus the stay of action under
English law was ultimately upheld and interim relief or an injunction sought by
the appellant Euro tunnel consortium against the Balfour Beatty Group
(contractors), refused. 721  The considerations that were made involving
substantive law, and in particular the general principle of "exceptio non
adimpleti contractus" or "l' exception d' inexecution", was discussed in
connection with the question of whether the court should have a power to give
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  “Eurotunnel v. Balfour Beatty.” [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 7 (C.A.); [1993] 1 Lloyd's
Rep. 291 (H.L.) .
721
  “Eurotunnel v. Balfour Beatty.” [1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 291 (H.L.)  (1992), p.300,
p.305 and p.311.
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a summary judgment because the matter in dispute could not give rise to a
dispute due to the absence of an arguable case.  This was based by the
appellants on an interpretation and application of section 1(1) of the Arbitration
Act 1975 as well as R.S.C. Order 14.  The H.o.L. elaborated however, that the
principle of civil law was a recognised standard of trade law and attributed
enough legal significance to it that a dispute about the legal effect of this
principle was material to giving rise to a dispute as referred to under the
applicable Arbitration Act 1975.722  This discussion also implied that the
choice of law was undisputed and was undoubtedly respected by the Court:
"That the doctrine is a part of the international trade law which is made
applicable to the contract by cl.68 is common ground, and it is also common
ground (at least for the purposes of these proceedings) that the doctrine is
capable of being excluded by consent."
The Court also recognised the motivations for including the specific choice of
law clause, as well as the arbitration and dispute settlement agreement, and
with it forced the parties to stick to their original decision to have contractual
disputes settled according to neutral principles of law and outside the regular
state jurisdiction:
"I have no doubt that the dispute resolution mechanism of cl.67 were the
subject of careful thought and negotiation.  The parties chose an indeterminate
'law' to govern their substantive rights; an elaborate process for ascertaining
those; and a location for that process outside the territories of the
participants.723   This conspicuously neutral, 'a-national' and extra-judicial
structure may well have been the right choice for the special needs of the
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  Ibid., p. 302 and 303.
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  [Brussels was stipulated seat of arbitration].
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Channel Tunnel venture.  But whether it was right or wrong, it is the choice
which the parties have made.  The appellants now regret that choice.  To push
their claim for mandatory relief through the mechanisms of cl.67 is too slow
and cumbersome to suit their purpose, and they now wish to obtain far reaching
relief through the judicial means which they have been scrupulous to exclude.
Notwithstanding that the Court can and should in the right case provide
reinforcement  for the arbitral process by granting interim relief I am quite
satisfied that this is not such a case, and that to order an injunction here would
be to act contrary both  to the general tenor of the construction contract and to
the spirit of international arbitration." 724
I suppose that this is a clear and convincing confession of English Law to
international arbitration which does not need much further explanation.
VIII.2.2.5  Scope of appeal on questions of law
Under the Arbitration Act 1996 only questions of English law are subject to
judicial supervision, Art. 82 (1); " 'questions of law' means - (a) for a court in
England and Wales, a question of the law of England and Wales...". Instances
where this criterion has been considered unfulfilled were cases raising question
on Islamic law, Swiss law and on the Vienna Convention.  This indicates that
there is "negative" definition of sources of law, i.e. specifying that they are not
English Law.  This way, the courts do not have to answer the question if
certain rules of law are formal law or in any way recognised as forming a
legislative basis.  Rules of a-national law are thereby not necessarily
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  “Eurotunnel v. Balfour Beatty.” [1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 291 (H.L.), p. 311.
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"stigmatised" because they are not necessarily positively dismissed as rules of
law.  There is, therefore, still a chance for an evolutionary development
towards recognition of certain rules of law, such as the UPICC, due to their
special qualities725 and the practical experience that has already been gained
using the UPICC along with "general principles of law".
VIII.2.2.6  Discussion of the position under English arbitration legislation
and the formative role of the courts
Even after the reform brought about by the enactment of the Arbitration Act
1996, English law certainly provides more scope for judicial supervision and
review (on the part of the courts), and for challenging the award (on the part of
parties to arbitration proceedings), than other jurisdictions, namely certain
continental European ones.  This does not necessarily mean a disadvantage for
the arbitration proceedings taking place in England, even when viewed
particularly under the aspect of employing a-national law rules either with, or
without, an express choice by the parties to a dispute.
The traditional attitude taken by English courts had as its objective the correct
administration of English law, the protection of English citizens against
injustice arising from arbitration proceedings and even the prevention of the
growth of areas inaccessible to English law within the English jurisdiction.726
The same objectives have been pursued by other legal systems such as the
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  See the discussion in the context of the article by Prof. Mankowski at VIII.2.3.3. et
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   i.e. areas "...where the King's writ does not run.", LJ Bankes in Charnikow v. Roth Schmidt &
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German system.  The idea to provide a minimum standard for arbitration
proceedings has brought all legislation relating to arbitration into existence.
"The second consideration is the interest of States, in particular the seat of
arbitration, in guaranteeing the fairness and impartiality of the procedure. As
the binding character of arbitration awards depends on national law, national
courts should play a role in securing the integrity of arbitrations conducted
within their jurisdiction.  Moreover, judicial control that guarantees the
integrity of the process is not inconsistent with the legitimate expectation of the
parties."727
This objective is less "an interest of States" but rather a responsibility of States.
English law has traditionally been particularly concerned with high standards
of procedural rules.  This concern has found its expression in the case law,
especially in the case quoted above, the Czarnikow.728  It is questionable,
however, whether the attitude behind this line of decisions should give rise to
such concerns as raised by Shackleton in his comments on the Arbitration Act
1996,729 with a view to assessing the chances for an application of a-national
rules of law to arbitration proceedings.
Comparing this attitude taken by the courts, and the case law developed
thereby, to the attitude within the German legal "environment" leads to the
following understanding:-
The focus of the discussion in England is more on the role of the courts as
opposed to arbitration tribunals.  This is clearly evidenced by the material
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  O. Chukwumerije: “Judicial Supervision of Commercial Arbitration: The English Arbitration
Act of 1996.” Arbitration International 15.2 (1999): 171-191, p.183.
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  Compare at VIII.2.2.2. above.
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  S. Shackleton: “The Applicable Law in International Arbitration Under the New English
Arbitration Act 1996.” Arbitration International 13.4 (1997): 375-389.
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quoted above which served English commentators to demonstrate the "static",
and "suspicious", attitude of English law towards arbitration.  In my view
English courts should not be equalled with "the state" without more as is
possibly done by Shackleton:
"Autonomous sources of legal norms have been generally unwelcome in
English arbitration law.  They are naturally a challenge to the competence of
state systems to control and resolve disputes...It runs contrary to positivist
views which closely associate law with the state and which dominate legal
thinking in common law jurisdictions".730
Clearly, the competition does not run between the "state" and the arbitral
tribunals but between the (state), courts and those tribunals.  Shackleton's
sentence to me should read: "They are naturally a challenge to the competence
of English courts to control and resolve disputes." The English system is not
only the mother and origin of all other "common law jurisdictions" it also
embodies one of the world's most prominent, independent and autonomous
court systems.  The English court system benefits from historical continuity
and uninterrupted identity and therefore certainly is unique in the world.  The
role of English courts with their individual historical role as King's and Queen's
juridical bodies and their unique method of establishing English law, the
common law and the law of equity, occasionally referring straight back to
decisions rendered in the Middle Ages and taking into account a wealth of
experience and commercial practice rightly invoke for themselves a great deal
of authority if it comes to matters of fair trials and just proceedings.731  The
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appearance of laymen acting as arbitrators in commercial matters can therefore
easily amount to intrusion from the point of view of the courts.  The courts in
England are independent form the state, i.e. Parliament and the executive
powers, and cultivate a strong awareness of this fact.  Assertion of power in the
domain of the law is therefore a natural phenomenon in such an environment,
much more so than in a state like Germany where, since the enactment of the
first modern and uniform codification of the civil law only one hundred and
fifty years ago, the fourth state is now at work.732  Although German courts are
certainly independent, too, they do not in the least have the same sense of
identity and material formative influence on the development of the law.  From
a comparative perspective, the aspect of competition between courts and
private tribunals is certainly a prominent feature to be kept in mind when
evaluating the current situation of arbitration and the evolution of transnational
law rules in English law.
The aspect of judicial supervision and review therefore also extends
predominantly to the area of procedural matters.  The heading of "procedural
irregularity", comprising "substantive jurisdiction" and "serious irregularity", is
therefore the one conferring the more comprehensive powers of adjudication to
the Courts, secs 67 and 68 of the Arbitration Act 1996.
The general objective of ensuring the minimum standard of procedure is in
keeping with most other Western jurisdictions but does not show substantially
greater possibilities to involve the courts in arbitration proceedings.
Over the last eighty years, since the Czarnikow, this involvement has
doubtlessly moved away from intervention and supervision towards assistance
                                                                                                                                 
change in attitude has been reflected in successive English arbitration laws which have increasingly
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and co-operation.733  This was motivated by pragmatic considerations.  Clearly
the value of arbitration was in the awareness of the courts even before the 1979
Arbitration Act and the resort of businesses to commercial arbitration was
respected:
"Among commercial men what are commonly called commercial arbitrations
are undoubtedly and deservedly popular." 734
From this grew the motivation to enhance English arbitration so that more
arbitration proceedings would be attracted,735  and there is certainly a general
awareness of the requirements of arbitration in terms of independence from
courts.736
One of the objectives behind the various reforms of the law relating to
arbitration was therefore competitiveness.  Internationalisation, harmonisation
and the curtailing of the judicial supervision was though pragmatically
motivated.737  From this follows the justified expectation that English courts
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will recognise when the time has arrived to give effect to a choice of a-national
law rules within commercial law and arbitration.
The so-called "unitary conception" of English law738 is not an obstacle to the
further growth of commercial case law, which could in fact one day express a
view under English law that there are autonomous rules of law carrying some
source of law function which they have acquired at the international level.
Again speaking with the DAC Report which, regarding choice of law in
arbitration;
"….declined to 'lay down principles in this highly complex area' in the interest
of 'flexibility'".739
The idea of "maintaining a single system of law"740 does not necessarily
generally prevent the acknowledgement "that, international transactions are
distinct from domestic contracts and may be governed by specific substantive
rules evolved at the international level". 741
Another observation by Shackleton seems to equal the one made from the
perspective of German law; the predominance of positivism and unitary
conceptions of national law:
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"Indeed the essence of much criticism of lex mercatoria and other transnational
normative structures as distinct bodies of law is the lack of resemblance to state
legal systems invariably presented as having superseded other forms of law
...Positivism, moreover, is analytically inadequate to account for non-statist
legal phenomena, and might even be specifically constructed not to account for
it.  Lex mercatoria, theories of a-national legal norms and the spontaneous
development of international law form the parties' expectations in international
practice and transactions are more closely connected to pre-positivist theories
of natural law and civil law conceptions of subjective rights which have no
directly corresponding category in common law." 742
A system like the common law seems to be most suited to respond to
developments on the international level compared to the civil law systems
which the author refers to above.  Due to the tradition of "restating" the law,
both by Acts of Parliament and by precedent, resemblances to the natural law
theories appear to be more natural than for civil law systems which function
through legislation entirely and are thereby prone to positivist traditions.
The tension arising from the alleged parallel existence of national and a-
national rules of law in arbitration is rather due to the nature of arbitration and
is "to some extent inevitable in any attempt by the state to regulate a process
which occurs by definition outside the state".743  Rather than asserting the
state's "role as the sole legitimate normative authority for English law",744 the
English legislator has taken responsibility to guarantee that "the integrity of the
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process is not inconsistent with the legitimate expectation of the parties".745  It
does not seem adequate to focus solely on "the state" as regards the formation
of private law rules in a common law jurisdiction relying on precedent:
"Secondly, the limitations placed on the arbitrators' choice of law in section 46
puts the state's interests first and will, in some circumstances result in a
violation of the will of the parties." 746
Indeed, relying entirely on party autonomy, the arbitrator would have to
establish the rules governing the contract (or dispute), strictly by reference to
the individual case.747  However, compared to the solution offered by the new
German arbitration law in §1051 ZPO,748 the provision in sec. 46 opts for the
more liberal choice suggested by the UNCITRAL Model law.  At least under
the scope and in the signatory states of the RC, it cannot be said that, "What
constitutes 'law' or even a 'recognized systems of law', differs greatly from
country to country,...and [that] there is little justification for imposing such
anglo-centric legal conceptions on foreign parties arbitrating in England."749
The subtle distinction between "law" and "rules of law" is a recognised
standard among the European jurisdictions and will certainly be within the
expectations of civil law based parties.  The identification of "law" with "state"
and ensuing positivism certainly arises more from the civil law sphere, and
especially from the history of the past one hundred and fifty or one hundred
and sixty years with the formation of the modern nation states.  This is because
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codification was very closely linked to political movements striving for
unification, liberalisation of public life and constitutionalism.  This movement
was less successful and less interruptive for legal evolution in England than on
the continent.750
Arbitration is an area where the state allows private dispute resolution and
thereby implicitly steps back.  The fact that the special self-regulating
environment in international trade and the high degree of its development
remains unrecognised in recent legislation, might therefore be understood not
only as a sign of obliviousness and statist conception, but also as continued
reliance on the role of the courts as a motor for adaptation to the requirements
of changing times.
"However, where English law is chosen by the parties and the place of
arbitration is in England, much will depend on the willingness of English
courts to tolerate any latitude exercised boldly by arbitrators in their
appreciation of the rules which govern international contractual relations." 751
VIII.2.2.7.  Conclusion
Under the Arbitration Act 1996 parties can opt to choose the UPICC as
governing law of the contract, sec.46 (1) (b).  Absent choice of law, however,
the arbitrator cannot apply the UPICC as governing law, sec. 46 (3).  The use
of the UPICC can be subject to appeal proceedings on questions of law, sec.
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69, as well as to challenging to award for serious irregularity, sec. 68 (2) (b)
and (e).  Out of these rules only sec. 46 and sec. 69 can be dispensed with by
agreement of the parties, sec. 4 (2) and Schedule 1.  Since only questions of
English law are subject to sec. 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996, it is likely that
the courts will disregard questions arising in the course of applying the UPICC:
“Given the restriction on Court intervention where a law other than English law
is applied, arbitrators may yet enjoy some freedom from sanction for the
application of forms of law unrecognised in England, including lex mercatoria
or general principles of law."752
There is, however, a possibility that matters of public policy or other aspects
falling under the criteria of sec. 69 (1) (c) and (d) could arise in such cases,
especially since rules like the UPICC are not recognised sources of law in
English case law and legal writing yet.  The court practice so far has shown a
general recognition and appreciation of the requirements of arbitration
proceedings and the interests of international trade, so that legitimate
expectations of the parties to arbitration proceedings are likely to be
considered.  This applies specifically since some notions introduced by the
Arbitration Act 1996 have been unrecognised in English law, such as the
concept of amiable compositeur.  These notions have been deliberately
imported in order to adapt to international practice so that these will be given
effect.  Subsequently other standards of international law, such as autonomous
rules of law, might be considered of a comparable value to the promotion of a
competitive English forum for arbitration, trade and commercial legal practice.
The question of whether the treatment of rules, such as the UPICC, as
governing law in the technical sense of conflict rules, and thereby as "law" as
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  S. Shackleton: “The Applicable Law in International Arbitration Under the New
English Arbitration Act 1996.” Arbitration International 13.4 (1997): 375-389, p.389.
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opposed to "rules of law", or whether they will be regarded as implied terms or
will have to be incorporated into the contract is open at present.  There is not
much authority or analysis on this question in sufficient detail.  Again, it will
be up to the courts to develop an attitude when the case arises.753
VIII.2.3  Judicial review of commercial arbitration awards under current
German law
VIII.2.3.1  No clear position in legal writings
In my view the traditional position prevailing in German legal science, as
reported so far in this section, is unsuitable to meet modern developments in
international commercial law and practice.  It ignores the actual developments
and requirements both in international commercial arbitration, drafting
practice, and also on the domestic level in state litigation.  It suffers from
defective foundations, because the positions brought forward are presented in
an inconsistent way and represent unfounded prejudices against a-national law.
This seems to result from a lack of awareness of the proper nature and
objectives of private law.  The particular circumstances of the application of
lex mercatoria, general principles of law, the UPICC or other a-national law
are to be reviewed, therefore.
VIII.2.3.2 Critical voices and well-preserved  prejudices
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  Compare Ibid. p.3.
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To illustrate this situation under the German lex lata a recent contribution is
highlighted in the following analysis.
VIII.2.3.2.1.  The use of CISG in Germany recommended
Prof. Mankowski advocates the application of the CISG to international
contracts in his article on the recommendable (right), choice of law for
international commercial contracts.   CISG, although in force in Germany as of
1 Jan 1991, is regularly excluded in international contract terms following
standard recommendations of lawyers.754  The reason observed by Mankowski
is that German lawyers755 are afraid to be confronted with issues which they
have not been trained in.756  Further arguments include the fact that there is no
precise body of case law or judicial authority to review the meaning of the
Articles of the CISG since they are very open textured.  Special difficulties are
anticipated as arising from the provisions on breach of obligation and
fundamental breach of contract (eg in Art. 45 and Art.64 (1) a)), of the CISG,
and the alleged fact that the Convention is too buyer friendly as a whole due to
the contribution of developing countries to its making.  These prejudices or
defences against the use of the CISG are correctly described as plainly
                                                 
754  P. Mankowski: Rechtswahl für Verträge des internationalen Wirtschaftsverkehrs.
RIW 1 (2003): pp.2-15, p.8, see also F. Ferrari in ZEuP 2002, p.737; this was also reported by
lawyers on the UNIDROIT conference held in Basel in 1997 on the topic of the UPICC.
755  Along with Swiss lawyers according to the discussions on the 1997 Basel
UNIDROIT conference.
756 P. Mankowski: Rechtswahl für Verträge des internationalen Wirtschaftsverkehrs.
RIW 1 (2003): pp.2-15, p.8.
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resulting from the horror alieni by Mankowski and others.757  Mankowski
then responds to each of these obviously unfounded arguments.  At this point
in time, the most important response is that the notion of breach of obligation
has been introduced into German domestic contract law in the course of the
2002 reform of the BGB,758 following the implementation of several recent
directives on consumer protection and unfair contract terms.759
Beyond these prejudices the advantages of CISG for international trade are
seen by Mankowski in the fact that there is a wealth of documentation which
makes the CISG accessible and prevents high costs for consulting and research.
He praises especially the high standard of electronic databases enabling
practitioners to track decisions on CISG worldwide, as well as the fact that a
lot of literature is available in all major languages.  Mankowski does not forget
to emphasise that some of the most influential standard works on the CISG are
German.760
The benefits of the application of the CISG to international (sales) contracts are
to Mankowski the fact that they provide a "uniform platform", especially for
string sales,761 because the uniformity allows equal access to the rules by all
the parties involved.  The uniformity also saves costs and the effort to establish
the applicable law via conflict rules.  The rules of the CISG are flexible, they
can be modified762  and thus adapted to the need of the different branches of
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 Ibid.; see also H. Lübbert in I. Schwenzer: "Schuldrecht, Rechtsvergleichung und
Rechtsvereinheitlichung im 21. Jh. - Symposium aus Anlaß des 65. Geburtstages von Peter
Schlechtriehm", 1999, p.8 et seq., compare Magnus in ibid.
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  Namely §§ 280, 281 and 323 BGB.
759
  EC Directives 93/13/EEC, 94/47/EC , 97/7/EC and 99/44/EC.
760
 P. Mankowski: “Rechtswahl für Verträge des internationalen Wirtschaftsverkehrs.”
RIW 1 (2003): pp.2-15, at p.10; Prof. Mankowski himself is a commentator of the CISG in
Benicke, Ferrari, Mankowski and Reinhart: “UN-Kaufrecht”, 1991.
761
  Ibid. p.10 2nd column.
762
  Under Art. 6 CISG.
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international trade who should not unduly insist on using their own standard
terms which allegedly uniquely serve their specific needs.763  Mankowski even
suggests the CISG "could become a true lex mercatoria - but codified and with
a clear, ascertainable content." 764
As to the choice of law aspect of the CISG Mankowski points out that the
Convention on its own cannot become the law governing the contract under
Art. 27 (1) EGBGB (kollisionsrechtliche Verweisung).  Mankowski calls the
CISG a "Rechtskorpus, aber kein eigenständiges Recht",765  a legal corpus, a
body of law, but no autonomous law.
Obviously, the CISG is part of German civil law and applies to cases falling
under the scope of the Convention, as set out in its Art. 1-6.  It would therefore
apply following a choice of law of German law and likewise in other countries
who have adopted CISG.  Mankowski, however, mentions expressly that the
CISG would then apply "unter dem Vorbehalt des intern-rechtlich zwingenden
Rechts des eigentlichen Vertragsstatuts", meaning that the rules of CISG
cannot override the mandatory rules of the state whose law it is part of.  The
formulation "Sie [CISG] stünde unter dem Vorbehalt.." however, suggests that
the CISG needs a specific additional authority or permission to apply within
German law which is not the case.766  It also appears to imply that there are
issues that better remain subject to German mandatory rules.  Here, as in so
many other cases of the mentioning of mandatory rules no specific example is
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 P. Mankowski: “Rechtswahl für Verträge des internationalen Wirtschaftsverkehrs.”
RIW 1 (2003): pp.2-15, p.10, 1st col.
764
  Ibid.  p.10, 1st col.: " Die CISG kann, wenn man sie denn endlich akzeptieren würde,
eine wahre lex mercatoria werden - aber kodifiziert und mit klarem, feststellbarem Inhalt."
765
  Ibid., 2nd col. ie the law of a state which exclusively can be the object of a choice of
law under Art. 27 EGBGB.
766
  German domestic contract law was considered to apply in complementation to CISG
according to Art.7 (2) CISG in the award of 29 Dec 1998 rendered by the Schiedsgericht
Hamburger Freundschaftliche Arbitrage in Hamburg, see RIW vol.5 1999, pp.394-396, p.395
(II.3.).
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given.  Usually, legislation relating to unfair contract terms and to consumer
protection is meant by this remark.767  Suffice to say, at this point even the so
called "Indizfunktion" (indicating function), of §10 AGBG and the application
of the rules of  §11 No.5 and 6 AGBG, forbidding penalty clauses and lump
sum damages,768 which are unknown to German law are disputed in German
legal science as far as international commercial contracts are concerned.769
Since the CISG, other than the UPICC, does not even contain such
controversial rules, the unavoidable mention of "mandatory rules" all the more
appears to be a reflex occurring regularly in the context of international rules of
law.770  It appears indeed to be the reflex triggered by the horror alieni and a
deep underlying conviction that the (own), domestic law undoubtedly provides
the best solutions for any case.
VIII.2.3.2.2.  But not the UPICC
Having advertised the substantive benefits of the CISG for international
contracts as described above, Mankowski does not recommend the UPICC for
the sake of these same qualities in the UPICC,771 despite their obviously being
equally suited to international commercial contracts and providing a scope
extending beyond sales contracts.  The UPICC even abstain from extending
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  Compare C.-W. Canaris:  “Die Stellung der "UNIDROIT Principles" und "Principles
of European Contract Law" im System der Rechtsquellen.”   pp.5-31, p.21-28.
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  A favourite target of controversial discourse.
769
  See H. Stoll: ""Rechtliche Inhaltskontrolle bei internationalen Handelsgeschäften" in
"Festschrift für Kegel", 1987, pp.623-662, at p.658 and C.W.Canaris:"Gesamtunwirksamkeit
und Teilgültigkeit rechtsgeschäftlicher Regelungen" in "Fetschrift für Steindorff", 1990,
pp.519 et seq., p.559.
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  Why would the German legislator enact a Convention that would lead to clashes with
existing mandatory rules?
771
  P. Mankowski: “Rechtswahl für Verträge des internationalen Wirtschaftsverkehrs.”
RIW 1 (2003): pp.2-15, p.11 1st col.
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their scope to consumer contracts (which the scope of the CISG includes), so
that concerns relating to the protection of weaker parties, commonly raised
against the application of international uniform law, have no room.772
Mankowski just warns of the lack of formal recognition as rules of law and of
the costly insecurity arising from this fact.773  For parties wishing to have the
UPICC govern their contract he recommends their incorporation as contractual
terms (materiellrechtliche Verweisung), even under the regime of arbitration
law, which in Germany potentially does allow for the choice of a-national rules
of law under §1051 (1) ZPO.774   Under Mankowski's own condition that the
UPICC cannot apply unqualified by mandatory domestic law, the UPICC are
subject to the rules relating to contractual construction rather than to statutory
interpretation.
This result seems unfavourable given that even Mankowski recognises the
specific qualities of the UPICC in relation to a choice of lex mercatoria or
general principles of law:
"Die Principles leisten genau solche Präzisierungen, wie sie der lex mercatoria
fehlen, und vermeiden genau jene Gefahren, welche die lex mercatoria
aufzuwerfen droht." 775 (The Principles achieve precisely the kind of certainty
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  Ibid., p.11 1st col.: Mankowski suggests that the UPICC "escape" these reproaches
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and thereby elegantly implies the evasion of mandatory rules providing for the protection of
weaker parties.
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  Ibid.,  p.12 1st col.
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  P. Mankowski: “Rechtswahl für Verträge des internationalen Wirtschaftsverkehrs.”
RIW 1 (2003): pp.2-15, p.12, 1st col.and p.14, 1st col. For a full discussion of the
interpretation of !051 ZPO see D. Solomon: “Das vom Schiedsgericht in der Sache
anzuwendende Recht nach dem Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Neuregelung des
Schiedsverfahrensrechts.” RIW 12 (1997): 981-990.
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  P. Mankowski: “Rechtswahl für Verträge des internationalen Wirtschaftsverkehrs.”
RIW 1 (2003): pp.2-15, p.14, 1st col.
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which lack in the lex mercatoria and avoid the dangers that can arise from the
lex mercatoria.)776
One should expect this view to result into a clear recommendation of the
UPICC, especially for non-sales contracts.
VIII.2.3.3. Advocated motivations for choice of law
However, the desire of some international contract negotiators to look for a
"neutral" choice of law is not considered a valid motivation by this
(prevailing), view in German legal science.777  Mankowski points out that only
a small percentage of arbitration proceedings before the ICC Court of
International Arbitration778 has involved a choice of lex mercatoria, general
principles of law or trade usages, and none of the cases decided before the
Vienna Chamber of Commerce involved the UPICC as governing law or
contract terms.779  He also explains in detail the factors giving rise to the
choice of law clauses that are actually included in international commercial
contracts.  These reasons deserve a more detailed analysis.780  At this point it
can be stated that Mankowski does not consider the actual motivations behind
the choice in most cases in which a "neutral choice" is attempted agreeable.
Instead he pursues the "education" of the negotiators towards the best solution
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  i.e. unpredictability, vagueness and the lack of recognition as "law" by state courts, as
described by Mankowski ibid. at p.13.
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  See below.
778
  Only 0.8% of all cases.
779
  P. Mankowski: “Rechtswahl für Verträge des internationalen Wirtschaftsverkehrs.”
RIW 1 (2003): pp.2-15, p.11 1st col.
780
  See below. Also, it might be worthwhile looking at the value of cases settled under
lex mercatoria or similar. It might turn out that the mere number of disputes is less telling than
the commercial weight of its subject matter. Again, the Channel Tunnel litigation is a
significant example for the role of choice of law in international business.
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which he deems to be above all the law of a state, especially one which leads to
the application of CISG.781  The justifiable motivations behind such a choice
are almost entirely of a monetary nature. This sounds attractive in the context
of international commercial contracts and also explains why an elaborated
doctrine relating to the integration of transnational substantive contract law is
not considered wanted.
VIII.2.3.4. Stigmatising a-national rules of law regarding choice of law in
international contracts for the wrong reasons
It reinforces the prevailing view of German legal scholars that it is positively
the requirement of state law, rather than merely that status of formal
legislation782  of a given set of law rules, which makes for its eligibility to be
governing law under (any), German conflict rule.
Unfortunately the proponents of this strict opinion overlook the danger of
arguing in a circle; the small percentage of cases employing a-national law in
arbitration might be due to the detrimental situation in this area of law and this
legal situation in turn is not changed due to the lack of a visible interest of the
"users" of the law 783 in such a change.
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  Mankowski recommends not routinely to exclude the CISG,P. Mankowski:
“Rechtswahl für Verträge des internationalen Wirtschaftsverkehrs.” RIW 1 (2003): pp.2-15,
p.14.
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  As suggested by C.-W. Canaris: “Die Stellung der "UNIDROIT Principles" und
"Principles of European Contract Law" im System der Rechtsquellen.” pp.5-31, compare
above.
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  See below.
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The monetary interests that Mankowski relies on to recommend certain choices
of law are costs generally induced by uncertainty, caution and error, as well as
costs for professional services to investigate the exact contents of a foreign
law, and the outcome of any dispute under the stipulated law
(Unsicherheitskosten, Rechtsermittlungskosten, Vorsichtskosten,
Irrtumskosten).  Another type of monetary interest, especially when benefiting
foreign parties, such as the British law profession, provide a reason for
Mankowski to advise against a recommendation of a choice of their law, i.e the
Common Law,784 despite his own argument that the chosen law should
"...present [itself]... in a familiar, not exotic language",785  a criterion which the
English language obviously fulfils.
VIII.2.3.5. Protectionist viewpoint
The first such "undesirable" commercial interest is the profit which the
predominantly  London based law profession gains out of the vivid marketing
effect of the location and ensuing conviction that English law is the "best" law
for transactions in branches like the commodities trade, financial services and
carriage of goods by sea.  The law profession, according to Mankowski, is
inclined to recommend out-of-court dispute settlement in order to avoid sharing
the fees.786  The other commercial factor is explained to be the creation of a
body of case law forming a "public asset" which would then only serve the
national interest (of the UK), rather than that of the foreigners who contribute
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  Ibid., p.6, 2nd.col.
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to its creation while bearing risks and costs.787  The Common Law
jurisdictions are said to typically only "concentrate on the effects on market
participants who are resident in their own sphere of application"788 so that
foreign parties do not benefit (commercially), to the same extent.789  Together
with the effects of the stipulation of a Common Law country as the forum, this
"advantage" of the common lawyer "increases nearly into exclusivity",790
especially through the growing body of case law.  As much as it seems
desirable for the chosen law to include a large body of case law for the sake of
predictability and perhaps even the prevention of disputes, the number of
precedence, according to Mankowski, does not necessarily indicate a high
quality of the law but rather a large quantity of users; a so-called "positive
Netzwerkexternaltiät, positive network externality.  This phenomenon791
simply distorts the fair competition between the legal systems by attracting
uncritical users as parts of a general movement.792  Still, Mankowski
postulates that the desirable law should "be open for the developments,
requirements and interests of international commercial relations",793  it should
be "open, modern and economy oriented".794  He appears however, not to like
to see it work as efficiently as English law and favouring the economic interest
of the City of London.  It may be left open if this attitude serves the
development of an open, modern and competitive German legal system.
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 Ibid., pp.6 and 7.
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 Ibid., p.6, 2nd col. This argument is taken from a work by Hudson: "The Law on
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  Ibid. also p.7.
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  Ibid. p.7, 1st.col.
791
  Observed and named by Mankowski.
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  P. Mankowski: “Rechtswahl für Verträge des internationalen Wirtschaftsverkehrs.”
RIW 1 (2003): pp.2-15, p.7, 1st col.
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  Ibid. p.3, 2nd col.
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 Ibid. p.5, 2nd col.
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VIII.2.3.6. The actual motivations behind choice of law clauses in
international commercial contracts
Also the Swiss law profession gains an advantage of the unhappy fact that a
"neutral" legal system is often misconceived by negotiators as being located in
a (politically), "neutral" country.795  This argument inspires the collection of
motivations for the choice of law in contract negotiations, which Mankowski
presents in his article, and which frequently form the actual choice of law
clauses.
These motivations are taken from empirical records. They are predominantly
irrational. Very often negotiations are first completed by the business team and
only then discussed among the law departments.796  Some businessmen like to
boast of their dislike of paperwork and legal technicalities.  Consequently,
choice of law questions are not considered important at all or subject to the
wrong assumptions.  Such assumptions are the above mentioned misconception
of the significance of political neutrality of a country for a choice of its law,
ideas about "Aequidistanz" (equal distance), of the chosen law from both
parties' familiar legal system, either geographically or substantively, and of
course part of a kind of "atavistic power game".797
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  Ibid. p.5 2nd col., the well planned attempt to induce the other party to choose the
home legal system of the interested (Swiss or Swedish) party just like a "Trojan horse"can even
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  Best characterised by H. Kronke in "Festschrift für Henrich" 2000, at p.390 as
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  P. Mankowski: “Rechtswahl für Verträge des internationalen Wirtschaftsverkehrs.”
RIW 1 (2003): pp.2-15, p.22nd col.
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This latter motivation seems to have a considerable impact on choice of law
clauses especially in the context of state party negotiations involving a-
national, "neutral" law.
The economical (rational), reason behind the negotiation of the applicable law
is that none of the parties wants to be burdened with the costs that the research
into the legal background of the transaction will cause,798 but since these costs
can never really be "calculated", even in one's own familiar legal system, this
argument is not driving parties to be as competitive about the question as they
actually are.  Again, the Channel Tunnel litigation, and ICC case No.7110 are
telling examples.  In both cases prestige issues were the decisive factor for the
choice of "neutral law".  A project like the Channel Tunnel gave enough reason
for all negotiating parties not to concede the application of each other's law.  In
the ICC case the agent of a sovereign of the Islamic sphere could not afford to
submit to the law of a foreign Western country.799  This is an important and
just issue of power ascertaining strategy.  Cost efficiency is not the driving
force.800  At least with the latter constellation of a state contract, commercial
projects may regularly involve aspects of international relations.  Choice of law
clauses are therefore not merely to be considered under financial aspects.  This
applies especially if one sees state sovereignty as a precondition for the
existence of "law" in the positivistic sense.  Although it does not seem to fit
into the picture of cool and calculating businessmen, these motivations are a
matter of fact and cannot be judged by monetary aspects only. The atavistic
and irrational component is real and requires room in the legal order.




  "Neutral" choice of law clauses are typical for contracts between agents of Islamic
countries and Western businesses or states.
800
  Although in the ensuing arbitration economic interest in fact drove the claimant
counsel to fight so hard for the application of the UPICC facing the limitation rules of English
law that would otherwise have applied and invalidated their claim.
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Domestic arbitration law and conflict rules should therefore consider these
interests within the international business world to resort to general principles
of law or similar a-national choices of law.
VIII.2.3.7. Giving effect to choice of law clauses under the scope of the
Rome Convention
The legislator of the ZPO did strive to make arbitration in Germany more
attractive.801  This was to be achieved by adopting the suggested rules of the
UNCITRAL Model Law.  The liberty contained in Art 28 (2) of the Model
Law as to the applicable conflict rules absent choice of law was not imported
into the ZPO, though, but the arbitrator can only apply the law of a state under
German law absent choice of law and is also bound by the standard prescribed
in §1051 (2) ZPO.  This was done because the legislator saw himself bound by
the RC; the official Parliamentary notes and the report of the reform
commission802  do mention a connection between the Rome Convention and
the rules of the new §1051 ZPO.  Solomon puts the question more precisely: Is
the German legislator obliged under the Rome Convention to enact
corresponding conflict rules for arbitration proceedings?803  Solomon states
that this question has not yet been discussed804 and contends that such an
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  D. Solomon: “Das vom Schiedsgericht in der Sache anzuwendende Recht nach dem
Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Neuregelung des Schiedsverfahrensrechts.” RIW 12 (1997): 981-
990, at p.981 and 989; see also BT-Drucksache 13/1572, p.52 which contains the official
reasons for the reform.
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  Kommission zur Neuordnung des Schiedverfahrensrecht: "Bericht mit einem
Diskussionsentwurf zur Neufassung des Zehnten Buchs der ZPO", edited by
Bundesministerium der Justiz , 1994, p.166 et seq.
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  D. Solomon: “Das vom Schiedsgericht in der Sache anzuwendende Recht nach dem
Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Neuregelung des Schiedsverfahrensrechts.” RIW 12 (1997): 981-
990, p.988, 1st col.
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 Ibid. p.988, 2nd col.
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obligation does not exist.805  Because the legislator does not enforce the
conflict rules contained in §1051 ZPO by way of sanctioning non - compliance,
the arbitrator is de facto not obliged to comply with the conflict rules of the
forum. The RC does not extend to arbitration law because this matter is
generally outside the scope of state legislation;
"Mit § 1051 ZPO-E bzw. seinem Gegenstück Art. 28 ModellG wird nach
alledem versucht, eine Frage zu regeln, die gesetzlicher Regelung im Grunde
nicht zugänglich ist." (By §1051 of the draft ZPO and it counterpart Art. 28 of
UNCITRAL  Model Law, it is after all attempted to regulate a question which
is basically not open to legislative regulation." 806
In Solomon's opinion the legislator is free to issue different rules for arbitration
than for state litigation.  He subsequently reminds that certainly such
differences would surprise given that the legislator seeks to find the best
solution from his point of view:
"Schreibt er nun für Schiedsgerichte eine andere, insbesondere eine flexiblere
Lösung vor, so stellt sich die Frage, warum er diese nicht auch für die
staatlichen Gerichte für angemessen hält." (If he now prescribes a different, and
especially a more flexible solution for arbitration tribunals, the question arises
why he does not consider this appropriate also for state courts.)
This different treatment can be justified, according to Solomon, by the role of
party autonomy in arbitration.  State legislation and litigation require not only
the interest of the parties but also other interests and considerations to be taken






into account.  The prevalence of party autonomy, however, makes §1051 ZPO
"the legislative interpretation of the typical intentions of the parties" regarding
choice of law.807
VIII.2.3.8. Conclusion
This section VIII.2. reviewed the current legislation relating to the recourse
against arbitration awards in English and German law and its use and
interpretation. It has identified weaknesses in both the wording of the
legislation and its application which could convincingly be rectified thereby
allowing transnational uniform law and especially the UPICC to be used as
governing law in arbitration proceedings.
What then is the best solution for choice of law rules in arbitration and in state
litigation?
VIII.3. The desirable standard in the law of arbitration: discussion
Following the previous two sections of Chapter Eight which have set out and
reviewed the current status of the lex lata, this section asks what the necessary
consequences from these findings are.  It investigates possible solutions to the
problems and obstacles caused by traditional doctrine and current legislation in
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arbitration law in respect of the smooth application of specialised uniform
commercial contract law on an international level.  It analyses doctrinal ways
of supporting more modern and favourable attitudes in courts, legislation and
doctrine towards the application of uniform contract law, and thereby
possibilities for the development of a modern doctrine and methodology of
international contract law.
The best solution is one which is based on the correct understanding of the
objective to be promoted and achieved through the rules.
VIII.3.1. The nature and objective of arbitration
Solomon correctly characterises arbitration proceedings as a manner of dispute
resolution which is allowed by the state, possibly desired, but not managed and
supervised ("verantwortet") by the state.808  Arbitration seems to be desired as
far as the legislator expresses his wish to create an attractive forum for
arbitration.809  This implies that positive effects are expected to result from the
activities of private dispute resolution, for example, the economic growth
within some branches of trade and legal services.  On the part of the litigants,
however, the attractiveness of arbitration is the aspect of confidentiality and
greater flexibility compared to state litigation.  Considerations relating to costs
and speed of proceedings are less convincing, given that arbitration procedures
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are not necessarily "cheap" and fast.  The interest of the business world is well
described by Mankowski:810
"Zum einen versuchen Wirtschaftskreise, sich aus der Regulierung des
staatlichen Rechts zu lösen und sich gleichsam ihr eigenes Recht zu schaffen
[sic!]. Die Befürworter der lex mercatoria ist insoweit eine verklausulierende
Chiffre für den Willen zur Selbstregulierung in den betreffenden
Wirtschaftskreisen. ...Dem können...ein gewisser Wunsch nach
Entrechtlichung und Entformalisierung des grenzüberschreitenden
Handelsverkehrs zu Grunde liegen." (On the one hand business circles are
trying to free themselves from the regulation of state law and quasi create their
own law [sic!]. The support of the lex mercatoria is insofar as encrypting code
for the will of self governance in the respective business circles....At the basis
of this could lie...a certain desire for de-legalisation and de- formalisation of
cross - border trade.)
Contrary to Mankowski's underlying view that this driving force within
international business circles is unfavourable it is legitimate and actually gets
support from most of the national laws relating to arbitration.  The observation
of this process shows that state law does not provide the appropriate
environment for the specific needs of international trade dispute settlement.
The deficiencies are to be found in the lack of recognition of the fundamental
difference between domestic and international commercial contracts regarding
the subject matter on the part of national legislators.  The other deficiency is
the fact that the original source of contract law (party autonomy and the
freedom of contract), is not recognised by many practitioners within the
domestic legal services.  State legislators allow arbitration proceedings by
                                                 
810
  P. Mankowski: “Rechtswahl für Verträge des internationalen Wirtschaftsverkehrs.”
RIW 1 (2003): pp.2-15, p.13 1st col.
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offering state proceedings to help with the enforcement of awards.  The high
compliance rate of arbitration shows the success of this policy.  It proves the
point that de-regulation and self-governance are what is needed in international
(and in domestic), commercial dispute settlement.
VIII.3.2. Regulating contract law in the state
It is a misconception that contract law is a natural area of state legislation in
terms of exercising a policing role among litigating parties.  Contract law is
one area of private law which is less subject to the requirements of a social
order in a modern society.  This is often forgotten. Berger, for instance, does
point out that the state does not precede "the law", but fails to distinguish
contract law from "the law".811  Berger wants to remind us that it has always
been common ground; that there are in fact general principles of law or natural
justice which are independent of the existence of a sovereign and state and its
territory.  Therefore, it is also inappropriate to raise concerns against the
creation of a quasi independent law within business circles.812  This
phenomenon is nothing but the consequence of the exercise of freedom of
contract and party autonomy which modern western states guarantee.  The
modern business world and the economies of western countries are founded on
party autonomy.  It is one of the basic civil liberties.  Contract law, therefore
plays an ambiguous role within the state legislation.
VIII.3.3 Historic argument: Forming identity
                                                 
811
  K.P. Berger:  "The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria",1999, at p.103.
812
  As Mankowski does as quoted above.
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Once more it shows that appropriate answers to modern questions of law
cannot be given without recourse to the roots of the present day state and its
law.  These roots are to be found in legal history and theory.  The idea of a
patronising state legislation in the area of contract law has been alien to the
European type of nation state.  Concepts taken from modern welfare legislation
and from consumer protection interventions headed by the EU organs are not to
be mistaken to originate from traditional general contract law itself.  The
situation of Germany invites cutting off the ties linking the present to the past,
i.e. the true origins of the present contract law as it is embodied in the civil
code, even after the recent reform.  The German state has so little continuity
that relatively recent, i.e. post-war developments in contract law including
contracts for employment and services and sales as far as consumer rights are
concerned, might suggest that a protective and patronising attitude of the state
is natural to apply to contracts and state adjudication.  However, the protective
element is rooted in the natural role of the state as a social order from which
authority is derived to operate the criminal justice system, as well as the whole
realm of social legislation and administration.  In the course of the growth of
this aspect of state activity, a jungle of "public law" rules have been created,
many of which lead to a sometimes unhealthy marriage of market economy and
state regulation.  Examples are the health systems 813  and labour law.
Discontinuity in German history might have made it difficult for lawyers to
look back at a time "four states" ago, in the first half of the nineteenth century
                                                 
813
  For an interesting insight see M. Löwisch, ed.  "Wettbewerb, Kollektivverträge und
Konfliktlösung in der Reform des Gesundheitswesens", 1999. This volume presents the papers
delivered and the discussions on a symposion on the law and relevant aspects relating to the
reform of the health system in Germany.
360
when the first codifications were created and fought for.814  Codification in the
civil (i.e. private) law was strongly opposed to due to the predominance of
local usages and "common law".  The contract law which was then eventually
drafted over a period of about fifty years by scientists was based on common
principles of a long tradition of German "Partikularrechte" and the Roman law
in the form of a ius commune. 815   It was not directly adapted to the hierarchic
structures of the feudalistic society, but restated ancient and fundamental
principles of European (Roman), and Germanic law.  Examples for typical
legislation in civil matters of a bygone age are rather to be found in the family
law and the inheritance rules of those days (eg. relating to divorce and
illegitimate children).  The conflict of laws remained largely unregulated and
was subject to practice and judge made law.
This practice of recourse to "general principles" and usages was the prevailing
and well tested practice for many centuries, while codification and ensuing
positivism has been prevailing for only the last one hundred and fifty years.
This reminiscence should be enough to make a strong point that general
principles of law are ascertainable and manageable.  The arbitral tribunal in
ICC case No. 7110 at least showed considerable proficiency in doing so.  A list
of recognised principles has been published by Lord Mustill and K.P. Berger
and their existence as terms of reference is undisputed among practitioners.
Dealing with general principles and a-national law, however, means accepting
a paradox for the state legislator.  The pre-Kaiserreich-Germany, the "Holy
Roman Empire of German Nation" contained a large number of local laws
which were tied together by an inconsistent confession to the ius commune, the
                                                 
814
  See Part Two, at V.3. above for details on the first enactment of the BGB. Many of
the protagonists of the drafting process of the BGB were MPs and there were vivid discussions
in public about its provisions and concepts.
815
  Compare Part One II.2.2.1.2. above.
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surviving Roman Law.  This universal presence of "common law", Roman or
Germanic, was common to all individual German states who each had their
local particular legal system.  "Diversity in unity" was a reality to this extent.
No sovereign, however, had the ambition to regulate contract law.  There were
restrictions to free trade and exchange of goods through customs and taxes, but
these are essentially different from contract law.  This insight is reflected by
the exclusion of contract law from the competences of the EU.  Because of a
lack of relevance of common contract rules for the common market, the
drafting of a European Civil Code has been taken off the agenda of the
common legal policies.
Contract law within a territorial nation state is thus national law but not
essentially a state matter of regulation.  Nevertheless, the contract law is only
in force within the boundaries of that state and addresses its inhabitants.816
Regarding the content of contract law, it is obvious that it aims at balancing
material, economic interests,817  rather than imposing behavioural standards.
This essentially corresponds to the nature of commercial relationships.  The
prime reference is the law of damages.  Damages are traditionally measured
and awarded in money and only recently are immaterial losses, emotional
suffering etc. recognised as giving rise to a claim.  The moral and social aspect
is dealt with under the criminal law and other legislation.818
The latter aspects typically serve the long term community life of any human
society.  Contracts, however, concern only temporary relationships which are
not necessarily determined by geographical circumstances.819  This special
                                                 
    
816
  Forming the paradox of contract law, compare Part One  I.1.3.1. above.
    
817
  Germanic law even recognised this technique to remedy physical injury and murder:
the higher the victim's social position the more the murderer or his family had to pay in
damages, see K. Kroeschell:   "Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte I"Vol. 8, 1985, p.43 et seq.
    
818
  Leading to loss of rights or claims or offices.
819
  Especially since the internet has emerged as a market place.
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aspect has always made commercial law require different treatment when
compared to domestic private law.820  Travelling and thus leaving the
protection of the home territory has always been characteristic for international
trade.821  Traders, however, did not set out to settle in other territories as
citizens or subjects of that other sovereign but entered into legal relationships
limited by very specific objectives; exchange of goods, services and currency.
Self governance in international trade is a reality and a necessity even today
and has a long tradition.  Modern legal systems are to be measured by the
flexibility and openness with which they meet these requirements.
Protectionist anxieties 822  instead of dynamic competitiveness does not seem a
helpful attitude in this context.  Preventing the liberal choice of applicable law
rules by an arbitrator is therefore not a desirable objective in a modern code for
civil procedure.
VIII.3.4 Recommended adjustment of legislation and analytical
foundations
Along with Solomon it should therefore be recommended to cancel §1051 ZPO
or replace it with an open rule allowing for an arbitrator's discretion as to the
applicable law absent choice of law including so called lex mercatoria and
general principles of law as governing law in arbitration proceedings.  The
minimum standard should be the rule suggested in Art 28 (2) UNCITRAL
                                                 
820
  See below.
821
  See eg the world of German medieval merchants in England and Russia forming the
Hanseatic League, compare U. Ziegler:   "Die Hanse - Aufstieg, Blütezeit und Niedergang der
ersten europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft", 1996.
822
  As raised by P. Mankowski: “Rechtswahl für Verträge des internationalen
Wirtschaftsverkehrs.” RIW 1 (2003): pp.2-15, p.6 2nd col, see also above.
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Model Law which allows a free choice of the conflict rules.  For the purposes
and within the scope of arbitration, there can be no doubt that general
principles, the UPICC and other a-national law codifications are considered
law by their "users".  They are recognised standards which provide a suitable
basis for arbitral adjudication.
It is therefore necessary to make it clear that deciding an arbitration case
according to general principles, the lex mercatoria or the UPICC, does not
equal an ex aequo et bono decision and thus does not per se overstep the limits
set by the parties in their arbitration agreement.823  In cases where these rules
are referred to in the conflict of law clauses of an international contract it must
be possible for the arbitrator to apply such rules as the governing law of the
contract, as it was done in ICC case No.7110.  This means that national law
does not dominate the legal reasoning, but serves as a default set of rules
merely to complement the international substantive law where gaps arise.  The
technique to do this is demonstrated in Chapter Four of this study and should
serve as an example of how to develop a modern methodology of applying
uniform substantive contract law.
VIII.3.4.1. Equity decisions distinct from application of a-national rules of
law
In cases where there is no choice of law clause, the parties' intentions are to be
investigated by the arbitrator and a-national law can be applied if this seems
appropriate.  State contracts are a strong indicator that national law was meant
                                                 
823
  i.e. if it does not contain an express authorisation to act as amiable compositeur.
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to be disregarded (negative choice law), by the parties.  It seems an appropriate
assumption to deem this a standard default choice of law in a range of typical
constellations, for instance those involving specific branches or a degree of
complexity of the contracts under consideration.824
The application of a-national law is not a case of deciding ex aequo et bono.
This latter way of deciding is another, separate form of arbitral procedure. Ex
aequo et bono decisions are characterised by focusing even more on the
individual case and thereby deliberately disregarding any general legal norms.
It is the classic role of the arbitrator as umpire.825  The focus is on the decision
not on the reasoning or the grounds for this decision.  It is a misunderstanding
to classify any discretionary argumentation and decision by an arbitration
tribunal as acting as amiable compositeur, as Mankowski does:
"Zweitens wäre eine Wahl der lex mercatoria ein echter Sprung ins Dunkle.
Was würde man damit eigentlich wählen?...Daß ein Schiedsgericht ad hoc eine
ihm geeignet erscheinende Rechtsregel bildet und diese Regel dann als
Rechtssatz deklariert, ist jedenfalls nicht auszuschließen....Dieses wird noch
erhöht durch Anreize für den Schiedsrichter, die lex mercatoria als angebliche
Grundlage anzuführen, sich in Wahrheit aber als amiable compositeur selbst
den Dispens von Rechtsnormen zu erteilen, ohne daß dazu eine Ermächtigung
durch die Parteien bestünde." 826  (Secondly a choice of the lex mercatoria
would be a real leap into the dark. What would one choose with it?...It cannot
be prevented that an arbitration tribunal forms ad hoc a rule of law which they
                                                 
824
 See below  for further discussion of defining cases of application of a-national law
and compare Chapter Seven.
825
  Note in this context that French law conceives of the amiable compositeur  as an
"office" and thereby marks the difference between this and the standard arbitration process, see
Art 1474 NCPC and below.
826
   P. Mankowski: “Rechtswahl für Verträge des internationalen Wirtschaftsverkehrs.”
RIW 1 (2003): pp.2-15, p.13/14.
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deem appropriate and then declares this a legal norm (Rechtssatz, formal
law)... This is reinforced by incentives for the arbitrator to declare the lex
mercatoria a basis [for this] while actually granting himself leave from
applying any rule of law and act as amiable compositeur without authority of
the parties.)
This view does not correctly reflect the mechanisms of arbitration proceedings.
As long as an arbitrator demonstrates that he (or she), intends to form his
decision according to any rules of law, the arbitrator is not acting ex aequo et
bono, irrespective of the quality of the legal norms or rules of law applied, or
the method of application.
VIII.3.4.2  Reassuring position in case law
This position has been confirmed by the German Federal Court
(Bundesgerichtshof), in a decision of 26 Sept 1985.827  In that case an
arbitration tribunal decided a case according to English law absent an express
choice of law under German conflict rules.  These conflict rules had been made
applicable via a choice of the parties to decide the case according to the
German procedural rules relating to arbitration.  It was contested as to whether
the arbitration tribunal had decided the case according to English law, or rather,
acted as amiable compositeur thereby exceeding its powers conferred by the
parties. The court held:
                                                 
827
  BGHZ 96, 40 = NJW 1986, pp.1436 et seq.
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"Aus dem Schiedsspruch ist aber hinreichend deutlich zu entnehmen, daß das
Schiedsgericht nach Rechtsgrundsätzen und nicht nach Billigkeit entscheiden
wollte".828  (The award makes it sufficiently clear, however, that the
arbitration tribunal wanted to decide according to principles of law [sic!] and
not according to equity.)
From this it follows that a decision ex aequo et bono must be the recognisable
intention of the arbitrator and cannot be derived from the quality of the applied
rules of law alone.
VIII.3.5  Status quo under German law: Conclusion
Regarding the recognition of a-national law, in particular the UPICC and
general principles of law, the situation under German domestic arbitration law
is simply undecided. There are no court decisions clarifying the position
unequivocally and distinguishing the notions of equity from the application of
a-national rules of law.  There is no in-depth discussion in legal science.  The
matter is not in the centre of interest.  Therefore a position has to be developed
within German legal theory based on a modern conception of contract law.
                                                 
828
  BGH NJW 1986, p.1437.
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VIII.3.6. Comment and suggestion for a doctrine of international
commercial contract within the German legal system
Legal theory in Germany should develop a concept of international commercial
contract.  By defining the notion of international commercial contract, a-
national law can become the law governing the contract in certain instances
where domestic law does not cover the underlying questions, or, where it draws
exclusively on objectives which are typical for domestic constellations, but not
for international commercial relationships.  This can be achieved by drawing
on existing definitions contained in the CISG and in the UNCITRAL Model
law.
After all, on the domestic level of adjudication in commercial matters, German
law already provides an existing infrastructure for such developments; district
courts (Landgericht), are staffed with expert judges who are laymen,829  to sit
trials in so called "chambers for commercial matters", Kammern für
Handelssachen.830  These are specialised panels of judges (chambers), who
apply their special knowledge of commercial issues to decide the case
appropriately.831  This special competence is voluntary and applies on request
of the claimant, §96 GVG. Disregarding this competence does not give rise to
appeal.832
                                                 
829
  So called "Handelsrichter", commercial judges are appointed by the chamber of
commerce under §108 GVG for a period of four years.
830
 §93 GVG; (text in H. Thomas, and H. Putzo:   "Zivilprozeßordnung", 2003, pp. 1705
et seq.).
831
  Compare §§93-114 GVG.
832
 See H. Thomas, and H. Putzo: "Zivilprozeßordnung", 2003, No.1, §93 GVG.
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The definition of commercial matters in §95 GVG includes claims against
"Kaufleute", meaning "merchants", as well as matters arising out of cheques
and bankers drafts and matters involving competition law, stock exchange and
the transformation of enterprises (Umwandlungsgesetz).
This definition of commercial matters based on the term "Kaufmann"
(merchant or trader), is a peculiarity of German law that is decisive within the
discussion of a-national commercial law.  German law bases a whole
commercial code (HGB), on its definition of merchant which draws on the
person of the trader, the merchant himself and the nature of his business, rather
than on the nature of the transaction.  This justifies833 the operation of a so-
called "Sonderprivatrecht der Kaufleute", a special civil law for merchants in
Germany (along with Austria and Switzerland).  This situation plainly invites
the development of a specific legal environment for international commercial
matters.
The fact that the RC makes the law of a state the law governing the contract
absent choice of law, does not mean that any law by definition presupposes a
state legislator.  In order to develop a theoretical foundation for a "new lex
mercatoria, i.e. an appropriate body of law rules to govern international
commercial contracts, it is necessary to consider attributing a source of law
function to the UPICC and other a-national law including general principles of
law which are the "common laws" of the merchant community.  The traditional
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  i.e. under Art. 3 (1) GG, the right to equality under the constitution. It is accepted that
the special circumstances applicable to merchants, such as their special knowledge and
experience justify their subjection to different rules of private law, incorporated in the HGB,
the commercial code.  Classic examples are rules relating to offer and acceptance and
contractual rights relating to defective goods.
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catalogue of sources of law as set out by Canaris 834 needs to be supplemented
by another value incorporated by the UPICC.835
Perhaps this could be called a source of law sui generis and apply as lex
specialis for international merchants as "Sonderprivatrecht der internationalen
Kaufleute".
VIII.4.   Summary : Autonomous source of law function of a-national rules
of law
It follows from the discussion so far, particularly in the preceding section, that
it is not correct to deny the UPICC, the lex mercatoria, or general principles of
law, the quality of law.  There is enough evidence to suggest that these form a
recognised legal basis, at least for arbitral decisions and are handled with
sufficient certainty by arbitral tribunals.  Predictability should not be the
criterion, but persuasion, i.e. the convincing deduction of individual solutions
from the uniform international substantive contract law rules upon appropriate
legal reasoning.
                                                 
834
  See at VI.2. et seq. above C.-W. Canaris:  “Die Stellung der "UNIDROIT Principles"
und "Principles of European Contract Law" im System der Rechtsquellen”,  pp.5-31.
835
  Note in this context the remark made by Prof. Peter Mankowski in: “Rechtswahl für
Verträge des internationalen Wirtschaftsverkehrs.” RIW 1 (2003): pp.2-15, p.13 who states that
jointly discovering the lex mercatoria is highly attractive intellectually. This may certainly be
understood as describing his impression that over-ambitious academics use the research in this
field to promote themselves and to this end pursue openly a marketing strategy for the benefit
of both the lex mercatoria and themselves. This resentment is based on a misinterpretation of a
genuine attitude towards the promotion of a potentially emerging novel international legal
methodology.  This methodology will have to give new answers to some important questions
of international commercial law. Compare F. Blase: “Leaving the Shadow for the Test of
Practice - on the Future of the Principles of European Contract Law.” The Vindobona Journal
of International Commercial Law and Arbitration 3.1 (1999): pp.3-14, p. 13.
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It is not necessary, though, to attribute qualities to the lex mercatoria which
turn it into a "legal system", 836 or decide ultimately the relationship between
the lex mercatoria and the UPICC.837
In my view the term lex mercatoria is not meant to describe a precise set of
legal rules but rather describes a whole set of phenomena.  Lex is not only the
substantive but also the procedural rules including usages and practice.  It is a
general and unspecific descriptive term.  This does not diminish the value and
position of the UPICC.  They doubtlessly have the same qualities as the CISG
and should be recognised as legal rules to apply to contracts falling within their
scope.  The specific circumstances, which are set up by the international
trading community formed by the businesses and the bodies of self-governance
of certain branches, such as the trade associations based in London or
elsewhere, and international arbitration institutions such as the ICC, LCIA,
German arbitration institutions, the Vienna and Zurich Chambers of Commerce
etc; do provide enough authority to confer the quality of source of law
legitimately to the UPICC and general principles of law.
VIII.5.  CONCLUSION
Chapter Eight has demonstrated how arbitration awards based on a-national
contract law are dealt with in national legal systems.  It shows that they are in
fact normally upheld and hardly ever overturned, despite the lack of express
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  As Berger does; K.P. Berger: "The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria",
1999.
837
  Do they constitute the lex mercatoria or are they an aliud (P. Mankowski:
“Rechtswahl für Verträge des internationalen Wirtschaftsverkehrs.” RIW 1 (2003): pp.2-15,
p.14).
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provisions in virtually all European national arbitration laws and the strong
criticism expressed towards the use of a-national law in the conflict of laws
doctrine.838  The high degree of diligence in reaching arbitration decisions and
their acceptance by parties is strong evidence of the legitimacy of the use of a-
national uniform contract law, such as UPICC, as law governing the contract.
An important condition for this, however, is the development of a notion of
international commercial contract which has been neglected so far in legal
science.  A clear definition of this notion could provide the basis for the
application of UPICC as lex specialis.  This method has a strong doctrinal
foundation in German law with its specific infrastructure of law merchant in
both contract law and procedural law.  It also seems a possibility under English
law given the importance assigned to commercial matters and arguments by the
courts in the British legal tradition.
A need for the use of transnational law such as UPICC is clearly indicated by
the experience of contract negotiating and arbitration proceedings, showing
that irrational and atavistic motivations dominate choice of law decisions,
rather than purely economical factors such as foreseeable results.  This
observation supports the arguments set out in Chapters Two, Six, and Seven
regarding the need for uniform contract law.
                                                 




The thesis has identified three obstacles to the easy application of transnational
uniform contract law in national legal systems and has examined ways of
overcoming these using the examples of English and German contract law.
1. The first of these obstacles is to be found in current legal theory of contract
law (Part One).  The prevailing view in both countries maintains the theory of
unity of law and state and does not see the necessity and potential of unity of
law.  Unity or uniformity of laws is often understood as providing uniformity
of results upon its application and is also understood to be derived from, or
presuppose, a legislative power flowing from a centralised political force (such
as the European Union or the United Nations through their commissions),
weakening the sovereignty of nation states.  Therefore the term unity or
uniformity is often replaced by that of harmonisation, meaning the same, but
being disguised in this form, appearing as a pleasant metaphor.
Part One has proven (in Chapters One and Two), that both issues can be
resolved by reviewing these traditional positions and by considering more
specialised research results many of which are already part of established
modern contract doctrine.
The theory of unity of law and state cannot claim universal acceptance and is
not necessarily to be followed in a modern doctrine of international contract
law (Chapter One).  A review of the status and nature of the concept of contract
law in general shows that the arguments regarding legitimacy of transnational
373
law rules, which are normally used against the use of transnational uniform
law, are unfounded.  A pluralistic concept of legislative power in contract law
is an accepted contemporary standard, while the doctrine of unity of law and
state can be shown to be derived from the era of feudalism, and subsequently
an outdated and unduly limiting understanding of nation state and national law,
which links questions of territoriality and state sovereignty with that of
legislation.  This is not appropriate in the area of private law, especially
contract law.  Chapter One has proven that modern pluralistic democracies
have to review the underlying concepts of modern contract law.  It has proven
that due to the openness of contract doctrine, there is room for developing it in
such a way as to accommodate uniform contract law, such as the UPICC, as a
legitimate form of contract law.
Chapter Two defined uniform contract law as providing uniformity of sources
covering areas where the need for it is present.  This need promotes and
maintains the standard and the degree of such uniformity, not a central political
power.  Fears of loss of sovereignty are therefore unfounded with regard to
uniform contract law or its origin.   The evolution of this law is driven by its
protagonists such as arbitrators, merchants, lawyers and the state courts.
Chapter Two confirmed that there is no supervisory instance in state courts
needed to provide justification and identity to transnational uniform law.
Chapter Two explained that uniform law derives its justification from the need
for uniformity of contract law in international trade, not from values like
predictability and uniformity of results.
Both chapters provide an example of a modern methodology of international
contract law by carrying out reviews of existing concepts, which are often used
uncritically, thereby creating barriers against modern developments in
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international trade law and wrongly assuming adverse effects and difficulties in
existing domestic contract law.
These are the findings of Part One of the thesis relating to general contract
doctrine.
2.  Part Two of the thesis (Chapters Three, Four and Five), identified the
second barrier against applying uniform law in domestic legal systems; the
method of application by lawyers is guided by unhelpful habits of thought
leading to a shortfall of the potential of transnational contract law.
Objections against the drafting of individual rules and thereby the quality of the
law are often based on an inconsequent method of application as well as
preconceived understanding of doctrinal concepts.  Chapter Four identified an
instance of such an application method and explained how it can lead to
unfounded results; the user does not employ the same technique that he or she
would use in their own domestic legal system without realising this or
explaining why.  The user also does not apply an autonomous interpretation
technique but conceives of rules of the UPICC as isolated stand alone rules.
Generally, concepts are often superficially understood and efforts are not made
to integrate them into domestic law.  As an example, Chapters Four and Five
could prove that the concept of specific performance is not a general obstacle
to integrating UPICC into English law, and that the individual rule regulating
payment obligations in the UPICC (Art.7.2.1.) does not lead to an overly rigid
right to performance if appropriately applied.
Chapters Four and Five carried out an exemplary application of this rule in
English and German law and show ways in which this rule can be used in both
legal systems by applying established methods of interpretation and application
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of national law.  Different aspects in both systems have been identified as
providing the solution; under English law acceptance by the courts is the most
important condition, and a favourable environment for such an acceptance is
assumed (Chapter Four).  Under German law, UPICC rules can be applied to
international commercial contracts under the doctrine of lex specialis
regulating specialised issues and superseding the national contract rule. The
UPICC are also a valuable model for law reform of the existing law of
construction contracts (Chapter Five).
Part Two of the thesis has proven that individual rules of uniform contract law
such as the UPICC can be successfully applied within a context of national
contract law.
The method of applying UPICC carried out in Part Two of the thesis is an
extended autonomous interpretation; it includes recapitulating relevant historic
developments and reconsidering concepts in the light of European legal
history.  This is an important element of a novel methodology of international
contract law.
3.  The last part (Part Three), of the thesis examined the third obstacle to the
application of UPICC; their treatment in the conflict of laws.  The conservative
attitude in prevailing legal doctrine and legislation hinders the application of
UPICC because it creates insecurity as to whether decisions obtained by
relying on transnational uniform law will be upheld and be enforceable.
Other than Part Two, this part does not deal with the substantive law aspects of
the UPICC such as the content and quality of its rules, but rather, with the
procedural and conflict law aspects of its use.
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There are two important factors forming the status of UPICC in the conflict of
laws; the question of whether UPICC can be stipulated by international
contractors as the law governing the contract to the exclusion of national laws
implying its source of law function and the role of such uniform law in dispute
resolution, namely in arbitration.
Part Three has proven that the UPICC are a source of law sui generis (Chapters
Six and Seven).
The UPICC are regarded as sources of law in modern contract doctrine, and
many scholars have presented solutions for their integration into current legal
doctrine.  None of those are being agreed with by the prevailing views in either
English or German legal doctrine, and they have not resulted in express
legislation.
Chapter Six recapitulated the relevant doctrines and opinions brought forward
in connection with UPICC as lex contractus.  It especially highlights flaws in
current modern legislation regulating the conflict of laws and arbitration law.
This is forming a barrier against the use of UPICC by creating insecurity.
There are numerous examples of inconsistent legislation and contract doctrine
in England and Germany, and also in other European countries.
Chapter Seven explained suggestions in legal science of how integration of
uniform law into domestic conflict of laws could be achieved.  It demonstrates
the ways in which the UPICC are dealt with in arbitration and demonstrates
how established methods of using international uniform law in the conflict of
laws can be successfully employed.  It highlights common errors in the use of
such law, namely the habit of wrongly understanding these methods as conflict
rules (eg. the theory of gaps and the complementary use of domestic law).  It is
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important to use the autonomous method of interpretation consequently and
reconsider the theory of gaps.  If traditional ideas about the general superiority
of national contract law are dropped, these established methods of applying
uniform law can be successfully carried out.  They then respect the
international character of the norms and their subject matter, international
commercial contracts.
Chapter Eight particularly, demonstrated that the traditional positions contain
contradictions and are based on irrational preconceptions (such as the horro
ailieni and certain forms of protectionism in the legal profession), so that they
may not be upheld for much longer in a modern world of global trade.  Chapter
Eight also confirmed the motivations of international contractors in choice of
law negotiations, providing further evidence of the need for uniform contract
law.
Although arbitration case law cannot offer or replace a consistent scholarly
doctrine of source of law for transnational uniform contract law, it provides
evidence of its source of law function (Chapter Seven).  It is up to legal science
and the state courts to develop a consistent theory of uniform contract law.
The willingness to do so can be derived from English and German case law
since arbitration awards based on uniform law are generally upheld (Chapter
Eight).  However, neither legislation nor doctrine expressly acknowledge the
source of law function, and thereby deny the possibility of choosing UPICC as
the law governing the contract for international commercial contracts.  A novel
doctrine and method of uniform international contract law, therefore primarily
has to work out a definition of international commercial contract and move
away from static concepts of contract doctrine assigning unqualified priority to
national contract law, which is naturally not designed for international
dealings.
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4. The thesis introduces a novel doctrine of international contract law based on
an autonomous method of application of rules of transnational uniform contract
law, such as the UPICC, extended by reviewing and recapitulating relevant
concepts and doctrines in general contract law, including their historic origins.
Under this doctrine the UPICC have a source of law function sui generis and
can be chosen as governing law of international commercial contracts.  They
apply as lex specialis in relation to domestic contract law, with the effect that
the national contract law is thereby generally excluded but will apply as a
complementary law where the uniform law leaves gaps.  The gaps arise on the
level of substantive uniform law and do not amount to further choice of law
effects like a conflict of law rule.  Uniform law rules as they are provided by
the UPICC provide better and easier solutions for international contract
disputes due to the uniformity of sources, the neutral status and the scholarly
high level of specialised drafting technique, forming one important aspect of
their source of law quality, the persuasive force (Part Two and Chapter Six and
Seven).
This method also has to be applied to international conventions such as CISG
and other Model Laws, and also to international Treaties affecting private law,
such as Double Taxation Treaties and certain EU legislation.
